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This thesis argues that the doctrine, organization, equipment and training of 
armies must shift to the conduct of Unconventional War (UW). This shift is required 
because a change has taken place in the nature of war. Different theories attempting to 
understand and find ways to cope with this change have reached the same conclusion: 
armies have become inefficient in the conduct of a “new way of war.” Of the various 
theories that have evolved to explain this shift, this thesis adopts the Generational Change 
Theory, which appeared in an article in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989.  This Theory 
refers to the “new way of war” as Fourth Generation War (4GW).  While all branches of 
the military, including the Air Force and the Navy, are affected by 4GW, this thesis 
restricts itself to examining the impact of 4GW on the Army. In this examination, it is 
inevitable that references are made to the political and social aspects of war. That is 
natural because the military does not operate in a vacuum or void where it is the only 
entity affected and involved in the conduct of war.  
Armies at present are geared to fight the earlier generation of attrition and 
maneuver wars and hence find success evading them on the 4GW battlefield.  However, 
fighting in the 4GW environment with an army structured for earlier generations of 
warfare results in military dysfunction. The thesis statement is: Infantry based armies 
practicing UW are essential for the 4GW battlefield. In effect, this thesis argues for the 
conventionalization of Unconventional Warfare (UW).   
The thesis has two hypotheses. Hypothesis One states that heavy armor/artillery 
based armies should give way to infantry based armies. Hypothesis Two states that the 
military doctrine of these infantry based armies should be based on UW.  
Chapter II explains and amplifies 4GW. Chapter III examines the relationship 
between terrorism and 4GW, and the moral and ethical issues of 4GW that are at cross- 
purposes to conventional war. Chapter IV studies the impact of 4GW on the Principles of 
War and suggests how these principles should evolve to be effectively utilized in 4GW. 
Chapter V examines whether Special Forces (SF) are the panacea for 4GW.  
Chapter VI details the organizational aspects of SF, including their limitations. Chapter  
 vi
VII looks at the changes required in the Army to fight in a 4GW environment, including 
changes in doctrine, organization, equipment and training. Chapter VIII provides 
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I. A PARADIGM FOR CHANGE 
God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the 
courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the 
difference.  
Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) 
 
War and society have a timeless relation. By its very nature, society precedes war 
because society is essential before war can take place. Individual human beings coalesce 
to create a society. The word “individual” implies having a distinct character. When 
living beings exist in proximity with each other, at some stage they come into conflict 
because of the imperative of survival. Survival demands that one living being procure the 
essentials of survival rather than the other. The best of food and shelter are required to 
become the fittest and to survive. They are also required to beget the best and strongest of 
offspring who will continue to get the best of food and shelter, to perpetuate the race 
(Bates, p. 24). If there is a paucity of resources for comfortably surviving, conflict arises 
in the competition to get the best (Keegan, 1993, pp. 25-26). In line with Darwin’s theory 
of survival of the fittest, this conflict started when the first life forms evolved, carried on 
to primeval humans, and continues to this day. 
Conflict between two individual human beings can be defined in many ways: 
“match,” “joust,” “duel,” “competition,” “brawl,” “scrap” and so on. When winning is a 
matter of life or death, there is an imperative to increase strength. The strength of an 
individual is limited but can always be overcome by superior numbers. When individuals 
are joined by their kith and kin, neighbors, or supporters, in other words by other 
constituents of their society, the conflict widens in scope and involves a large number of 
people. A large number of people in conflict arrayed in two opposing and separate camps 
is “War.” War is therefore inevitable as long as humans exist. All societies that desire 
sovereignty and progress must be prepared for war.  The social structures that constitute 
society evolve and change depending upon the ability to generate wealth, the evolution of 
technology, the increase of knowledge and a number of other factors, which are beyond 
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the scope of this thesis. Evolution is a ceaseless process and throughout the history of 
time, society has undergone and undergoes gradual changes (Bates, p. 22). 
Armies are established by societies for the furtherance of two basic interests: to 
protect what they value and to gain what is required for the furtherance of their interests. 
A society assigns a mission to its army and the mission is directed by the interests of the 
society. The army, through its own experience and the learned experience of others, 
creates a way (doctrine) to fulfill that mission. The army then asks society to provide the 
material means (manpower, weapons, equipment) to operate per this doctrine. Once these 
requirements are met, armies evolve the organizations, strategy, operational art and 
tactics needed to fulfill their mission. This evolution impacts the way war takes place. As 
society evolves, for better or worse, so does war. There are a number of theories that 





Table 1. Some Theories of the Evolution of Warfare 
 
Regardless of individual proponents and theories, the ultimate hypothesis is that 
the nature of warfare has changed to the extent that traditional military theories and the 
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organizations built to implement them are dysfunctional in dealing with this change. The 
theorists reason that there are dramatic changes sweeping through the world, the foremost 
of which is globalization. These changes have been brought about by technology as well 
as increases in population. Technology makes the world a smaller place by making 
worldwide travel and communication easier, cheaper and faster. Increases in population 
also make the world a smaller place. This is illustrated by the simple analogy that three 
people inside a restricted space will be closer to each other than two people in the same 
space. Changes such as globalization and urbanization are leading to changes in society, 
which directly impact the causes of war as well as the “way of war.” The new ways of 
war are at variance with the conventional concepts of war upon which armies have 
historically waged and regulated battle. 
This has resulted in a state where conventional armies appear to be out of 
synchronization with reality. This thesis begins with the premise that this departure from 
reality is a fact, and goes on to suggest how this state could be rectified by defining the 
paradigm upon which the effectiveness of the Army within this environment could be 
based and improved. 
This thesis is not an exposition of any specific theory. Each theory has something 
of consequence to contribute and their ultimate conclusion is common. However, the 
thesis requires one base theory to define the nature of the “new way of war.” For this 
purpose, the thesis is centered on the theory of “generational” shifts in warfare as 
explained by William Lind and his co-authors in their seminal article on Fourth 
Generation War which came out in 1989, titled, The Changing Face of War: into the 
Fourth Generation. This theory was used because it best lends itself to discussion of the 
changing face of war from the strategic to the tactical level. Wherever Lind’s theory falls 
short, relevant points from other theories have been incorporated to amplify 4GW. 
A generational shift alludes to the change that takes place in line with the changes 
in the environment and technology and which makes hitherto followed practices 
outmoded. Generational changes happen over time, through the efforts of “practical 
people solv[ing] specific problems related to their fights against much more powerful 
enemies” (Hammes, 2004, p. 3). While practical people usher in a new generation, others 
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stick to the older generation for reasons that are covered later in the thesis. Their 
persistence with the old initiates a downward spiral in their ability to wage war 
efficiently. This is because their doctrine, organization, equipment, strategy, operational 
art and tactics belong to a previous generation of opponents and are inappropriate to the 
present generation. 
This thesis begins with the premise that 4GW is here. An indicator of this change 
is the fact that conventional armies in the present age, which are organized and trained to 
fight in environments of previous generations of war, are often frustrated in achieving 
their goals in 4GW. They find it difficult to effectively win wars utilizing the methods 
and determinants of a state’s military power which were used successfully in the past.  
 
A. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY 
 This thesis fulfills its purpose in the following manner: first, a case is made 
explaining why the traditional and conventional means of warfighting based upon 
firepower are loosing their effectiveness on the 4GW battlefield. Second, the thesis 
identifies what is required to make armies more effective against enemies who adopt 
4GW methods. 
 In Chapter II, the thesis explains 4GW to the reader because it is an amorphous 
concept, which has lent itself to subtle changes in interpretation since it was first 
elucidated in 1989. The changes come about as new forms of 4GW methods evolve, other 
thinkers ponder the emerging trends in war and events unfold in ongoing 4GW conflicts, 
especially in context of the terrorism content of 4GW.  This is examined in Chapter III, 
which also covers moral and ethical issues related to 4GW. 
4GW requires that we re-examine all the things that impact how we have 
traditionally made war. Of prime importance in this context are the Principles of War. 
Chapter IV studies the impact of 4GW on the Principles of War. It suggests how the 
Principles of War should be interpreted and developed to enable the Army to utilize them 
to effect in 4GW. 
Special Forces (SF) are best structured to fight on the 4GW battlefield. Their 
performance in the First Gulf War and in Afghanistan indicates their importance in 
unconventional applications.  Chapter V studies the attributes of SF that make them the 
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ideal fighting forces against 4GW enemies. Chapter VI examines the limitations of trying 
to combat 4GW using only SF. Chapter VII looks at the changes required in doctrine, 
organization, equipment and training for configuring the army to fight effectively in 
4GW. Chapter VIII concludes the thesis and provides recommendations for successfully 
charting a course for the future. In line with the second hypothesis, I will explain that we 
need to evolve our concept of war so that what has previously been labeled “UW” 
becomes the normal way of war. In other words, the unconventional must become the 
conventional. 
This thesis is based primarily on an analysis of secondary sources. These include 
works by military analysts in books, professional journals and other publications, 
including websites concerned with this subject. The primary sources used include 
interaction with instructors and students at the Naval Postgraduate School, an interview 
with Colonel Anthony Wood, USMC (Ret.), Director of Applied Research, Collaborative 
Agent Design Research Center, California Polytechnic State University, and my personal 
experience in counter-insurgency in India. 
 
B. THESIS STATEMENT  
Infantry-based armies practicing unconventional warfare are essential for the 
4GW battlefield. 
1. Hypothesis One 
The 4GW battlefield imposes conditions for which infantry-based armies using 
UW are the most suitable fighting force. 
The nature of sensors, air power, precision weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction negate large-scale conventional wars between nation states. In this milieu, 
heavy armor, artillery or other firepower-based armies are not the more efficient means of 
fighting. Armies need to be centered on infantry using the tenets of UW. 
2. Hypothesis Two    
We must structure conventional armies to fight unconventionally in the 4GW 
environment. 
The key aspect of Hypothesis One is that light infantry utilizing UW is best suited 
for 4GW. Special Forces are the best light infantry trained in UW. Hence, the obvious 
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optimum solution is to increase the size of SF. However, there is a limit to which SF can 
be increased because specialized organizations can lose the qualities that make them truly 
special after they attain a particular size or if overused. Therefore, the answer lies in 
making the conventional army more “SF-like.” In other words, in the Fourth Generation, 
what has hitherto been UW must become the conventional. 
 
C. FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
The nature of 4GW has similarities with how war has been fought at varying 
times in history. For the past 350 years or so, war has progressed in a particular manner, 
which is erroneously understood as the only form of “war.” As society progressed, so did 
armies, utilizing the spin-offs of the industrial and technological ages. Armies learn from 
the hard experience of war. They arm themselves with the instruments of war after 
having convinced their political masters of the need for particular instruments or when 
adverse performance drives home the imperative of change. 
Progressive change, therefore, is slow and may entail temporary periods of 
inactivity. Either periods of relative peace make governments complacent or realities of 
governance dictate that scarce resources be diverted into other sectors of human endeavor 
or necessity. As a result, long lead times are required to field appropriate military 
organizations, weapons and equipment. When the head of the state was an absolute 
monarch, involved both in war and governance, he could usher in changes in the military 
with short lead times. The same can happen in modern times if the head is a dictator, or 
the regime is totalitarian (witness the swift German rearmament between the world wars). 
Prior to the industrial age, major changes in weapons and equipment did not require long 
lead times, as the weapons and equipment were relatively inexpensive and did not 
involve such large investments that a change was financially impossible, if not 
impractical. However, at present, any change becomes extremely expensive because it 
means making huge investments redundant. For example, if billions of dollars were 
invested in a new aircraft, it is imperative that the aircraft be used for its complete life 
span. If its use is no longer appropriate, this large investment will still need to be utilized 
rather than wasted. 
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Not only will it be utilized, but also, the complete gamut of things which support 
its employment, such as doctrine, strategy and tactics, will continue to be followed. This 
is akin to the difficulty that a factory would face if it had to switch over to the production 
of a totally different product. It would need new assembly lines and machines, new 
workers, new managers, new doctrine and a new culture. Such straightjackets of 
contemporary bureaucratic reality ensure situations where the armed forces find 
themselves incapable of operating optimally whenever a change takes place in war. This 
is the situation at present with respect to the transformation of war in the shape of 4GW. 
Armies are bureaucracies mired in inertia, both physical and mental, which makes it 
difficult for them to usher in change. 
This means that armies at present are organized and trained to fight wars in a 
manner that is becoming obsolete. The way today’s armies fight wars in an environment 
where they are dysfunctional results in a wasteful use of resources and prolonged wars. If 
victory is achieved, it is at a disproportionate cost and more a result of wearing out the 
enemy. This is not an efficient way to wage war against 4GW opponents, whose nature, 
described in the next chapter, is such that they have greater lasting capacity. Weaker 
opponents have learned the imperative of perseverance through trial and error. It has been 
stated that copies of the article “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” 
by Lind, et al., have been found inside the caves at Tora Bora in Afghanistan. If this is 
true, it shows that 4GW fighters have paid attention to their own as well as their enemy’s 
weaknesses. They have figured out that the methods of war that necessity has forced 
upon them are successful, and this motivates them to hedge all their bets on 4GW. 
Conventional armies fighting enemies who utilize 4GW are perplexed to see that 
their opponents spend proportionately a far lesser amount of money to wage war. If a 
state cannot fight 4GW enemies with economies of scale, eventually the chance is great 
that it will not be able to bear the human and economic cost of war. 
The Navy and the Air Force have always been instruments to support land forces 
and help ensure success. Regardless of the theories of Giulio Douhet or Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, the final determinant of victory is “boots on the ground.” This is all the more true 
when the scope of technology is reduced on the battlefield. 4GW opponents attempt to 
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reduce the technological and quantitative superiority of a foe by a change of strategy and 
tactics in which they use unconventional and asymmetric means to wage war. In waging 
this war, they use the one renewable source of strength that most of the world, and 
especially weaker enemies, have in plenty: manpower. It is inevitable that in these 
circumstances, land forces in the shape of the Army assume greater importance in the 
prosecution of 4GW. 
 
D. OUTLINE OF THE INDIVIDUAL CHAPTERS 
1. Chapter II:  4GW - The Shape of Transformed War 
This chapter examines the generations of warfare as defined by Lind and his co- 
authors and elaborated upon by Hammes (2004). The explanations by these two 
proponents of the generational change in war are amplified in order to lay the basis for 
the balance of the thesis. This is essential as 4GW is an abstract war. It involves the 
interplay of those elements and determinants of power, which are not associated with the 
traditional ideas of war. 
2. Chapter III: 4GW, Terrorism and Ethics 
4GW presents a number of issues. The primary and most obvious is the 
relationship between terrorism and 4GW. Are they the same or different? A second issue 
is the ethical dilemma confronting conventional armies when they encounter situations 
that are ethically at cross-purposes to their ethos and training. This chapter attempts to 
clarify these issues.  
3. Chapter IV: 4GW and the Principles of War 
4GW requires that all armies analyze all the things that impact how they have 
traditionally made war. Of prime importance in this context are the Principles of War. 
This chapter examines the impact of 4GW on the Principles of War. It determines 
whether the Principles of War need any additions, subtractions or modifications in view 
of the changing scenario consequent to the onset of 4GW. 
4. Chapter V: Special Forces (SF) as the Panacea for 4GW 
SF are the best structured to fight on the 4GW battlefield. Their performance in 
the First Gulf War and in Afghanistan indicated their importance in unconventional 
applications.  This  chapter  looks  at  the  changes  required  in the Army to fight in a 4GW  
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environment, including changes in doctrine, organization, equipment and training. The 
chapter concludes that if we increase the size of the SF, we will achieve our objective to 
fight on the 4GW battlefield. 
5. Chapter VI: When Special is No Longer Special 
The very definition of “special” implies that it refers to something unique. When 
something unique becomes commonplace it is no longer “special.” Whenever there is a 
move to expand special or elite forces, there is a corresponding dilution of the qualities 
which made the force special or elite. This chapter delves into organizational theory and 
history to explore this issue and determine whether increasing the size of the SF is the 
panacea to combat 4GW.  
6.  Chapter VII:  Doctrine, Organization, Equipment and Training for 
4GW 
This chapter is a heuristic attempt to specify the manner in which war should be 
conducted by the army on the 4GW battlefield. This involves framing a doctrine and 
identifying the requirements as far as organization, equipment and training are concerned. 
7. Chapter VIII: Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter concludes the thesis and provides recommendations for successfully 
charting a course for the future. This chapter concludes that our concept of war needs to 
evolve so that what has previously been labeled “unconventional war” becomes the 
normal or rather the conventional way of war. In other words, the unconventional must 
become the conventional. 
  
E. DEFINITIONS 
 Definitions relevant to the thesis are given below.  
1. War  
There are a number of definitions of war. Some relevant definitions are given below. 
a. Actual, intentional and widespread conflict between armed 
communities (Orend, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). 
b. The continuation of policy by other means  (Clausewitz,  1832,    
p. 87).  
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c. Armed conflict between two or more governments or states 
(Microsoft Encarta). 
d. State of conflict, generally armed, between two or more entities. 
Characterized by intentional violence on the part of large bodies of individuals organized 
and trained for that purpose (Britannica Concise Encyclopedia). 
e. Armed conflict between states or nations (international war), or 
between factions within a state (civil war), prosecuted by force and having the purpose of 
compelling the defeated side to do the will of the victor (The Columbia Encyclopedia). 
f. A widespread armed conflict between two entities that are either 
sovereign or seek sovereignty and which have differences over political interests or 
ideology (author’s definition). 
2. Types of War 
a. Conventional War 
Direct military combat or the threat of such combat between the organized 
professional establishments of states. It normally involves large scale sustained combat 
operations to achieve national interests, objectives, or to protect national interests 
(Adams, 2001, xviii). 
b. Unconventional War  
Warfare not following traditional theory and conventions of war. 
Traditional theory is based upon war between uniformed armies of nation states. 
Traditional conventions of war are those which are ratified by international treaties, 
humanitarian laws and ethical military tradition (author’s definition).  
c. Guerrilla War  
An unconventional warfare activity involving military and paramilitary 
operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in enemy held or 
hostile territory. The primary tactics of guerrilla forces are raids and ambushes (Adams, 
2001, p. xix).  
d. Small Wars 
All campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of 
regular troops [it ] has no connection with the scale on which a campaign may be carried 
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out; it denote[s] in default of a better [term] operations of a regular army against 
irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular forces (Callwell, 1996, p. 21). 
e. Asymmetric War  
War that embodies action concepts that leverage unpredictability, 
indirectness and unorthodoxy and recognizes possible victory of the weak over the strong 
(Lambakis, 2004).  
f. Proxy war 
A war conducted between nations utilizing non-state players to fight on 
their behalf. At least one of them employs a third party to fight on its behalf. The extent 
and type of support provided by the states involved in proxy war will vary, but financial 
and logistic support is normally always provided (Indian Army Doctrine, 2004).  
g. Insurgency 
An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted 
government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (Adams, 2001, p. xx). 
h. Cyberwar  
Refers to conducting information related military operations. It means 
destroying or disrupting information and communication systems while protecting your 
own. It includes aspects of C3I, intelligence, communications and Identification Friend or 
Foe (IFF). The aim of cyberwar is to “turn the balance of information and knowledge in 
ones favor” (Arquilla & Rondfeldt, 1997). 
i. Netwar 
An emerging mode of information related conflict (and crime) at a societal 
level, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization, doctrine, strategy and 
communication. These protagonists generally consist of dispersed, often quite small 
groups communicating, coordinating and acting in an internetted manner without precise 
leadership or headquarters. At the grand level, netwar aims to disrupt damage or modify 






3. Non State Warriors 
a. Terrorist 
A person disguised as a civilian who uses actual or threatened spectacular 
violence to create an atmosphere of intimidation for achieving political objectives 
(author’s definition). 
b. Militant 
[A person] engaged in aggressive and combative activities for the service 
of a cause (freedictionary.com). 
c. Insurgent 
A person who is the member of an irregular armed force that is in an 
armed rebellion against the constituted authority (Hanle, 1987, p. 115). 
d. Guerrilla  
(1) A member of an irregular military force fighting small-scale, 
limited actions, in concert with an overall political-military strategy against conventional 
military forces (Encyclopedia Britannica).  
(2) One who carries, on or assists in carrying on, irregular warfare; 
especially a member of an independent band engaged in predatory excursions in wartime 
(Hanle, 1987, p. 115).  
4. State Warriors 
a. Conventional Military  
The organized armed forces of a state trained and equipped to fight a 
conventional war (author’s definition). 
b. Special Operations Forces 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are small, elite military units with 
special training and equipment that can infiltrate into hostile territory through land, sea, 
or air to conduct a variety of operations, many of them classified (Feickert, 2004). 
c. Elite Forces 
Organized military forces which have and nurture higher standards of 
morale, motivation, endurance and training and which have built up a reputation for 
bravura and success. They operate in comparatively smaller groups to carry out special or 
unusual high-risk missions (Cohen, 1978).  
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5. Operations 
a. Clandestine Operation 
 An operation sponsored or conducted by government departments or 
agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.  A clandestine operation 
differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation 
rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor.  In special operations, an 
activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational 
considerations and intelligence-related activities (Adams, 2001, p. xvii). 
b. Covert Operation  
 An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of 
or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.  A covert operation differs from a clandestine 
operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor rather 
than on concealment of the operation (Adams, 2001, p. xviii). 
c. Special Operation   
Operations conducted by specially organized, trained and equipped 
military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic and 
psychological objectives by unconventional military means (Adams, 2001, p. xxv). 
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II. GENERATIONS OF WARFARE 
War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to 
the given case.  
    --Carl Von Clausewitz (1832, p. 89) 
  
A. UNDERSTANDING WAR 
To understand 4GW, there is a need to have a detailed look at war. This is 
required to understand what causes war, what is its nature, what it involves and the 
dynamics of its evolution.  
1. The Social Causes of War  
Conflict is as old as the existence of man. Whereas the aim of conflict in 
primordial times was part of the struggle for survival of the fittest, later it became a fight 
to keep within one’s possession a piece of real estate from which resources required for 
human existence could be extracted. As Johnson (1982) says, “[It is] the universal fact of 
life that all men want more out of their environment than they can possibly get” (p.17). 
Initially, the resources were food and then shelter. As man evolved beyond the hunter–
gatherer phase and started constructing permanent shelters and practicing agriculture, the 
retention and protection of land acquired new meaning. This became more important as 
land became the source of mineral wealth which led to the development of industrial and 
social infrastructures, both of which are important in making man’s material life 
comfortable. As the size of groups expanded, so did their requirement for space and 
resources.  This led to the formation of groups, leading to clashes with rival groups and 
evolution towards what would be called war. War needs direction and the dominant 
warriors became leaders. This was in line with other needs of society because “society is 
a form of order imposed by some men, on others, and maintained by coercion” (Johnson, 
1982, p. 17).  Leaders need an organization to follow their directions, which leads to the 
formation of political communities. This leads to one of the definitions of war given in 
Chapter I: war is “an actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political 
communities.”  
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2. The Nature of War 
Wars normally take place between two opposing sides. Three sides 
simultaneously fighting with each other, as happened in China in the 1930s when the 
Nationalists, Communists and Japanese fought each other, is an exception. Even if three 
enemies are fighting with each other they will always coalesce into two groups for short 
periods of time until one side is bested. If two victorious allies came together only to 
defeat the third, the two victors may subsequently have differences and become 
antagonists. The Second World War is an example where the communist Soviet Union 
siding with the capitalist Allies was only a marriage of convenience against the common 
fascist enemy. As soon as the Germans were defeated, the communists and the capitalists 
were back at each other’s throats.  
The nature of war is therefore a state of conflict between two or more political 
systems or entities, arising and prosecuted to fulfill the vital interests of the entities. A 
war may be fought internally between rival political factions (intra state) or against an 
external enemy (inter state). In all cases, war involves actual or threatened violence 
against the other person or entity. The violence needs to be extreme to impose the kind of 
deterrence required to break the will to continue to fight. The most extreme violence is 
death. The prosecution of war therefore means taking measures to cause or threaten to 
cause the physical destruction or near physical destruction of opponents. This has 
resulted in the development of weapons designed to make killing more efficient. Starting 
with teeth, sticks and stones, man has evolved to thermonuclear weapons, attaining 
greater efficiency at each stage. 
3. The Evolution of War 
Progressively throughout history, efforts have been made to build and improve the 
weapons to wage war. The development of weapons has led to the creation of 
organizations to best utilize the weapons. For example, the pike, musket, lance, grenade, 
artillery gun and tank have at various times impacted organizations, changing their 
shapes so that the new weapon could be used to effect. Organizations have in turn 
depended on technology to produce better weapons. Whenever weapons and 
organizations reached a peak, especially between evenly matched antagonists, one side 
has sought to best the other by coming up with better ideas to synergize weapons, 
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equipment and organizations. If two sides have similar weapons, then the side with the 
better ideas for using them wins. This has led to the search for and the evolution of 
various doctrines and strategies for war. War is constantly evolving and the technology, 
doctrine, tactics and training are constantly upgraded by the entities engaged in waging 
war. Since the peace of Westphalia in 1648, these entities have been nation-states.  
 
B. THE GENERATIONS    
If we delve too far back into history to understand war, we are apt to lose track of 
our aim, which is to find a paradigm to best conduct war in the present age.  There has to 
be a logical and appropriate point from which we can takeoff in the search for an 
effective and economic means to wage war.  The “generations” theory of war is suitable 
for achieving this purpose as it starts from the peace of Westphalia, a point of time when 
the trinity of sovereign government, politically empowered people and armed forces 
dependent on them for direction came into being. We can then see how war reached the 
stage of 4GW, a stage where in comparison to earlier generations, there is the greatest 
dispersion, decreased logistics, no mass, more maneuver, no distinct war or peace, no 
frontline, no civil-military distinction and a battlefield which is extremely non-linear. 
 This was how 4GW was initially defined. The start point is therefore from the 
benchmark on the subject of generations from the Peace of Westphalia and the formation 
of the State, which in spite of the widespread extent of globalization is still the dominant 
form of organization of political communities in the world. This thesis considers the 
evolution of war in terms of “generations” as explained by Lind, et al., (1989). They 
defined the generations as given below. 
1. First Generation (Classical Nation-State War) 
First Generation warfare emerged from the mid 17th century onwards; it was 
classical nation state war, which culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. It stressed on 
reliance on manpower and was based on the use of firearms, conscript armies and rigid 
drills to achieve massed firepower, which at that time had restricted ranges. It was linear 
in nature because linearity enabled maximum volume of fire to be brought to bear on the 
enemy in an essentially disciplined and linear battlefield. The naval “broadside” was an 
extension of this concept to warfare at sea. Since the offense was linear, so was the 
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defense. In defense, there was a concept of holding a linear “front line.” The front line 
and its fortified linear defenses were also corollaries of the “nation-state,” which had 
sanctified borders, and to the detriment of maneuver, an obsession with protecting every 
inch of those borders.  This generation created a culture of “order” in the military to an 
extent that was last seen in the Roman legions. While its strategy was based upon mass, 
its tactics were centered on deployments in line and column, which maximized firepower. 
There was no operational art evidenced in this generation, though exceptional military 
leaders like Napoleon Bonaparte did practice it (Grelson, 1992; Luvaas, 1999, p. 127). 
The absence of operational art in the First generation is also evident from the writings of 
Clausewitz, an exponent of the art of war whose profound views were rooted in the First 
Generation. He identified a distinction only between tactics and strategy. He said that 
“tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of 











Figure 1.   Linear First Generation Battlefield 
 
 
2. Second Generation (Industrial Wars of Attrition) 
Second Generation warfare arose in response to the new technologies of the 19th 
century. These technologies significantly increased the volume of direct fire with 
machineguns and efficient rifles and also introduced greatly destructive indirect fire by 
artillery. This technological change brought about an emphasis on firepower.  It was 
classic attrition warfare where the aim was to wipe the enemy off a piece of ground in 
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order to occupy it.  It was a case of the First Generation manpower-heavy armies 
graduating up the rung of evolution.  The battlefield remained linear, though in 
comparison to the First Generation, the width of the zone in which war was fought 
increased because of increased ranges of weapons, mainly artillery, and the reach of 
nascent airpower. Trying to break through thick fortified zones led to extreme attrition 
and the classic grinding stalemates of World War I.  It was the culmination of the 
philosophies of Clausewitz and Jomini. Strategy lay in mobilization and movement of 
bigger armies than that of the enemy. This generation saw the crystallization of the 
concept of operational art, which was identified by Jomini as Grand Tactics and which he 
described as “the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles, as well as 
during their progress” (1838, p. 178). The Second Generation of war saw attempts to 
move huge armies to outflank the enemy, facilitated by technologies such as railways and 
the telegraph. Tactics required lesser stress than in the First Generation and could be 





Figure 2.   Linear Second Generation Battlefield with Indirect Fires 
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3. Third Generation (Maneuver War) 
Third Generation War evolved due to the need to find a way out of Second 
Generation stalemates. This evolution was a result of ideas such as the German “storm 
troop tactics” used late in World War I, which sought to break the stalemate on the 
Western Front. The obvious way was to concentrate resources at a focal point, make a 
breakthrough and then roll up the enemy from the rear or cut him off from support. This 
led to a realization of the advantage of maneuver. In this case, generational change was 
motivated not by technology, but by ideas. It was only two decades later that a 
technological innovation, the tank, gave the concept of maneuver greater impetus. The 
outcome was the concept of blitzkrieg, developed by the Germans as a form of maneuver 
to render the linear defenses of Second Generation armies useless. In maneuver warfare, 
the battlefield became non-linear, as witnessed by the German panzer spearheads 
breaking through across the Meuse in 1940 and later across the Bug in 1941. The same 
could be seen in Israeli armored columns cutting through Egyptian forces in the Sinai in 
1956 and 1967, the swift Indian leapfrog to Dacca in 1971, bypassing pockets of strong 
Pakistani resistance, and the U.S. armored spear-thrusts across Iraq in 1991 and 2003. 
Though all professional armies realize the value of maneuver war, Jominian traditions 
have been a constant hindrance to its full employment, which requires that “[T]he 
enemy’s army must be brought to battle and destroyed” (Jomini, 1996, p. viii). 
 
Figure 3.   Non-Linear Third Generation Battlefield of Maneuver War 
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4. Fourth Generation War (4GW)  
 4GW is an unconventional war, which can be called an “evolved form of 
insurgency” (Hammes, 2004, p. 208). 4GW is the antithesis of the traditional concept of 
war. In 4GW, the distinction between war and peace is blurred to the vanishing point.  It 
is non-linear to an extreme point wherein there are no definable battlefields or fronts. The 
distinction between “civilian” and “military” disappears. Actions occur concurrently 
throughout the space in which all participants’ function, including in their society. It is 
war where cultures can be in conflict. It uses a mix of political, social, military and 
economic means to defeat the enemy’s will to resist. It can be carried out by states and 
also by transnational or sub-national non-state organizations. This is a throwback to the 
pre-First Generation era where the monopoly of states over war had not been established. 
4GW draws upon the unconventional aspects of revolutionary guerrilla wars and old-
fashioned terrorism and transforms them by utilizing modernity. To its adherents, this 
imparts a better ability to communicate and disseminate instructions, ideas and 
perspectives than had they persisted with conventional approaches to military endeavors. 
Better means of communication enable wide dispersion and functioning in cells. In fact, 
of all the generations of war, 4GW exhibits the greatest dispersion, decreased dependence 
on centralized logistics, no mass targets and more maneuverability. The conduct of 4GW 
evidences no distinct period of war and peace, no frontline and no civil-military 
distinction. This makes it very different from the earlier generations and alien to 
conventional armies. There are short and small tactical engagements and no battles, 
though the war per se is prolonged. Non-linearity is so extreme that the battlefield 
encompasses the enemy’s whole society. The growing importance and use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum for military operations pushes non-linearity into another 
dimension and greater extremity. This push requires that the word “battlefield” be 
redefined as “battlespace.” The U.S Army defines “battlespace” as “Components of this 
space are determined by the maximum capabilities of friendly and enemy forces to 
acquire and dominate each other by fires and maneuver and in the electromagnetic 
spectrum” (TRADOC Pamphlet 5255). The non-linear targets include the population’s 
support of the war and the enemy’s culture.  4GW may also result in the phenomenon of 
trans-state organizations pursuing non-territorial ends. 
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As Wilcox and Wilson (2002) state, “In sum 4GW encompasses attempts to 
circumvent or undermine an opponent’s strengths while exploiting weaknesses, using 
methods that differ substantially from an opponent’s usual mode of operations.”  It is a 
mutation of insurgency where the nature of sanctuaries, allies and ideology are changed. 
These modern insurgents (4GW warriors) adopt not the traditional hierarchal structure or 
organization, but looser, networked structures. Their state sponsors cannot openly support 
them, therefore, they must take on a non-state character wherein the closest non-state 
allies they may find are organized transnational criminal syndicates or overzealous Non 
Governmental Organizations. 
 
Figure 4.   Fourth Generation Battlefield: Non-Linear to the Extreme 
 
C. AN ANALYSIS OF 4GW 
1. Social Characteristics of 4GW 
• A return to a world of cultures, not merely states, in conflict, 
manifested in the decline of the state and the rise of alternate, often 
cultural, primary loyalties all over the world, including in the Western 
world.  
• A decrease in harmony in society. Paradoxically, 4GW has greater 
success in open societies. The globalized world is its ideal environment. 
At the same time, 4GW promises to impede globalization, as societies 
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erect defensive barriers to protect themselves from attacks by Fourth 
Generation warriors. 
2. Political Characteristics of 4GW 
• The loss of the state's monopoly on war and on the first loyalty of 
its citizens gives a fillip to 4GW. At the same time, 4GW uses the 
responsibility that the state continues to have for its citizens to develop a 
strategy where, by making its citizens targets for terror, it can force the 
state to conform to a desired behavior. 
• The rise of non-state entities that command the primary loyalty of 
people based upon highlighted differences. These entities may be gangs, 
religions, races and ethnic groups within races, localities, tribes, business 
enterprises, and ideologies. The variety is almost limitless. 
• The predominant role of propaganda and psychological pressure is 
to change the minds of the political policy makers. Propaganda is directed 
at the target as well as those who can exert psychological pressure on the 
target. 
3. Military Characteristics of 4GW 
• A war waged by what appear to be irregular armies on one or both 
sides. The deployment of these armies can be independent of borders or 
political geography. 
• The primary target of military action is to defeat the will of the 
people and takeover control of their political system. 
• Terrorism is a favored tactic to defeat the will of the people. 
• For the weaker side, the preferred terrain for operations is the 
urban jungle. This complex terrain provides cover from the superior 
technology of one side, while also providing means of modern 
communication and access to media and instant audiences. It is ideally 
suited to 4GW. 
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• Military operations are small scale, preferably with higher 
spectacular value. The aim is to wear down the opponent rather than 
annihilate him or physically force his surrender.  
 
D. VARIATION FROM PREVIOUS GENERATIONS 
4GW has much in common with traditional low-intensity conflict in its classical 
forms of insurgency and guerrilla war. As in those small wars, the conflict is initiated by 
the weaker party through actions which can be termed “offensive.”  The difference lies in 
the manner in which 4GW opponents adapt those traditional concepts to present day 
conditions. These conditions are shaped by technology, globalization, religious 
fundamentalism and a shift in moral and ethical norms which brings legitimacy to certain 
issues previously considered restrictions on the conduct of war.  This amalgamation and 
metamorphosis produces novel ways of war for both the entity on the offensive and that 
on the defensive. The variations are outlined below. 
1. State and Non-State Distinction 
With the loss of the state’s monopoly on power and the right to make war, unlike 
previous generations, in 4GW, wars may be between states, or states versus non-states. 
The wars with the Barbary pirates waged by the U.S. from 1801 to 1816 are the closest 
example of a war with non-state actors in the period covered by the “generations.” 
However, in that example, the pirates did have acknowledged and known state sponsors 
who could be pressured to deny sanctuary to the pirates.  
2. Civil and Military Distinction 
There is no distinction between civil and military personnel. Civilians may form a 
large part of the 4GW “army” as seen in the Intifadas.  Civilians are not protected in the 
manner they have been in past wars, in theory at least if not in practice. This is inevitable 
as 4GW targets the mind and culture of the enemy in a manner which was not as 
important in earlier generations of war. In 4GW, the war takes place in inhabited areas 
and little effort is made to keep civilians out of the firing line.  In fact, the weaker side 
may make a deliberate attempt to use the populace as a shield, as evidenced in the war in 
Kosovo in 2000 (Matsumara, et al., 2001). The weaker side may also take deliberate 
action against civilians to force reaction by the organized uniformed military, e.g., by 
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firing upon their enemies from among crowds of apparently peaceful protestors. The 
resultant civilian casualties are thereafter exaggerated through the media to gain moral 
advantages.  
3. Greater Dispersion, Lesser Mass 
There is the greatest dispersion in 4GW compared to the earlier generations. The 
4GW opponent operates in greatly dispersed cells. In this manner, by not presenting mass 
as a target, the superior firepower of the stronger adversary can be avoided. The ability to 
operate in a much dispersed manner is aided by the growing urbanization of the world as 
well the information revolution, which enables command and control to be exercised 
from any part of the globe with nothing more than a commercially available cell or 
satellite phone. 
4. Logistics 
The 4GW opponent has a greatly decreased dependence on logistics. In this 
regard, 4GW warriors draw upon the unconventional aspects of revolutionary guerrilla 
wars where the people provide the logistics. The difference here is that 4GW warriors can 
infiltrate the opponent’s country, live among his people, and feed off them without the 
people even being aware of their presence. Globalization greatly aids this ability. The 
interconnectedness among people and countries makes infiltrating into a target society 
easier and the members of the infiltrated society do not become suspicious. 
5. Area of Conflict  
The battlefield is not defined. It can be located within a complete country or 
region or anywhere on the globe. This obviously means unlimited room for maneuver. 
The traditional Third Generation maneuver warfare of mechanized means becomes 
maneuver implying the ability to appear anywhere and adopt any means unfettered by 
legalities. This holds true for the terrain over which 4GW is fought. Rugged terrain, 
whether natural or manmade (cities), is the preferred area of operations in 4GW as it 
negates the maneuverability of armies dependent on mechanization for mobility. In such 
terrain, the greatest mobility is foot mobility, which is least affected by terrain, visibility 
or weather. 
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6. Declared War  
There is no distinct period of war and peace. A country may be ostensibly at 
peace but otherwise at war. There is no frontline. War takes place anywhere. There are 
short and small battles and prolonged wars. Casualties in individual engagements are 
comparatively small. It is the prolonged nature of the war that makes it expensive, both in 
terms of human as well as financial costs. Attacks are launched from within a defended 
area and progress outward in ripples.  Military and police actions get mixed up. This 
makes it prudent to hand over control to the military on the assumption that the police 
will not be able to stand up to military attacks, whereas the army will be able to handle 
police situations. The army using more force than required often results in an adverse 
effect on the successful prosecution of the war. 
7. Non-Linearity  
4GW tends to be extremely non-linear. Linearity can be understood in two 
different manners. The first and objective interpretation was previously explained; in 
4GW, physical linearity, as evidenced by two armies arrayed face-to-face, is much less 
evident than in Third Generation War. The second aspect of non-linearity relates to its 
subjective interpretation. This is best explained by Beyerchen (1992) who states that 
“‘non-linear’ indicates that the norm is what it negates.” To further amplify, in line with 
other words like “asymmetrical,” “unstable,” “irregular,” and “inconsistent,” the word 
“non-linear” too conveys that the “truth” or the correct thing resides in the original word. 
The non-linearity in 4GW therefore alludes to the change it brings to the truth (accepted 
conventions) of war. 
8. The Determinants of Victory 
In previous generations the determinant of victory was defeat of the enemy army 
on the battlefield or the utter destruction of his means of making war in the future. In 
4GW, whoever manages to wear down the will of the other side, even if he loses 
militarily, is the victor. The aim is no longer to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy, 
but to obtain maximum psychological effect from the casualties inflicted. Since the 
ultimate aim is to win the allegiance of the populace, there are no material spoils of 
victory for the victor in the shape of booty. Rather, the degree to which one side gains an 
advantage over the other is demonstrated by how much it can provide to the population in 
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terms of security or economic handouts. Winning the allegiance of the population is as 
important as winning the war. 
9. The Nature of the Enemy 
The nature of the “enemy” has blurred. Wars are launched against governments 
and not people. The Korean War was fought against the North Koreans even though the 
people were pawns in the hands of their communist rulers. The Second World War was 
fought against the Germans and the Japanese and not against Hitler or Tojo. In 4GW, war 
is fought against the rulers and not the people, even if the people support the ruler. This is 
because of the realization that even if the rulers are defeated, it is ultimately the will of 
the people that matters. For example, the war in Iraq was against Saddam Hussein, and is 
now against the Islamist terrorists, not the Iraqis, and the war in Afghanistan was against 
the al Qaeda and Taliban, not the Afghans. 
10. The Importance of the Media 
In the earlier generations, media was always used to report on what was 
happening rather than to shape the course of the war. More often than not, its focus was 
the home population and keeping them positively informed. In 4GW, the media is used to 
undermine the will of the opponent. The target may be the enemy decision makers or the 
enemy populations. Globalization and the information age mean that getting the message 
to the target audience is that much easier. Media management therefore is as much a 
tactic in 4GW as is terrorism. It is a more information-based conflict than all other 
generations of war. Since the aim is to target the mind of the enemy, information 
becomes naturally important. 
11. The Use of Terrorism 
Terrorism comes to the fore in 4GW as both a tactic and a sophisticated strategy. 
Because 4GW was born to offset the advantages of the stronger entity, it is natural that 
terrorism, which can paralyze the stronger entity, is a favored tactic in the doctrine of 
4GW. 
12. The Appearance of the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) 
Non-Governmental Organizations working across international borders have a 
growing impact on 4GW. By utilizing and manipulating NGOs, 4GW battles can be won. 
A well-known example is the use of NGOs to mobilize world public opinion during the 
 28
standoff between the Mexican government and the Zapatista movement at Chiapas in the 
period 1994-1998 (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001, pp. 171-199). Another form of NGO on 
the 4GW battlefield are the Private Military Enterprises (PMEs), increasingly being used 
to aid in the fight against the Fourth Generation enemy. Though ostensibly brought in to 
make up for reduced manpower in the military, they often have other utility in this new 
generation of war. They can be used to carry out those military actions in 4GW which the 
military will not undertake as yet, for reasons that will be elaborated upon in Chapter IV. 
The NGOs, by taking on a large number of the tasks traditionally associated with the 
state, are accelerating the effect of the non-state enemy and globalization in reducing the 
sovereign power of the state. 
 
E. 4GW: IS IT UNCONVENTIONAL WAR? 
Armies at present are geared to fight the Second or Third Generations of war 
against armies of other states. However, the majority of conflicts in the world at present 
take the form of 4GW. This results in inefficient use of resources and prolonged wars. If 
victory is achieved, it is at a disproportionate cost and more a result of wearing out the 
enemy than a display of excellence in the art of war. This is no different from attrition 
warfare, albeit greatly extended in the dimension of time. Also, it is not a very fruitful or 
imaginative conduct of war by the side that is not using 4GW methods. As the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, “The cost–benefit ratio is against us! Our 
cost is billions against the terrorists’ cost of millions” (War on Terror Memo, 2003). 
A comparison between the components and instruments of a conventional 
(presently Second or Third Generation) and Fourth Generation military force is given 
below to assist in comprehending how the components differ. 
The unconventional aspects of those adopting 4GW in comparison to a 
conventional entity such as a nation-state are presented below. 
1. Leadership 
The leadership of the conventional entity is provided through a visible 
government based on known norms such as a democracy, monarchy, dictatorship, etc. 
The leadership of the entity waging 4GW may be a façade for a sponsor state that denies 
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its involvement, an acephalous grouping of like-minded people or a single person thrust 
into a position of leadership through charisma.  
2. The Military 
The conventional military are the armed forces of the state, traditionally in the 
form of an army, navy and air force. They will have clear channels of command and 
control. These are operated using communication systems that utilize conventional 
technology. In fact, these are such powerful symbols of sovereignty that they are as 
essential as a flag, a national anthem or national holidays for a state to signal its 
sovereignty to the international community.  
As far as 4GW is concerned, depending on the complexion of the conflict, the 
military will be in the shape of terrorists, insurgents, militants, guerillas, etc., as well as 
all who support them directly or indirectly from within the population. They may not 
have a conventional command and control system and may just be cells linked informally 
into networks. These cells may use commercial means of communication, but will not be 
dependent upon them. Instead, they use social networks for communication. 
 
F. NAVIGATING THE INTERPRETATIONS 
The initial explanation of 4GW has varied among those who have studied it 
intently and attempted to understand it in light of global events. Such events include the 
Intifadas in Palestine, the al Qaeda brand of terrorism and the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. This is desirable because the article by Lind and his co-authors was intended to be 
heuristic and they did not have all the answers. They stated in their conclusion that “the 
purpose of this paper is to pose a question, not to answer it.” In fact, events since 1989 
have done more to further the understanding of 4GW than any theoretical follow-up 
could have done. 
Writings on the subject share common ideas, but also create confusion and 
dichotomies. The definitions of 4GW as given by a number of people over different 
periods of time are provided below. 
• 4GW is war that is widely dispersed and largely undefined. It has no 
distinct periods of war and peace. It is non-linear with no frontlines. There are no 
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“civilians” or “military.” Actions will occur concurrently throughout the participants’ 
depth. It is driven by technology as well as ideas (Lind, et al., 1989). 
• War by national, international, transnational and sub-national actors which 
strategically attempts to directly change the minds of enemy policymakers through the 
use of political, social, economic and military networks of the information age. 
Tactically, it is low intensity conflict mixed with techniques of earlier generations 
(Hammes, Sep 1994). 
• War which pits nations against non-national organizations and networks, 
including not only fundamentalist extremists, but ethnic groups, mafias and narco-
traffickers, etc. It has roots in guerrilla warfare, Leninist insurrection and old-fashioned 
terrorism and is rendered more effective by modern technologies, computers and mass 
communication (Gould and Spinney 2001). 
• Warfare in which at least one side uses non-traditional tactics and is 
composed of a non-governmental military force (McFedries, 2003). 
• Intelligence-driven stateless, state or state-supported warfare with possible 
interstate spillover, intertwined with transnational crime, which takes strength from 
religion/ideologies. It leads to a formless kind of war (Howard). 
• Warfare in which the state looses its monopoly on war. In 4GW, non-state 
entities and cultures are in conflict outside the bounds of international treaties and rules 
of war. It is akin to warfare before the rise of the nation state and hence present-day 
armed forces are unsuitable to fight it (Lind, 2004). 
• Warfare carried out by foes that prefer low-tech warfare, avoiding decisive 
engagements and leveraging addiction to technology, bureaucratic processes and western 
thinking (Wilson, Wilcox & Richards, 2004). 
• Warfare that aims to achieve a moral victory by undermining enemy 
strength (in opposition to direct attacks on the enemy strength), exploiting enemy 
weaknesses and using weapons and techniques that differ substantially from those used 
by  the opponents (Robb). 
• War in which the other side refuses to stand up and fight fair (Defense and 
the National Interest). 
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These definitions suffer from a few drawbacks. They convey the erroneous 
impression that 4GW methods can be applied only by weaker, low-technology 
antagonists against stronger and technologically advanced enemies. This impression is 
created because all the writers are Americans and they can only relate to U.S. experiences 
as a target of 4GW. All these experiences are clustered around the Global War on 
Terrorism, Afghanistan, Iraq, Taliban, al Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism. This is 
natural as the most recent and the most violent act has had the deepest impression on the 
mind of the writer as well as the reader. This shortcoming in analysis finds military 
theorists conveying the following: 
• 4GW is only practiced by non-state actors, 
• 4GW is only applicable by the weak, 
• 4GW is a method adopted by Islamic extremists, 
• The armies of states cannot utilize 4GW methods, 
• It is unethical and counterproductive and unfair to adopt 4GW methods. 
The originators of the Generations Theory did not intend to create these impressions, 
though in later years they too have tended to talk of 4GW as something that only the 
villains do. This is an inherently erroneous impression. The First to Third Generations 
have universal applicability. They also always implied that if side A progressed to the 
next generation of war, then it was in the interest of side B to also advance to the next 
generation if it was to avoid being outclassed in the field of battle. 
The Western lineage of the Generations Theory should not detract from its 
validity because innovations in war have been the product of the industrial/ technological 
age, which arose and flourished in the West. The rest of the world copied and followed 
the Western norms of war. 4GW, on the other hand, does not have its origin in the West 
as it evolved chiefly as a result of the application of minds by the weaker entity to 
counter the dominance of the Western armies. The roots of 4GW lay to some extent in 
the methods adopted by Mao to fight with Nationalist armies operating in the manner of 
Second Generation western armies; and by the Vietnamese operating against the French 
and Americans who, by extensive use of air mobility, were trying to apply Third 
Generation concepts to fight what were in their estimation crude Second Generation 
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enemies. Though the roots of 4GW are not Western, we should bear in mind examples 
from earlier generations indicating that a particular generation of war is better fought by 
the methods of its own generation or of the next generation. 4GW thus can best be 
countered by 4GW itself. If cultural compulsions prevent us from adapting to 4GW 
conditions, then it would be better to find a Fifth Generation rather than attempt to fight 
4GW with Second or Third Generation methods. In sum, 4GW, whose essence goes back 
to Sun Tzu (use the strength of the stronger against him), should have as much 
applicability in the West as the earlier Western generations had in the East. 
 4GW is inherently an unconventional way of war. If it has aspects that make war 
more effective in the current world (predominantly urban) environment, then advanced 
armies will do well to study all its aspects. They could very well adopt those aspects to 
make their way of war more contemporary and efficient.  
The increasing amount of literature about 4GW tends to focus more on its 
politico-social character. This is all very well because 4GW is steeped in aspects which 
frequently make it cross the divide between purely military to political/social/police 
operations. However, military professionals analyzing 4GW may find solutions to 
counter 4GW foes that are more in the realm of politico-social actions. The military 
would do well to be aware of the politico-social aspects of 4GW, but they should not 
loose sight of the fact that their endeavor should be to find military ways to counter the 
military actions of 4GW foes, rather than looking at solutions which are not purely their 
field.  All generations of war require a synergy between the resources of the state. 4GW, 
however, requires such synergy to a much greater degree. 
1. What is New in 4GW? 
 The points made above make it appear that 4GW is the same as the term 
“unconventional war” and “asymmetric,” which are defined in Chapter I. 
a. The Transformation of War by the Weak 
Insurgencies and guerrilla war have much in common with 4GW. Where 
they differ is that the former, in planning the course they were to run, factored in progress 
towards successive stages in which they were to grow in strength. This growth was to 
finally culminate in a capability of fielding regular armies having the power to defeat 
their enemies. These enemies were to have been weakened by unconventional warfare 
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practiced against them while they themselves became stronger. 4GW avoids the 
requirement of transforming into a regular army and attempts to leapfrog directly to the 
stage where the will of the enemy is broken without defeating his military. This is the 
“transformation in war” brought about by the weak. Some even call such transformation 
the “Revolution in Counter – Insurgency Affairs.” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute). 
b. The Impact of the Globalized Environment 
The globalized environment has grown significantly in strength and scope 
from the 1990s onwards. The networking of communications through computerization, 
the World Wide Web and the growth in international trade and crime across national 
boundaries has changed the basic environment of war. The change includes a decline in 
the sovereignty of the nation-state and the power it exercised over or the loyalty it 
demanded from its subjects. This has led to social loyalties shifting towards religions, 
clans and ethnicity, independent of the confines of state boundaries. Coupled with these 
changes are the phenomenon of urbanization and a growing lack of resources. Change in 
environment impacts all human endeavors, including the way we make war. In effect, 
4GW is an evolved form of war in tune with the evolved environment. It is different from 
past insurgencies and guerrilla wars because the environment in which 4GW is waged did 
not exist earlier. 
 
G. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
The theory that war can be divided into generations to explain its current shape 
was first elucidated in 1989 by William Lind and his co-authors, Nightengale, Schmitt, 
Sutton and Wilson. Since that time, 4GW has become a popular term used by military 
writers and thinkers to describe the changing face of war. In brief, 4GW is a form of 
warfare whose methods enable a weaker entity to wage war with a stronger entity with a 
higher degree of success. The method of 4GW is to use unconventional strategies and 
tactics to attack the weaknesses of conventional military forces. The foremost weakness 
is a military culture that is not attuned to fight unconventionally. 
In brief, 4GW aims to do the following to achieve victory: 
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• Undermine enemy strengths by the simple expedient of avoiding the 
enemy’s strength and attacking his non-military weaknesses with the aim of targeting his 
will to fight.  
• Use asymmetric weapons and techniques that differ substantially from 
those in the opponent’s arsenal and doctrine. 
4GW has benefited from the following, which are the result of a changing world political 
and social environment: 
• Globalization via technological integration, trade and migration. 
• The growing dilution of the nation-state's sovereignty and connected 
monopoly on violence.  
• The rise of cultural, ethnic and religious conflict.  
1. The Generational Development of Warfare  
a. First Generation War. Warfare based on mass conscript armies, 
firearms and tactics of the line and column.    
b. Second Generation War. Warfare made possible by the industrial 
revolution, which enabled utilization of massive indirect firepower to fight wars 
of attrition. 
c. Third Generation War.  Warfare based upon maneuver and 
mechanized means of mobility as exemplified by the Blitzkrieg.  
d. Fourth Generation War. Warfare using unconventional social, 
political, economic and military means for targeting the will of the enemy, rather 
than aiming at his physical destruction. 
2. Differences in 4GW from Previous Generations 
Many of the methods used in 4GW appeared in earlier generations of war, albeit 
as exceptions rather than the rule. However, there are important differences in the present 
day environment, which give a new logic and impetus to these methods, edging them 
towards the rule. These are listed below. 
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• Modern technologies, communications and economic integration enable 
global operations.  
• Nation-state warfare disturbs the economic and social equilibrium in the 
world. It is curbed by the interests and actions of the world community. This has forced 
all open conflict into the 4GW mold.  
• The ability of small states or entities to procure weapons of mass 
destruction and pose a threat to world stability and order has increased.  
• Open societies and economies present an opportunity to attack a state 
indirectly by targeting its society and culture.  
• New technologies have dramatically increased the lethality and 
effectiveness of small groups of 4GW warriors, as well as their ability to survive in 
cellular networks. Networked organizations, made possible by improvements in 
technology, are much better at adapting to and surviving operations by conventional 
forces.  
• Global media makes it possible to influence opposing and friendly 
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III. 4GW AND TERRORISM 
[Terrorism is] a form of surrogate warfare in an international system in 
which open warfare has become too dangerous. 
--Chalmers Johnson (Revolutionary Change, p. 187) 
 
A. THE RELATION BETWEEN 4GW AND TERRORISM  
Lind, et al., (1989) had stated that “4GW may be visible in terrorism, but that 
terrorism is not necessarily 4GW.”  This did not draw a clear distinction between the 
relative relationships of terrorism to 4GW or vice versa, though the article did state that 
“we are not suggesting that terrorism is the fourth generation.”  In fact, what they said 
was that if one were to mix terrorism, new technology, non-state status, an ideology, 
hatred for a culture, and garnish the concoction with media, the result could be a cocktail 
called 4GW. Such generalization was not a surprise because when the article came out 
sixteen years ago, it was attempting to grope in the dark and arouse interest in the 
complex phenomena of the changing nature of war. After the 9/11 attack the phrase 
“Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)” has added to the dichotomy.1  The 
inappropriateness of this term is often commented upon, but its common usage by the 
leadership, the elite and official United States strategy documents has resulted in its being 
embedded in the lexicon of the current war with non-state entities, in particular, al Qaeda. 
Terror can be defined as “a state of intense fear,” “one that inspires fear,” “a cause 
of anxiety,” or “an appalling person or thing.” On the other hand, terrorism is “the 
systematic use of terror as a means of coercion” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). A 
reflection on these meanings makes it obvious that war cannot be waged against a state of 
affairs, a cause or means. It could possibly be waged against “one that inspires fear” or 
“an appalling person” (al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden). However, even this is not wholly 
correct, as it cannot be stated that the GWOT is directed against only al Qaeda or Bin 
                                                 
1 Certain official United States government documents, such as Congressional Research Services 
Reports for Congress, call it “Global War on Terror.” However, the 9/11 Report (p. 333) as well as 
important papers such as the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (p. 19) and the U.S. National 
Security Strategy 2005 (p. 26) call it the “Global War on Terrorism.”   
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Laden because they are not the only threats to world peace or to the United States. The 
elimination of these two entities will not spell the end of terrorism. Therefore, the GWOT 
is actually directed at those who do not follow those conventions of war and international 
law that preclude the use of terrorism as a means of coercion of non-combatants.   
From the time Lind and his co-authors wrote the article, though the basic structure 
of terrorism has remained the same, it has been quasi-legitimized as a way of war. The 
reason for this quasi-legitimacy is that nations that can justify its use have increasingly 
chosen to engage in terrorism.  An example is Israel, which justifies assassination or 
sniping at suspected terrorists in the name of its security because its survival is at stake 
(Ben-Ari, 2004). To this extent, terrorism can be said to have evolved in ways different 
from the past, when it was considered an activity which was definitely against the 
conventions of war and hence, quite abhorrent. In recent times, terrorism has drawn much 
more discussion and debate. This is especially true post-9/11, which revealed terrorism in 
a new avatar. In addition to its classic definition of being a way to influence a target 
audience, terrorism in 4GW is synonymous to a weapon system. A person willing to 
detonate explosives tied on his body is like a guided missile, and the crowd or bus or 
convoy where he strikes is not innocent people but a military target. Hence, there is a 
requirement to recognize the place of terrorism in the conduct of war. In fact, the 
increased use of terrorism is one of the constituents that propel war from the Third to the 
Fourth Generation. Understanding the place of terrorism is essential to be proficient in 
4GW. With that aim in mind, this part of the thesis examines the relationship between 
terrorism and 4GW to determine whether terrorism is an element or tactic of 4GW, or a 
form of war by itself. 
1. Definitions 
 Before comparing 4GW and terrorism, it is pertinent to review the definitions of 
both war and terrorism to understand their intrinsic meaning. Of the definitions of war 
given in Chapter I, the definition taken from the Encyclopedia Britannica is the most apt 
because it best characterizes war as it is prevalent today. This definition addresses the 
following aspects, which are relevant to war. 
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• War is waged between “entities” (the word entity covers states, non-states 
and transnational or sub-national organizations). 
• The violence in war is “intentional.” 
• The violence involves large bodies of individuals organized for war. 
Terrorism is the action of a terrorist, and the terrorist is defined in Chapter I. 
Laqueur (2003, p. 235) says that terrorism has more than a hundred definitions, because 
concepts like terrorism (or nationalism, democracy or communism) can have no 
sacrosanct definition. Some more easily understood definitions of terrorism are given 
below. 
• An act or threat of violence against non-combatants with the objective of 
exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise influencing an audience (Stern, 2003, p. xx).  
• As per Title 22, US Code, terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated 
violence, perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence a target (Tucker, 1997). 
• The US Joint Staff definition is “the calculated use of violence or threat of 
violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments and societies, 
often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives (Tucker, 1997). 
• The US Intelligence community definition is “the threat or use of violence 
for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to, 
established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to shock or 
intimidate a target group wider than the immediate victims” (Tucker, 1997).  
• Terrorism is a force employment process in which abnormal lethal force is 
used against a symbolic victim to affect the will of a target entity (Hanle, 1989). 
• [Terrorism is] more than crime and less than war it is violence against 
innocents or non-combatants intended to influence an audience for the sake of some 
political objective (Tucker, 1997). 
2. War and Terrorism 
War seeks to break the will of one side to resist the demands of the other. The 
First and Second Generations of war did this by the use of “physical” force. As Hanle 
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states, “physical force is manifested by destroying or damaging [the enemy’s] means to 
fight and by killing, wounding and capturing the enemy’s combatants” (p. 19). The 
physical forces of the opposing sides clashed with each other until one was weakened 
through attrition to be incapable of prosecuting the war, or was destroyed. The incidence 
of terrorism in these generations of war was normally not a deliberate endeavor because 
non-combatants were not involved in battles. In fact, a deliberate effort was made to 
avoid built-up areas because armies could not maneuver in their confines. As a result, 
there was little contact with non-combatants in a battle. For example, in the Battle of 
Gettysburg in 1863, there was only one reported non-combatant casualty out of the 
approximately 50,000 total casualties of both the sides. This was supposedly a woman 
killed by a stray cannon shell.2 
Third Generation War aims to avoid the direct clash of force on force. It aims to 
out- maneuver the enemy. It avoids the enemy’s strength and gets inside his defenses to 
make him incapable of effectively using his power in synergy or to defeat him piecemeal. 
Third Generation warfare is a war of ideas. It is asymmetry in organization and doctrine 
that tips the balance in favor of the side resorting to a war of maneuver. Wars and battles 
of this generation should be short because capitulation is quick after one side is 
outmaneuvered.3  Such wars have little time for terror to be employed to achieve any end. 
If at all, terror comes to the fore in the subsequent phases of stability operations. An 
example is the combat between German and partisan forces throughout Europe in World 
War II.  
In 4GW the question of using superior physical force to win does not exist. The 
side favoring 4GW is invariably so weak in the terms of orthodox determinants of power 
that the very act of embracing 4GW implies that it does not intend using physical force 
for quick and decisive results. In 4GW, moral ascendancy is sought by undermining the 
enemy’s morale and willingness to fight. This is done not by targeting his military force, 
                                                 
2 Statement by guide during tour of the battlefield from the Naval Postgraduate School in Mar 2005. 
3 However, this becomes otherwise if one side does not do what is logically expected. For example, 
during the Russo-German War from 1941-1945, time and again the Soviet troops did not surrender when 
surrounded, which pushed warfare back from the Third to the Second Generation. This stymied German 
maneuver warfare and led to the costly battles of attrition typical of war on this front. The similar situation 
existed in the U.S. versus Japan island campaign in the Pacific theatre in World War II. 
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but by affecting the morale of first his population and then his military. To that extent, the 
war in Iraq started as a Third Generation war and has now become a 4GW. The Iraqi 
Sunni groups or Ba’ath remnants are fighting an insurgency. Their al Qaeda/Islamic 
fundamentalist allies are not fighting for Iraqi sovereignty; they are fighting a 4GW 
against America in which Iraq is one of the theaters. For them, the Iraqi insurgents are the 
tools to fight a proxy war against the Americans and to terrorize the Iraqis.  
3. The Effectiveness of Terrorism 
The 9/11 attacks were conducted with the aim of creating an atmosphere of terror 
and distrust within the American population. The attacks succeeded in doing that. Four 
years after the attacks, with institutional memory having been diluted, people are apt to 
dismiss the notion whether terror was created at all by 9/11. The fact is that for a period 
of time, terror was created not only in the United States, but also all over the world. This 
is best explained by the near paranoia in countering terror that was generated and still 
persists in the United States.4 The U.S. proclaimed a Global War on Terror and this 
confused the issue because the enemy was not terror per se, but those who were using 
terrorism as a weapon. The same adversaries can also use other means of 4GW. They can 
inflict financial damage through the internet and cyber war, they can undermine the target 
culture and society through proliferation of drugs and they can create rifts in society on 
the basis of religion. It is easy to understand why terrorism scores over the other methods 
as a very visible component of 4GW. Whereas other means may cause greater financial 
damage, they cannot create terror -- they can create only anxiety. It is wanton and random 
destruction of lives and material that creates terror. 
4GW relies on moral force and ideas. In the biblical story of the fight between 
David and Goliath, David created an asymmetry of weapons by using a slingshot. 
Goliath’s reliance on weapons (sword and sheer size) that were not appropriate against 
stone missiles negated his strength. This is a guiding principle of 4GW. It advocates use 
of those weapons and means that the stronger enemy is not geared to fight. If we consider 
terrorism the only way to fight a stronger foe, then David could not and did not have the 
                                                 
4 The excited response that took place in Washington D.C. in May 2005 when a light private aircraft 
strayed over restricted airspace is an example.  
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capability of using terrorism against Goliath. He therefore created asymmetry in a 
different manner. This is the case in 4GW, where its proponents have terrorism as one of 
many weapons in their armory.  The difference is while the effect of those weapons may 
not be spectacular; the effect of terrorism is quicker and more dramatic because 
sensational events draw and maintain greater media and public attention.. A vehicle 
accident with fatalities gets greater public attention than death through common diseases. 
An exotic disease gets more attention than a common disease.5 Similarly, death through a 
shooting gets more attention than death through an automobile accident, death through a 
terrorist action gets greater coverage than a normal criminal shooting and death through 
decapitation by knife draws much more attention than shooting someone or blowing him 
to bits with a 1000 pound bomb. Terrorism, which menaces people with personal 
physical danger, creates a greater impact because of the greater anxiety it generates as 
compared to cyber-terrorism, which may result in greater economic loss but creates much 
less anxiety for the common man. 
As the definition of war illustrates, war has to involve at least two entities. If an 
analysis is conducted with a bias towards one of the entities, the analysis would be 
incomplete. How other cultures see terrorism is also an important issue. Do they also see 




[T]error struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means; it is in 
the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent’s heart is 
obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the 
means and the ends meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing 
decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose upon him.  
                                                 
5 In India in the 15-44 year age group, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis kill nearly the same number of 
people. However, greater attention is paid to the control of HIV/AIDS than to tuberculosis. For all ages, 
HIV/AIDS is the ninth leading cause of death, yet it draws greater media attention than the other leading 
causes, which, in descending order, are heart disease, respiratory infections, diarrhea, perinatal causes, 
cerebovascular disease, tuberculosis, road accidents, and measles. (1998 figures by WHO retrieved May 
20, 2005, from http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/1999/WHO_HSC_PVI_99.11.pdf) 
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The above statement makes it seem that terrorism is war and imposing terror is 
the only aim of the Quranic concept of war. This is incorrect, as terror by itself has never 
won a war. It has always been a combination of means that created the conditions that 
forced one side to capitulate.  
It is also pertinent to understand that terrorism itself acquires a shape based upon 
the “eye of the beholder.” Public amputation or beheading may appear as terror to the 
Western eye. In a Muslim country following the dictates of Sharia, it is punishment as a 
consequence of the dispensation of justice. A public beheading shown in this vein is 
described in James A. Michener’s classic historical fiction novel Caravans written in 
1963. Terrorists, who are now more familiar with Western values, use a form of death 
which is not alien to them, but which the West considers repugnant. In this manner they 
successfully create terror. Terrorism aims to create a spectacle because one of its goals is 
to generate an audience. The nature of the spectacle, which is engineered to inspire 
insecurity through dread, is what separates this spectacle from entertainment.  
4. Terrorism as Legitimate Strategy and Tactics 
On the eve of the 2004 presidential elections in the United States, a message from 
Osama bin Laden was shown on television. Bin Laden stated that security against future 
al Qaeda attacks on American citizens would depend on the actions of the American 
people, not the outcome of the election. In other words, Bin Laden (or those who follow 
his path) realized that regardless of a change in the Oval Office, United States policies in 
the war on terrorism would not change. U.S. policies will change only when the will of 
the people desires a change. The quickest way to effect the will of the people is through 
acts of terrorism. Since impacting the will of a nation is the objective of war, and terror is 
an effective instrument to do so, in recent years terrorism has gained much more 
legitimacy as a means of war. In the 20th century, Tucker (1997, p. 57) wrote,  
 
Terrorism, whatever else it may be, is now identical in common usage 
with violence that is illegitimate, not merely damaging to our interests, as 
would be the military actions of an enemy, but unjustifiable and 
unconscionable. 
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Since that time and into the 21st century, there has been a perceptible change in the 
attitude towards terrorism. Terrorism has become much more legitimate as a strategy or 
tactic in war, even though it is still politically expedient to label 4GW opponents as 
“terrorists,” implying that the use of terror is negative.  
a. Terrorism as Strategy  
Strategy is the broad overarching concept for achieving a particular 
objective. It “fixes the direction of movements” (Jomini, 1838, p. 175). The Merriam 
Webster dictionary describes strategy as the “science and art of military command 
exercised to meet the enemy in combat in advantageous conditions.” The word “strategy” 
also implies a variety of the use of strategy. An example is the strategy of deterrence 
through “mutual assured destruction” in nuclear war. As a variety of means used in 4GW, 
terrorism is a strategy. An entity can decide that it will launch a campaign of terror with 
the aim of affecting the will of the opponent so that the opponent is forced to accept the 
desired outcome. In this case terrorism is a strategy. 
b. Terrorism as Tactics 
Tactics are the means used for executing strategy (Jomini, 1838, p. 175). 
They area the method of employing forces in combat and hence are related to actual 
conduct. A specific terrorist act is therefore terrorism employed as a tactic. 
Terrorism has always been considered legitimate by revolutionaries as a 
form of war. Johnson (1982, p. 152) says, “a terrorist is a person who seeks to create 
conditions of extreme fear and anxiety, […] but who fails.” Had he succeeded he would 
be a revolutionary or a freedom fighter. In the present day, as the face of war is changing, 
terrorism is gaining legitimacy. The clearest mirror of changing values in society is the 
film and television industry. This is truer in the United States than in any other part of the 
world because of the American liberal tradition, which does not attempt to cloak the 
views of its citizens. The fourth season of the popular American television serial titled 
“24,” aired on Fox Broadcasting Network in the United States, provides an example. The 
serial showed both terrorists and innocent suspects being subject to torture, which is 
considered a modus operandi of terrorists. The serial showed a fictional Defense 
Secretary of the United States permitting torture with drugs, stun guns, and coercive 
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threats of violence directed at people. These include his own son, who is suspected of 
withholding information vital to the security of the United States in a “ticking bomb” 
scenario. The serial showed similar torture, including applying electrical shocks to a 
federal employee wrongly presumed to be compromised, as almost routinely applied 
desperate procedures to gain information.  
This dramatization created no ripples of protest about the use of torture 
from any quarter of the people or media. This demonstrates that acts that constitute 
terrorism, if directed to achieve national interests, evoke much less outrage and are 
increasingly considered acceptable by the people. Such acquiesce legitimizes terrorism. 
On the other hand, the producer and lead actor of the series appeared on television to 
convey to the viewers that the depiction of some Moslem citizens of the United States 
carrying out horrific acts of terrorism should not be taken to mean that the complete 
Moslem community is anti United States.  This was probably the result of complaints 
about depicting Moslem United States citizens as enemies of the country.  
5. Key Elements in 4GW and Terrorism 
Some key elements in 4GW and terrorism are compared in Table 2. 
Table 2. Key Elements in 4GW and Terrorism 
 
Key Elements 4GW Terror 
Aim Imposing will upon an opponent 
by targeting his moral strength 
rather than pure destruction of 
military potential. 
Influencing the will of a target 
by creating a sense of insecurity. 
Strategy Rendering the enemy militarily 
ineffective by a combination of 
means, including gradual 
attrition, raising economic costs, 
psychological operations, 
propaganda and diplomacy.  
Surprise attacks by using 
unexpected and abnormal lethal 
force on a target to influence an 
audience. 
Tactics Sporadic but prolonged hit and 
run attacks, terrorism, allegations 
of violations of human rights, 
hacking and disruption of 
communications and essential 
services.   
General or suicide bombings, 
atrocities and rape, hijackings, 
kidnappings and executions.  
Primary Targets The armed forces, the population Specific key people and the 
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Key Elements 4GW Terror 
and the government. population.  
Method of 
Breaking the 
Cohesion of the 
Target or 
Alliance 
By diplomacy (engineering 
dissensions), direct action 
(terrorism through non-state 
actor/proxy), cultural war (drug 
trafficking, creating schism in 
plural societies (on the basis of 
religion and ethnicity), economic 
war (hacking networks, slowing 
down free movement of trade, 
causing loss of productive work 
time).  
By creating a sense of insecurity 
through abnormal lethal acts. 
 
The table above shows that 4GW in essence, as in all generations of war, is a 
struggle to impose the will of one side on the other. 4GW involves one side using a 
number of different means to impose its will on the other side. None of the means is 
effective alone.   
Rather, a combination of means creates the synergy needed to achieve the aim. 
Terrorism is one such prime mean used to influence the will. In 4GW, it is the most 
effective military mean available to the weaker antagonist. Terrorism is not war; it is a 
part of 4GW’s larger canvas.  
6. The Place of Terrorism in 4GW  
When viewing the generations of warfare, it can be stated that the First and Third 
Generations entailed war between armies. Civilians were expected and permitted to get 
out of the way of direct harm. This is not to say that they do not suffer through 
dislocation, shortage of food, etc., but the intent was not to harm them directly. Second 
Generation warfare is less discriminating, especially as seen in World War II. Neither the 
Axis nor the Allies restrained themselves because of the presence of civilians. The 
bombing of Coventry and London, thousands of bomber raids on Germany, the firestorms 
created in Tokyo and even the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed 
hundreds of thousands of civilians. Ostensibly, the aim the aim was not to kill civilians to 
create terror, but to destroy cities that were industrial centers (Hanle, 1989, pp. 179-180). 
In any case, as all the instances demonstrate, if we assume that the bombing of cities was 
designed to create terror among the civil populations, the method failed. In none of the 
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cases were national cohesion and resolve broken through terror bombing. Third 
Generation War attempts to target the things that make conduct of war possible, such as  
industrial installations and C3I systems. However, because Third Generation War is 
essentially a war to outmaneuver armies in the field, direct assault on civilians is not an 
essential principle.  
The First to Third Generations of war aimed to change the political structure of a 
nation-state, after overcoming the protection provided by its armed forces. 4GW attempts 
to directly erode the political structures that guide warfare. Achieving this goal without 
the use of armed forces is preferable; indeed, a deliberate attempt is made to do just that. 
Lind, et al., (1989) state that 4GW has “a goal of collapsing the enemy internally rather 
than physically destroying him. Targets will include such things as the population’s 
support of the war and the enemy’s culture.” All political structures are made up of the 
leaders and the people. What affects the people and how they pressurize the leaders to 
influence their decisions is used to advantage in 4GW.  People are most affected by 
insecurity. The quickest and most efficient way to bring about insecurity is through 
terrorism.  Terrorism thus becomes one of the preferred means of waging 4GW within an 
overall military sphere.  
 In 4GW the stronger side is easy to condemn if it uses disproportionate force, 
especially if it causes collateral damage. The weaker 4GW opponent utilizes the media to 
highlight such collateral damage and gain the support of the international community or 
even of its opponent’s population.  To avoid such damage, precision attacks by smart 
munitions (which were actually developed for a Third Generation battlefield) are used 
against primitive war making means. This results in a mismatch of economics. A million 
dollar missile is used to destroy a facility which may be preparing Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) and which will inflict only a thousand dollar loss (if the targeting 
intelligence is accurate, which may not be the case). 
7. Terrorism: A Component of the Military Sphere of 4GW 
Hammes (2004) says that “4GW uses political, economic, social and military 
networks to achieve its aim” (p. 155). Each of these spheres is comprised of a number of 
components. The principal military components of 4GW are defined below. 
 48
• Conventional Operations. Direct operations can be defined as the kinetic 
clash of force using firepower and movement. 
• Information Operations. Operations with the aim of acquiring all types 
of information and intelligence and preventing the enemy from making use of his own 
information and intelligence. These include actions taken to protect, simulate, 
dissimulate, breakdown, disrupt or monitor any or all means of communication to 
degrade or facilitate decision-making. 
• Psychological Operations. These consist of the application of 
propaganda, terror and state pressure (Heath, 2001). The aim is to affect the psyche of the 
target for negatively influencing its behavior, discrediting the opponent, sowing 
dissension among allies and inducing deception regarding plans and intentions. Of the 
three elements, the state actor invariably does not use the element of terror for fear of 
ostracism or because it follows humanitarian values. In 4GW, the non-state or weaker 
actor cannot use state pressure. It therefore relies exclusively on propaganda and terror. 
8.  Terrorism: A Tactic of 4GW 
The above illustrates the place of terrorism within 4GW.  It clarifies ambiguity 
regarding whether terrorism is a tactic of 4GW, the same as 4GW or a different type of 
war in its own right. The essence of terrorism, exemplified by its very name, is to cause 
terror. Terror can be best inflicted by conveying an example to the target audience of a 
very real and tangible threat of extreme pain and death as well as abnormal insecurity. 
Uncertainty regarding the exact time and place of potential terror events 
disproportionately heightens feelings of insecurity. Terrorism is organized intimidation. It 
aims to make the objective malleable to facilitate molding it to the desired state. 
Terrorism facilitates the aim desired to be achieved through war, but it is war that 
ultimately achieves the aim. Terrorism by itself has never won a war. The French 
counter-campaign of terrorism in Algeria won them the battle of Algiers, but they 
ultimately lost the war. 
Recently, professional armies have contemplated using Special Forces (SF) to 
fight 4GW on a symmetric stage. The logic behind this is that SF will be able to 
overcome the asymmetry imposed by the 4GW opponent. Of all the means used by 
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Special Forces, Direct Action (DA) is what they are most identified with. The reason is 
that in the public eye, DA is as spectacular as terrorism. Often, DA is carried out away 
from public view; however, an event such as the live telecast of the SAS action at the 
Iranian embassy in 1980 was watched by millions of people (SAS Rescue, 1980). Such 
exposure reinforces the image of Special Forces glorified through motion pictures. In the 
focus on DA, other important actions in the realm of Special Operations are pushed to the 
sidelines (for example, psychological operations, civil affairs, etc.). This gives the 
impression that only DA is the only component of Special Operations. In much the same 
way, terrorism overshadows the other means of 4GW; creating an impression that 
terrorism is itself a type of war rather than a tactic of 4GW.   
4GW is a new generation of war. It has not arisen out of the blue. Its roots are 
spread over a wide period in time. It has evolved through guerilla wars and wars of 
national liberation. The norms of modern society, in particular modern democracies 
functioning with modern means of communication, have given it greater power. Its power 
does not come from modern weapons. The preferred weapons of 4GW warriors are the 
ubiquitous AK 47, with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), bombs, pistols and grenades 
coming a close second. These are all the basic weapons of previous generations. What 
differs is how these weapons are used. They are not used for direct confrontation. They 
are used for surprise attacks on the military and for terrorizing the civilian population. 
The best weapons in 4GW are those which can be carried surreptitiously with ease and 
have sufficient firepower with which to overawe, coerce and terrorize the population. 
Sophistication of weapons is not relevant in 4GW as compared to conventional 
war. This is clear from a comparison of the two Intifadas.  In the second Intifada, 
terrorism through suicide bombing has been the cornerstone of the Palestinian strategy. 
This has in no way been successful for them in the same measure as creating simple 
asymmetry was in the first Intifada. At that time, the rock throwing Palestinian youth 
facing Israeli tanks did more to win the 4GW than the suicide bombers of the second 
Intifada. They created such an asymmetry that the Israelis were at a loss as how to deal 
with unarmed youth using tanks.  
 50
This makes it clear that terrorism is but one of the many weapons in the armory of 
4GW. The versatility of this weapon is limited only by the creativity of the human mind. 
Terrorism is the Fourth Generation War’s directly offensive tactic. 
 
B. MORAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES  
4GW raises a number of moral and ethical issues. This is because 4GW uses 
strategy and tactics that are at cross-purposes to conventional war. These include the use 
of methods that evoke terror or are contrary to the rules of war. Often, conventional 
armies have a lament that they are fighting with “one hand tied behind their back,” or that 
the 4GW foe is “fighting dirty.” For those brought up to fight conventionally, any use of 
unconventional appears unfair. The current ethics of war are a result of the body of 
international law formulated by Hugo Grotius and Emerich de Vattel in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. That international law largely based on Christian ethics led to the formulation 
of the Geneva Conventions, which progressively became more encompassing from 1899 
to 1977 (Rizer, 2001).  Christian ethics are not very different from the ethics of other 
religions, and nation states all over the world have not found it difficult to make their 
armies follow the Geneva Conventions or at least acknowledge their spirit. This is 
because all major religions believe that God is kind, compassionate and just and these 
values guide the Conventions. The Geneva Conventions, which were established with 
interstate conflict in mind, have gray areas when war acquires Fourth Generation hues. 
An example is the questions arising about the status of the detainees at Guantanamo. As 
per conventions on prisoners of war, they are not prisoners of war. But then in 4GW, 
increasing incidents of unorganized militants being taken prisoner will continue. Non-
state terrorists, proxy wars and attacks focused on undermining cultural and ethnic  
harmony present different challenges.  These challenges bring to the fore strategies and 
tactics that may be ethically incorrect from the viewpoint of conventional nation state 
war. 
While framing the laws of war, there is a degree of practicality in ensuring that 
the laws do not unduly hinder the conduct of war. Legal verbiage purges terms that imply 
that where there is a question of national interests, the military will not be restrained by 
ethical constraints. For example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions sought to protect civilians 
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in war to avoid a repeat of the horrific slaughter of civilians in World War II.  This 
convention, however, states that prosecution of those who harm civilians was to be 
carried out only if the harm they inflicted on civilians was “not justified by military 
necessity and carried out wantonly” (Rizer, 2001, p. 2). Because of this clause, in practice 
it is easy to cover up infringements by citing military necessity as justification for failure 
to adhere to international law/convention. An effort was made through Protocol I of the 
1977 Convention to overcome this shortcoming. The United States has yet to ratify this 
convention (p. 3). This is not surprising because otherwise the United States would have 
to rule out a large number of options that are essential in 4GW. 
 Following the same logic, the United States renounced the International Criminal 
Court treaty in May 2001, asking for signatory states to withhold the application of this 
treaty to U.S. servicemen (Lynch, 2004). Those states that do not do so and are the 
recipients of U.S. aid will be denied that aid. This has led to an outcry about partisan U.S. 
motives because such cuts will not apply to NATO members or other key U.S. allies. 
What has happened is that the reality of 4GW imperatives has guided U.S. actions. It is 
unreasonable to expect soldiers to fight a war where any inadvertent action under extreme 
stress may open a soldier to prosecution. Those who have led troops in stressful situations 
know that morale is the first casualty when opponent soldiers feel that their country 
expects them to fight a 4GW but will not support them or provide legal defense in case of 
an inadvertent error of judgment. Nations faced with fighting insurgencies have always 
sought to create provisions to protect genuinely inadvertent actions from prosecution.  
India created such a provision as far back as 1958 when its military was engaged in 
counter-insurgency in its North-East region. Known as The Armed Forces Special 
Powers Act, the Act has been extended wherever the military has been employed to 
combat insurgencies or terrorism, be it Punjab or Kashmir (India: Intelligence). Similar 
rules also exist for police personnel. Organizations like Amnesty International, which 
serve an important watchdog function, often oppose such acts. However, the reality of 
4GW keeps these acts in place. Genuinely deliberate and unacceptable infringement of 
human rights should always be punished. For example, in Kashmir since 1990, 68 Army 
personnel have been punished for human rights violations.  Punishments ranged from 
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imprisonment for seven years to dismissal (Army in Kashmir).  However, it must be 
noted that in 4GW, false allegations are a part of the armory of the 4GW practitioner to 
the same extent as acts of terrorism.  
The use of euphemisms such as “enhanced interrogation techniques” or “extreme 
coercive persuasion” separate torture and terror practiced by the “good” and the “bad” 
sides in 4GW. It is difficult to acknowledge but easy to visualize that both euphemisms 
indicate the same practice. 4GW has evolved more from the actions of the militarily 
weak. The responses of the strong, who find themselves frustrated by the advantages that 
the weak acquire through 4GW, are also within the genre of the Fourth Generation. 
Terrorism is the strategy and tactic of the weaker antagonist in 4GW.  In the search for 
methods to counter 4GW foes, the stronger party may also have to use harsh measures, 
though tempered by restraint. These measures could be labeled “terrorism” in the eyes of 
the beholder, as they often are by human rights organizations. These human rights 
organizations operate under a set of rules framed by conventions appropriate to earlier 
generations of war. In other words, as all adapt to 4GW, so must the laws of war and the 
outlook of those who interpret them. 
This raises questions of ethics. Should regular armies steeped in the tradition of 
jus in bello adapt coercive methods of warfare? If they are adopted, might it ultimately 
result in the legitimization of terrorism? 
 
The Israelis justify their compulsion and need to fight terror with terror because 
the nature of the threat to their state validates its use.  For example, Israeli sources state 
that with the use of coercive measures they foiled at least 90 terrorist attacks in the period 
1995-1997 (Schmemann, 1997). Neither the exact details nor the accuracy of this 
statement can be verified because, for obvious reasons, no records are kept of the use of 
police methods for extracting information. Post-9/11 there has been a perceptible decline 
in the arguments against the use of terror in war. While outwardly the jus in bello 
arguments are still valid, in reality, logical arguments are found to circumvent its dictates. 
An argument that is successfully advanced is the distinction between “military 
necessity” and “military convenience” (Cook, 2001). Coercive acts under military 
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necessity (the ticking bomb theory) are justified and considered legitimate.  Similar acts 
under military convenience are not justified.  However, in reality, while operating in the 
field the distinction between necessity and convenience either gets blurred or can be 
blurred if justified. Cook further states (2001, p. 2) that he proposes application of a 
standard from the American Civil War to the “different” war in which the U.S. is 
engaged, i.e., 4GW. This is the “reasonable person” standard of proof. The reasonable 
person is a hypothetical individual whose view of things is consulted in the process of 
making decisions of law. The question, "How would a reasonable person act under the 
circumstances?" performs a critical role in legal reasoning in areas such as negligence 
and contract law.  This standard of proof states that if reasonable and prudent persons 
should have known a particular piece of information in the circumstances that they are in, 
then even if they truthfully state that that they are unaware of the activities of terrorists in 
their area, this otherwise truthful statement does not provide them moral immunity from 
prosecution. As Cook (2001) explains, “[t]his standard asks not what they did know but 
what they ought to have known had they exercised the diligence and degree of inquiry a 
reasonable person in their circumstance would have exercised” (p. 2).  
Another argument advanced to deal with the ethical issue of collateral damage to 
innocents is the moral principle of “double effect” (Cook, p. 3). Saint Thomas Aquinas is 
credited with introducing the principle of double effect in his discussion of the 
permissibility of self-defense in the Summa Theologica (II-II, Qu. 64, and Art. 6). Killing 
one's assailant is justified, he argues, provided one does not intend to kill him (McIntyre, 
2004).  This is propounded to counter the use of civilian shields by the 4GW antagonist. 
This principle states that when it is not possible to separate civilian from military targets 
[in 4GW], it is acceptable to proceed with an attack even knowing that innocents may be 
killed or injured, because killing innocents was not a part of the plan or intention. Rather, 
it is, as Cook says, “an unavoidable by-product of legitimate military action” (p. 3). 
The apparent utility of 4GW methods in permitting low cost war to be waged 
makes it more attractive to everyone. If conventional armies exercise any restraint in 
using 4GW methods it is because of the restrictions imposed by international military and 
social ethics. These ethics owe a great deal to the “Golden Rule” principle, which states 
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“do to others what you would like them to do to you” (Kidder, 2003, p. 25). This 
principle has been preached by all religions and by a number of ancient and modern 
philosophers. Modern Western democracies have developed ethics for legitimate killing 
based upon this principle. The distinction lies with the manner of killing. Dying is bad, 
but a less painful death is preferred to a more painful one. Extending this argument, 
preference to die by or kill with a firearm is acceptable by society and not considered 
barbaric. It does not create the same indignation as when killing is accomplished by 
beheading using sharp edged weapons; this is considered barbaric.  One of the major 
reasons why 4GW favors application of terrorism is that the weaker cultures, which have 
evolved this form of war, find what are considered terrorist methods easier to apply 
because they are not so alien to them.  
 
C. CONCLUSION 
A defining character of the advent of 4GW is the gradual legitimizing of terrorism 
as a part of war. It is prudent to accept and recognize terrorism as a strategy and tactic 
that must be countered by a new theory of war. Such prudence is more practical than 
pushing it out of sight as a distasteful act more in the realm of unconventional forces than 
conventional ones.  Perpetual complaints or criticism about the moral degradation 
inherent in terrorism will not deter those who use it because of its obvious value. In the 
arena of 4GW, the study of terrorism must be a part of all curricula and training to bring 
this subject to center-stage. This will increase awareness about countering terrorism and 
encourage armies to consider what limitations should apply in the event that coercive 
measures are required. One must be realistic on this score as it cannot be expected that a 
grossly weaker foe will fight on the terms of the stronger. Therefore, terrorism is as much 
a reality to be confronted as is 4GW. 
Defeating  terrorism  requires  a  realization  that  it  is  a  strategy  and  tactic  of 
4GW. Just as  doctrine  has  to  be  developed  to  fight  wars  of  maneuver,  so  must  it 
be developed to fight terrorism in 4GW.  Some associate 4GW with a new name for 
insurgency (Echevarria, 2005).  Another  common  perception  is  to  associate  4GW  
with  a  form of  war  utilizing  only  terrorist techniques.  It  would  be  closer  to  the  
mark  to  state that 4GW is unconventional war that utilizes any means that can counter 
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the firepower and technical superiority  of  conventionally superior armies. Because of its 
favorable cost/benefit ratio, terrorism has to be inherent in 4GW. However, 4GW does 
not refer to only terrorism because it uses four different spheres: political, economic, 
social and military. Terrorism lies in the military sphere but can affect the other three. 
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IV. EFFECT OF 4GW ON THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR  
The strategic elements [principles] that affect the use of engagements may 
be classified into various types: moral, physical, mathematical, 
geographical and statistical. The first type covers everything that is created 
by intellectual and psychological qualities and influences; the second 
consists of the size of the armed forces, their composition, armament and 
so forth; the third includes the angles of the line of operations; the fourth 
comprises of the influence of terrain; and finally the fifth covers support 
and maintenance. 
-Carl Von Clausewitz (On War, p. 183) 
Doctrine and principles are synonymous. “Doctrine is a set of principles or 
techniques accepted as correct by practitioners in the field of endeavor” (Adams, 1998, 
p.13). Doctrine evolves through usage. The cumulative experience of successes and 
failures shapes doctrine. Different militaries may have differences in doctrine relevant to 
their peculiar requirements and experience. However, there are some aspects of military 
doctrine that are considered almost universally relevant. These aspects have been shaped 
through a combination of studies by military thinkers on the conduct of warfare over the 
ages, and the views of great captains of war based on their practical experiences. These 
time-tested precepts are known as the “Principles of War.” Fredrick the Great of Prussia 
rightly stated that “The lifetime of one man is not enough to enable him to acquire perfect 
knowledge and experience. Theory helps to supplement it; it provides a youth with 
premature experience and makes him skillful through the mistakes of others” (Air Force 
Doctrine, 2003). These principles are the essence of the theory of war.  
The Principles of War are the distilled wisdom of the conduct of war over the 
ages. They are the centerpiece of the theory of war. The Principles of War are central to 
an officer’s military education from the time he joins the profession. However, he learns 
their true importance at an intermediate stage in his career. By this time, their application 
should be intuitive and second nature to him in planning and conduct of operations. As 
per Miller (1956), the human brain has a limited processing capability. It can handle no  
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more than seven bits of information simultaneously, plus or minus two bits. Therefore, an 
aid in the form of Principles of War offers a paradigm for the conduct of war as well as a 
checklist to obviate errors. 
The way war is fought has undergone changes since the writings of Clausewitz 
gave the Principles of War a concrete shape. However, the principles have largely 
remained unchanged; indeed, they have acquired a sort of permanence because of the 
acceptance of the Jominian logic requiring to have proven building blocks of war. Many 
military thinkers, soldiers and civilians alike, have held the view that changes in the 
world as well as in the environment of war make revamping the principles prudent. From 
time to time articles appear in military writings attempting to justify and introduce new 
Principles of War. However, the principles have nonetheless changed only slightly. In an 
era where change is so fast that the disorientation it causes was given the name “Future 
Shock,” the Principles of War have remained largely unassailable. The reason for this is 
that under the veneer of technology and evolved modern organizations, it is still human 
intellect and emotions that formulate, conduct, order and act upon the dynamics that 
constitute war. 
Warfare evolves along with technology and society, and logically so too must the 
Principles of War if they are to remain relevant. Even if they do not change, their 
interpretation has to change in consonance with the times. Since war is evolutionary, a 
sound theory of war must be flexible and able to accommodate change. 
This chapter examines the need to change the Principles of War in light of the 
advent of 4GW. The examination is based upon the Principles of War that are followed 
by the U.S. Army. The first two generations of war were conducted at basically two 
levels, the strategic and the tactical. The Third Generation of war added a third, the 
operational level. The operational level involved the coordinated and related conduct of a 
number of battles (typically by a corps-sized formation), which led to the conclusion of a 
campaign in a particular zone of operations. This thesis contends that 4GW goes back to 
two levels, the strategic and the tactical. Most 4GW operations take place at the tactical 
level. This is because there is a deliberate effort to keep the intensity of war just below 
the boiling point. However, in 4GW, even actions at the tactical level can have strategic 
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implications. To illustrate, one soldier in the heat of the moment shooting a helpless 
wounded enemy in a tactical operation, when captured in the act by the media, raises a 
storm, which has strategic implications. Such an incident occurred at Fallujah in 2004 
when a wounded insurgent/terrorist was shot dead by an American soldier. 
 
A. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR 
The Principles of War have varied over the decades. Prior to 1920, the Principles 
of War took the shape of interpretation of the art of war rendered as advice by successful 
practitioners and theoreticians of war. They varied depending on the generation of war as 
well as the perception of the person enunciating them. From 1920 onwards, when they 
appeared in British regulations as “Principles,” they acquired the more permanent state in 
which they are currently viewed. (Delleman, 1999). Regardless of when they were 
formulated, they have a great deal of commonality as outlined in is evident from their 
compilation in the table given at Appendix A.  
1. The Necessity of the Principles of War  
It is prudent to avoid recurrence of past mistakes and apply correct methods and 
guidelines in the conduct of war. As Clausewitz (1812) stated, “[P]rinciples, though the 
result of long thought and continuous study of the history of war, will not so much give 
complete instruction, as they will stimulate and serve as a guide for your reflections” (p. 
11). 
Some Principles of War may have to be applied while keeping in mind the 
strategic level of war. The national aim, international opinion, political consensus, 
geography, public opinion, morale and economic constraints, etc., have great relevance to 
the application of these principles. Others may be more relevant at the operational and 
tactical level as these form the fundamental tenets for appreciating a situation, these may 
include planning and execution. The relevance, application and relative importance of the 
Principles of War is flexible and depends on the operational environment, resources 
available and lastly, on the style of command. Successful commanders have adhered to 
more Principles of War than they have violated. Application of even a few related 
Principles of War in combination with judgment and common sense has resulted in 
success, whereas disregarding them has led to defeat or an extremely costly victory. 
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The Principles of War are not a guaranteed recipe for success. They offer a 
paradigm for success. All human progress builds on the accumulated wisdom of the ages. 
Space flight would not be possible without the accumulated bank of basic physics, 
chemistry and other sciences. The apparently mundane principle of physics that “every 
action creates an opposite reaction” is the basis for rocket propulsion. However, this and 
innumerable other established and apparently mundane truths are the wisdom of the ages, 
which are the building blocks that make space flight possible. In much the same manner, 
the Principles of War are the building blocks of the art of war.  
There can be any number of Principles of War. However, if the Principles of War 
are continuously added, they are bound to lead to confusion. If there were fifty Principles 
of War and all were relevant (as they can be), the sheer number of principles would 
hinder their intuitive application because of Miller’s theory of seven, plus or minus two 
bits. Miller’s Theory goes on to say that each bit may itself be composed of seven 
plus/minus two bits of further separate (though related) information, “chunked” together. 
This may not be the reason why the U.S. Army has only nine principles, but it implies 
that there has to be a limit to the number of Principles of War, which are in essence 
“chunked” information. Table 3 shows a compilation of the main Principles of War and 
the possible minor bits related to each of them. 
 
Table 3. The Nine Principles and Their Constituent Bits 
 
Principle Constituent Bits 
Objective  
 
Aim, Center of Gravity, Focus, Singleness of Purpose, End State, Goal 
Offensive Initiative, Action, Orchestration, Simultaneity, Engagement, Combat 











Maximization of Resources, Synergy, Preservation of Combat 




Principle Constituent Bits 
Maneuver  
 
Flexibility, Movement, Dislocation, Avenues of Approach, Fire and 







Control, Defined Hierarchy, Joint Operations, Cooperation, 










Deception, Speed, Paralyze, Stun, Psychological Warfare, Information 
Dominance, Asymmetry 
 




If a computer were used to evaluate a situation and tell us which principles should 
be applied in what measure, sequence or interrelationship, a satisfactory answer would 
not be possible. This is because the way the Principles of War are to be applied in relation 
to each other, and to a constantly evolving situation, cannot be generated scientifically 
without loss of the “art” aspect of war. The Principles of War, therefore, are best kept to 
manageable numbers encompassing the most important precepts into which the lesser 
important (which can be called their constituent bits) are merged because of their 
underlying similarity. This ensures that in war, the major principles remain relevant aids 
to planning and decision-making. 
2. Principles of War in the U.S. Army  
 The Principles of War in the U.S. Army remained unchanged since 1949 (Alger, 
1982). The only variation has been the sequence in which they have been listed. One 
could presume that this is either because of their perceived relative importance or to 
facilitate their sequential, logical application. These are listed below: 
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1 Objective The Objective 
2 Offensive Simplicity 
3 Mass Unity of Command 
   4    Economy of Force The Offensive 
5 Maneuver Maneuver 
6 Unity of 
Command 
Mass 
   7    Security Economy of Force 
8 Surprise Surprise 
9 Simplicity Security 
 There are differences in the interpretation of some of the Principles in 2001 
compared to 1949. The 2001 interpretation of some of the Principles of War differs from 
that of 1949.This shows that the interpretation of the Principles does change as per the 
organizational, technological and cultural environment. Based on input from Alger 
(1982) and FM 3-0 (Operations) 2001 (Para. 4-32 to 4-49), the Principles of War as 
interpreted in 1949 and 2001, are compared in the succeeding paragraphs.  
a. Objective 
The 1949 version sees the ultimate objective as the [physical] destruction 
of the enemy. Intermediate objectives are those that contribute to attaining the ultimate 
objective. The 2001 version looks at objective as the aim of the higher commander, 
whatever that aim may be, specifying that it should be clearly known, defined and 
attainable. Intermediate objectives are those actions that contribute to the goals of the 
higher headquarters. The objective should be strategically and politically correct, and 
obtained using an appropriate, legitimate and restrained level of force. The objective must 
be speedily attainable unless it involves protracted stability or support operations. 
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b. Offensive  
The 1949 version sees this principle as central to retaining the freedom of 
action (initiative). Defensive operations are envisaged only in sectors where forces are to 
be economized. The 2001 version understands offensive as essential for seizing, retaining 
and exploiting the initiative. The offensive is taken to dictate the nature, scope and tempo 
of an operation, thereby forcing the enemy to react in the manner that we want him to. In 
this manner, the battle is orchestrated to exploit the vulnerabilities of the enemy. 
c. Mass  
The 1949 version looks at mass as the concentration of superior forces at a 
decisive place and time and employed in a decisive direction. The 2001 version also 
envisions concentration of combat power in time and space. Massing in this case is not 
perceived as massing of numbers, but of applying different elements of combat power 
against a single target. Massing is now more relevant to massing of fires because of the 
longer ranges and faster reaction times of modern weapon systems. Some of the enemy 
elements may be concentrated and vulnerable to operations that mass in both time and 
space. Others may spread throughout the Area of Operations, vulnerable only to 
simultaneous, nonlinear operations that mass in time only.  
d. Surprise 
The 1949 Principles of War envisage achieving surprise by denial and 
deception, variation in operations, rapidity and power of execution and use of 
unexpectedly difficult terrain. The 2001 version aims to achieve surprise by striking the 
enemy at a time, place or manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise results from taking 
actions for which an enemy or adversary is unprepared. It is a powerful but temporary 
combat multiplier. It is not essential to take the adversary or enemy completely unaware; 
it is only necessary that he become aware too late to react effectively. Factors 
contributing to surprise include speed, information superiority and asymmetry.    
e. Maneuver 
The 1949 version sees maneuver by itself as being unable to give decisive 
results until combined with the principles of offensive, mass, economy of force and 
surprise. The 2001 version sees maneuver as action to place the enemy in a position of 
disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. In stating that “effective 
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maneuver keeps enemies off balance by making them confront new problems and new 
dangers faster than they can deal with them,” the newer version adopts the tenets of the 
Observe, Orientation, Decision, Action (OODA) loop. Maneuver is seen as not only 
physical movement on the ground, but also as flexibility in application of leadership, 
firepower, information and protection, thereby achieving and applying mass, surprise and 
economy of force. 
f. Economy of Force 
The 1949 version looks at this principle as a corollary to the principle of 
mass. In order to concentrate superior mass at one place, economy of force must be 
exercised at other places. The 2001 version, while being in line with the earlier definition, 
also views economy of force as ensuring that there is discriminating employment and 
distribution of forces. While minimum essential combat power is to be allocated to 
secondary efforts, commanders should never leave any element without a purpose and all 
elements should have tasks to perform. 
g. Unity of Command 
The 1949 version implies achieving cooperation between all elements of a 
command for decisive application of full combat power. The 2001 version states that for 
every objective, unity of effort under one responsible commander is essential. 
Cooperation may produce coordination, but giving a single commander the required 
authority unifies action. With the advent of joint operations, U.S. armed forces may have 
to take part in multinational and interagency coordination and there may be situations 
where the military commander does not directly control all elements in the Area of 
Operations. In the absence of command authority, commanders cooperate, negotiate and 
build consensus to achieve unity of effort. 
h. Simplicity 
The 1949 version paraphrases Clausewitz by saying that in war even the 
simplest things become difficult. In order to ensure success, plans must be simple. The 
2001 version requires that plans be clear and uncomplicated and orders be clear and 
concise to reduce misunderstanding and confusion. This will aid speed of execution as 




The 1949 version looks at two aspects of security. One is the physical 
security of units and formations. The other aspect of security refers to being prepared to 
meet any action by the enemy in order to prevent being surprised. The 2001 version looks 
at security as never permitting the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. Security 
protects and preserves combat power. It does not involve excessive caution as calculated 
risk is inherent in conflict. The 2001 version looks at military deception to enhance 
security. It stresses security from asymmetric threats in low-threat environments. 
3. The Relative Interaction between the Principles of War  
Any given Principle of War cannot be considered in isolation. All principles must 
be considered relative to each other as such connectivity imparts synergy. With this 
operating philosophy, the nine Principles of the U.S. Army need to be seen with the 
thread of logic and sequence which binds them. This is explained in Figure 5 below. 
 












• Everything flows from the Objective. The Objective defines what is meant to be 
attained as the end state of the war. 
• The Objective is attained through the offensive, which implies positive dynamic 
action and involves the application of the rest of the principles.  
• Mass has to be applied keeping in mind Economy of Force lest it become 
wasteful. 
• Economy of Force applied to Mass facilitates Maneuver. 
• Maneuver aids Economy of Force and achieves Surprise. 
• Surprise can be achieved through Maneuver applied with Security. 
• Security achieves and maintains Surprise; Unity of Command facilitates Security. 
• Unity of Command provides Security and makes the exercise of command over 
diverse elements in different scenarios relatively simple. 
 
4. The Principles of War in Relation to 4GW 
The Principles of War are timeless. With minor variations, they are couched in 
identical language in all armies. This is because the basic concept of war is the same 
whether it is derived from Sun Tzu, Vegetius or Clausewitz. 
Introducing new Principles of War should be restricted because the confusion of 
change hinders understanding. It is easier to build upon existing knowledge than to state a 
theory afresh. Terminology should also have continuity in order to avoid the tendency to 
reinvent the wheel. It would be preferable to interpret the existing Principles of War for 
application in 4GW than to coin new principles that may obscure the essence of what is 
implied. Only where unavoidable should new principles be introduced. The succeeding 
paragraphs interpret existing Principles of War for application to 4GW. They refer to 
application in the tactical and strategic fields, because this is where 4GW is fought. 
a. Objective  
Clausewitz stated that “No one starts a war, or rather, no one in his senses 
ought to do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war 
and how he intends to conduct it” (Clausewitz, 1832). In conformity with previous 
generations of war, a clear objective is essential in 4GW. No objective, whether at a 
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strategic or tactical level, can be formed without correct knowledge of the situation. In 
4GW, it is imperative that the objective be such that the necessity for war and the 
righteousness of the cause are incontrovertible. 4GW, to those used to the “clean and 
fair” wars of the earlier generations, is psychologically debilitating and also difficult to 
handle. For a conventional military and a society attuned to conventional wars, 4GW is a 
cultural shock. Therefore, an objective that is morally correct imbues both the army and 
its supporting society with a spirit for persevering with 4GW. In 4GW, the overall 
strategic objective should be known down to the lowest level. Inappropriate action by one 
overzealous man who is not clear about the ultimate objective can wreak a 
disproportionate amount of damage. At both the tactical and strategic levels, correct 
selection of the objective and maintaining focus on that objective during subsequent 
progress of war is of utmost importance. The tactical objectives should be known at least 
two levels up. This helps in seizing the initiative when fleeting opportunities present 
themselves. As an example, within a unit, the platoon commander should know the 
battalion commander’s tactical objective (establish control in Area A, or clear Area B). It 
is irrelevant for him to know the brigade commander’s objective (establish control in 
Area A with the ultimate aim of addressing the adjoining Area C, or clear area B to open 
Highway X for secure movement of road transport).  
b. Offensive 
 In 4GW, offensive implies being one step ahead of the adversary at all 
times in the war of ideas. It implies proactively anticipating the future course of events. 
In 4GW, future actions in many instances have symbolic value and can be anticipated 
when viewed in relation to past events. For example, terrorist attacks have greater appeal 
when linked to a past event, such as retaliation for a specific loss in the past. Offensive 
strategy in 4GW envisages allowing no respite to the enemy over prolonged periods by 
using a combination of all means available, including the media, civil affairs and police 
forces. Offensive tactics in 4GW pertain to seizing the initiative and persevering in 
building up intelligence. Results of offensive action must be measured in terms of 
paralyzing the opponent’s freedom of maneuver within the population. Preemption and 
prevention should be emphasized over quantifiable results, which lead to the pernicious 
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practice of measuring success in terms of the dead. Counting the dead is a First and 
Second Generation measure of success which is counterproductive in 4GW. 
c. Mass 
 In 4GW, the conditions for the classic application of mass do not exist. 
There are no fortified trench lines to break through, no massed armies to defeat and no 
battles of encirclement to fight. Massing of fire is not as relevant as the application of 
precision fire. Massed fire in urban areas is more likely to hurt the population than the 
4GW foe. Mass, however, is still relevant when applied in a different context. In 4GW, 
large areas need to be physically kept secure. Boots are required on the ground in very 
large numbers to restrict the maneuver space of the enemy. At the strategic level, the size 
of the population has to be considered in evaluating the requirement of mass. The mass is 
required whether the population is friendly or unfriendly. If they are unfriendly, the mass 
of manpower is to keep them in check, and if they are friendly, it is to reassure and 
protect them. This involves prolonged and persistent deployment of a large number of 
troops, notably infantry or paramilitary/police forces who must persevere in carrying out 
the task of population control, a mentally tiring and thankless job. 
At the tactical level in 4GW, small unit operations are more relevant than 
large operations. Mass is more relevant to the ability to concentrate resources at one point 
after contact with hostiles is made. Massing prior to contact is counterproductive as it 
gives away surprise. Therefore, correct and actionable knowledge and intelligence is 
essential. Operations launched with inadequate intelligence will not achieve results as the 
4GW foe will easily avoid contact where he does not want it. The 4GW opponent will not 
tackle mass, he will always skirt it. The population will always outnumber the armed 
forces, especially in urban areas. Urban areas must therefore be handled piecemeal. Areas 
that are cleared must be held by paramilitary or police forces to prevent the 4GW enemy 
from flowing back in after the military presence is removed. This implies that mass in 
4GW is a combination of all the resources of the government, not just the army.  
d. Economy of Effort 
A Robo-Soldier is a small, tracked, electrically powered vehicle, capable 
of climbing stairs silently. It is armed with a 7.62 mm machinegun, a night vision device 
and sensors that allow it to be remotely guided into hazardous areas where it can kill 
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militants. It costs $230,000, and 18 have been ordered to be deployed in Iraq by 2005. 
(The Most Amazing Inventions: 2004). The United States is investing in this technology 
because of the great value it places on human life and because the U.S. can afford it. The 
far lesser value placed on human life by poor countries (not because of choice but 
because of compulsion) creates a cultural schism that is difficult for a Western mind to 
comprehend. Theoretically, for the cost of a Robo-Soldier, eighty human fighters could 
be produced in a poorer part of the globe.6 A 4GW foe can easily afford to sacrifice 
twenty ill-trained fighters (costing one-fourth of the Robo-Soldier) to destroy a machine 
such as a Robo-Soldier. To quote an example, the 4GW incident in Mogadishu, Somalia, 
is perceived as an American defeat despite a 1:75 kill ratio in the favor of the American 
soldiers. (Bowden, 1999). This incident proved that a low technology opponent, having 
no dearth of manpower, could achieve its aim against a high technology foe through the 
willingness to accept very heavy casualties. Even the richest of societies cannot sustain 
high expenditure in the long run. This illustrates the importance of the principle of 
Economy of Effort even for the materially preponderant side in 4GW. The hypothesis is 
that Economy of Effort must be kept in mind as a Principle of War, regardless of the 
relative difference in might between two adversaries. In this principle it is essential to 
outlast the enemy over the prolonged period that 4GW runs. The 4GW foe aims to wear 
down resolve. It does so by inflicting human and economic loss. The long timeline of 
4GW means that all resources, human and material, should be used judiciously even if 
there is no apparent lack of resources. Economy of effort in management of human 
resources is much more important than that of material resources. Wasteful use of men 
wears down moral stamina and degrades perseverance. The paradox is that in quantity of 
human resources the 4GW foe is invariably at par or superior to his opponent, regardless 
of his material inferiority.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Estimate based on an exchange rate of $1=Indian Rupees 45/-, per capita monthly family income in 
India being Rupees 2124/- (from http://www.ficci.org/fsedf/jdrchild4.htm) and an average estimated 
monthly cost of rearing a child (giving him free government education/no formal education) until the age of 
18 (after which the child can add to the income) being approximately Rupees 550/- per month. 
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e. Maneuver 
 In 4GW, maneuver implies agility of mind as well as the flexibility to take 
advantage of fleeting windows of opportunity. It signifies mental mobility as well as the 
ability for dynamic movement to conform to changing situations. Such a mindset is 
imperative in a war situation where there are no linear frontlines, no fixed defenses and 
no areas to capture and hold. The concept of “unconditional surrender” is unrealistic in 
4GW. That concept leaves no room for flexibility. In 4GW, if the enemy offers to 
negotiate it should be considered. Maneuver should not be restricted to physical 
maneuver, but should also include maneuver by other means, including psychological 
war and civil affairs (the classic war to win hearts and minds). The aim of maneuver at 
the tactical level within an Area of Responsibility (AOR) is to deny maneuver space to 
the 4GW foe. It also implies having a strategy of dynamic deployment. This is possible 
by constantly keeping the AOR under surveillance, avoiding patterns and addressing all 
areas. Correct maneuver requires an efficient intelligence infrastructure. Maneuvering as 
a reaction to events should be avoided because in many cases, that is exactly what the 
enemy may want. Future events must be anticipated and movement planned accordingly. 
At times, such action may appear fruitless and may lead to a decline in morale. However, 
if the troops are imbued with the right degree of moral spirit, they will understand the 
need for such action and will be able to carry out the task with the required perseverance. 
f. Surprise 
There is little scope for strategic surprise at the military level in 4GW, as 
in this war surprise is confined to the political field. Political initiatives are not in the 
realm of the military commander. By being aware of the potential political initiatives that 
can be undertaken to facilitate the military effort and by keeping in mind the military 
situation, the military leader will be in a better position to render correct advice to the 
political decision makers. Tactical surprise can be achieved in 4GW. Varying routine and 
operations is an obvious way to achieve such surprise. However, it is more important to 
think and operate unconventionally. The military actions of the 4GW foe invariably occur 
on a tactical level. They aim to cause attrition over a prolonged period of time. Their 
tactics are focused on taking advantage of the conventional methods of operation of their 
stronger opponents. If the stronger opponent itself adopts 4GW tactics, it will be able to 
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achieve tactical surprise. Use of Special Forces and unconventional methods will help to 
mentally outmaneuver the 4GW foe. 
g. Security 
At the strategic level, security is best maintained by having contingencies. 
Contingencies can be applied only when there is knowledge about enemy intentions. In 
the earlier generations of war, enemy actions and reactions could be anticipated by 
obtaining insight into his mind by studying his doctrine and methods of instruction and 
the way he trained himself in military exercises. The 4GW foe has no such 
institutionalized and formal parameters. Hence, knowledge through electronic 
surveillance supplemented by Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is very important. 4GW is 
a war of ideas. In such a war, political and diplomatic initiatives will frequently be 
launched by the enemy. These initiatives will attempt to negate military gains. Security, 
therefore, implies being prepared for complete changes in orientation of operations. 
Security also requires effective and imaginative management of media. This is to gain 
strategic moral advantage as well as to avoid premature disclosure of emerging strategies. 
Control of information, appropriate to operations, needs to be exercised regardless of the 
missionary inquisitiveness of free societies. At the tactical level, security of movement 
and plans is essential to avoid unnecessary casualties and compromising operations. 
Judicious use of communication media with secrecy devices will pay dividends. The 
4GW foe must not be confused with an enemy of the previous generations and credited 
with having capabilities that he does not have. The ultimate guarantee of security is to 
respect the ability of the 4GW foe to do the unexpected. Unfortunately, this is often a 
culturally difficult lesson, which is assimilated only after “blooding.”  
h. Unity of Command  
 At the strategic level, single point command under a person combining 
military and civil executive authority is essential. It facilitates success in 4GW because 
4GW is not a war that encompasses only military matters, targets or objectives. Defeating 
4GW foes requires synergy between a number of agencies. This requires a joint 
command, joint headquarters and intimate civil military interaction. Operations need to 
be coordinated with other military forces to achieve the objective. Tactical operations 
should not be launched without a purpose and without reasonably accurate intelligence. 
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Competition between different departments, arms and units needs to be curtailed, as it 
will eventually lead to a lack of coordination and economy of effort. 
i. Simplicity 
4GW is a complicated war because the conventional military is not 
attuned to wage it. It is also complicated because an element which is supposed to keep 
out of the way of war, i.e., the population, is by compulsion at center stage. A national 
single point of command authority, which results when an absolute monarch or dictator is 
the head of the government, makes it simpler to coordinate 4GW. That form of 
government, however, has proven and obvious disadvantages. In democratic setups, such 
single point command is an anathema. This makes the system of command, as well as 
consensus strategy, a complicated affair in 4GW. In the strategic sphere, there should be 
a conscious effort to create simple plans that are understandable and easy to execute. 
Operating in a joint environment makes understanding different work cultures and 
procedures difficult. Unity of command at lower levels of 4GW can make things simpler. 
In the tactical sphere, 4GW can be made simpler by intuitive application of knowledge. 
The value of intuition has been officially accepted by the U.S. Army, as evidenced in FM 
3-0 (2001) which says, “In unclear situations, informed intuition may help commanders 
make effective decisions by bridging gaps in information” (Para 5-3). The deception 
specialist Barton Whaley (2004) says, “Intuition has … only one source, prior experience 
that has been stored in memory.” This is possible after sufficient time has been spent in 
the Area of Operations. Development of intuition for conduct of operation requires long 
tenures within an AOR and the perseverance to see them through. 
5. An Analysis 
The United States of America has been involved in a 4GW since the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C. Many military theorists justify that the 
4GW preceded 9/11 and actually began from the time of the earlier Islamic bombings of 
U.S. targets. However, attempting to respond to the Islamic terror issue through political 
or diplomatic activities, rather than engaging the full might of the U.S. military. Only 
post 9/11 have there been active efforts which can be called war. The war in Iraq is 
referred to as an insurgency. In fact, insurgency is an armed rebellion against the 
established and constituted authority, which should be a sovereign state. In the period 
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after the end of active hostilities in May 2003, until 2005, when the Iraqi government was 
sworn in, Iraq did not fit this definition. What is happening in Iraq is a 4GW. The war 
involves more than indigenous militants. It involves Islamic militants from countries 
other than Iraq, fighting a 4GW against the U.S. and its allies. Just as the Cold War took 
nearly half a century to win, this war too could go on for an equally long time.  
The variation in the interpretation of the Principles of War between 1949 and 
2001 (see Table 4) is the result of the changing realities of the Cold and post-Cold War 
world. The 4GW the United States is involved in affects the interpretation of the 
principles of war in the same manner. An effective global war with terrorism requires that 
the Principles of War be interpreted relevant to this war. As mentioned earlier, the 
process of formulating the Principles of War occurs through learning a number of lessons 
and chunking them under headings that encompass their implications or applications. 
Previous studies of 4GW and the Principles of War present some aspects relevant to 
4GW that are not covered in the list of Principles of the U.S. Army, even though they 
often arise in examination of the Principles. These are Knowledge, Perseverance, Moral 
Force and Administration (the aspects they encompass can be seen in Table 5). Some 
may opine that Perseverance and Moral Force are similar. However, in the 4GW context 
they are different. The reason for this is the long timelines of 4GW, which are apt to wear 
out patience in short time periods. Keeping Perseverance as a separate Principle will 
ensure a focus on “lasting out,” which is central to 4GW. Perseverance is the strength of 
the 4GW foe, though it is forced on him by his relative weakness. Statements made by 
Osama Bin Laden or his lieutenants often refer to how al Qaeda and Islamists will 
eventually win the war even if it takes decades. Such statements are made because the 
weaker entities have no other option and this forces them to persevere. This is not 
difficult for them because perseverance is a cultural trait in most of the poorer parts of the 
world. No one desires long wars, yet the reality is that 4GW will have long timelines. 
Being as strong as the 4GW foe in terms of perseverance would help in fighting in the 
new environment of war. 




Knowledge is essential in any war. Intelligence is derived from knowledge 
about the enemy. In 4GW, where the enemy operates in shadows and may not even have 
the spatial extent and structure of a state, obtaining intelligence becomes even more 
important as well as more difficult. Knowledge of the nature of the 4GW enemy, his 
strategy and tactics, and his political, financial and military base will facilitate combating 
him. At the tactical level in 4GW, actionable intelligence assumes great importance. In 
4GW, such intelligence is obtained quickest when it is intuitive. Intuitive intelligence 
arises from knowledge which has become a capability. As Clausewitz stated, 
“Knowledge must be so absorbed into the mind that it almost ceases to exist in a separate, 
objective way” (1832, p. 147). The value of intuition has been officially accepted by the 
U.S. Army, as evidenced by doctrine contained in FM 3.0 (2001), which states,  
Skilled judgment gained from practice, reflection, study, experience, and 
intuition often guides it (exercise of command in operations). In unclear 
situations, informed intuition may help commanders make effective 
decisions by bridging gaps in information. (Para. 5-3)  
The same is the case in the British Army, where the Army Doctrine (1995) gives due 
importance to intuition by saying, “the commander must still make his decision based on 
his military judgment, where his experience and intuition, as opposed to computer 
analysis, will continue to play a key part” (Para. 0333). Knowledge in 4GW also refers to 
control over information and use of the media, which is a powerful factor in 4GW. How 
and when to release information is a vital part of the principle of Knowledge. Terrorists 
apparently know this, as evidenced by news channels like Al Jazeera repeatedly 
broadcasting the picture of a Marine shooting a wounded terrorist in Fallujah. The same 
channel declined to show the execution of an aid worker, Margaret Hassan, which was 
carried out by terrorists at about the same time (Diehl, 2004). 
b. Moral Force 
The relevance of Moral Force has been realized from time immemorial. 
As Napoleon said, “the moral is to the material as three is to one.” Moral Force comes 
about from the following: 
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 Belief in the cause, including its righteousness and importance, 
 Moral strength to persevere in spite of prolonged mental and material discomfort, 
 A culture of discipline and sacrifice, 
 At the tactical level, plain and simple esprit de corps. 
Moral Force has been the reason behind the successes of weaker sides 
when logic dictated that they should not have been successful. In 4GW, Moral Force is 
all the more important since such wars will extend over long periods of time, which tends 
to wear out human spirit. The reason for prolonged 4GW is that since the enemy avoids 
open combat, there can be no decisive victories. Lack of decisive victories spells 
prolonged campaigns. In addition, because 4GW has a quasi-political complexion, typical 
military methods of swift victories can be counterproductive. This implies that on both 
sides there will be a requirement to persevere in spite of setbacks. In a way, 4GW is 
similar to First Generation War as it is also a war of attrition. However, in this case, it is 
primarily a war to attrite the spirit. 4GW often results in casualties among non-
combatants because the war zone encompasses them. For the soldier who is prepared for 
previous generations of war, the sight of non-combatant suffering can be traumatic. 
Invariably, the suffering of the non-combatants can be used by the 4GW foe to target the 
national spirit of their enemy using public opinion, leading to effects that are more 
strategic than tactical. Tactical morale may still be maintained, but national morale may 
suffer attrition and decline, forcing a defeat. 
c. Perseverance 
Perseverance implies the ability to continue with a particular course of 
action, unmindful of lack of apparent success. It is essential wherever a protracted 
application of military capability is needed. In a 4GW, it may take years to achieve the 
desired results. The patient, resolute and persistent pursuit of established objectives, for 
as long as is necessary is a requirement for success in 4GW. Perseverance is therefore 
essential in 4GW. Quick-fix solutions will not be lasting. Perseverance implies the 
following. 
 Being mentally prepared for a long war. 
 Reining in the desire for “quick-fix” solutions. 
 Taking time to do a thing perfectly for a long-term solution. 
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 Mental robustness to withstand prolonged and continuous stress and strain. 
 Inculcating a culture of consistency and patience. 
 Continuing to strive for victory in the face of temporary reverses. 
d. Administration 
   The principle of Administration is one of the British Principles of War and 
it has been included as a principle by most armies of the British Commonwealth. In the 
United States military, this subject falls under the rubric of “Logistics.” Logistics has 
always been important to the United States military, as the U.S. military will always 
deploy overseas, where sustenance and maintenance require stress on logistics. 
Administration is, however, something more than logistics. Whereas logistics is restricted 
to pure provision of the wherewithal of fighting, administration is wider in scope and 
encompasses the following things: 
 Logistics, 
 Movement, 
 Coordinated support, 
 Physical comfort, medical care, meeting psychological requirements and 
welfare of the army. The same care is extended to the next of kin in order to 
maintain morale. 
While all aspects are important in the prosecution of war, administration is 
among the most important in long wars. It ensures that the military is capable of 
sustaining the prolonged discomfort and psychological attrition of 4GW. Administration 
directly impacts both the conduct of sustained operations and each of the other Principles 
of War. It is the lubricant that reduces the friction of war. However, even in the armies 
that consider Administration a Principle, it is a Principle that is often glossed over. The 
reason for this is that it is the least glamorous of all the principles, lacking glory, thrill, 
romance and attention. 
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B. U.S. ARMY -- PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER 
THAN WAR  
The U.S. Army has another set of Principles called the Principles for Military 
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). These are meant to cater to conditions akin to 





 Unity of Effort 
 Security 
While they consist of three of the nine general principles (Objective, Unity of 
Effort and Security), they have three additional ones (Perseverance, Legitimacy and 
Restraint). The concept of MOOTW presents several dichotomies: 
 Operations cannot be separated as those that are war and those that are other 
than war. This is because what has hitherto been understood as “other than war” is 
in fact the predominant shape of war of the future, namely 4GW. 
 Legitimacy and Restraint are factors that are relevant to dealing with a civilian 
population. The first should be an adjunct to the political decision to commit the 
military to war. If the decision lacks legitimacy, it will have a detrimental effect 
on Moral Force. The degree of restraint has political and humanitarian 
connotations. Restraint is a principle to be applied when dealing with a situation 
involving civilians. It cannot be a principle in war. In any case, restraint and 
legitimacy apply to the principle of “Objective” in FM 3-0. The manual states,  
 
Military leaders cannot divorce objective from considerations of 
restraint and legitimacy, particularly in stability and support 
operations…without restraint and legitimacy, support for military 
operations becomes unattainable. (Para 4-36)  
 
 Perseverance itself is covered as one of the requirements in pursuit of the 
objective. FM 3-0 states that, “[t]o accomplish missions commanders persevere” 
(Para 4-37). However, in 4GW, perseverance acquires an enhanced role. 
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Perseverance is also at cross-purposes to certain ingrained views of military 
operations. One such example is the view that military operations have to be 
conducted at speed to achieve surprise and keep the enemy off-balance and 
guessing. This was true of the earlier generations, especially the Third Generation. 
In 4GW, while tactical contacts still have to be made at speed to utilize fleeting 
opportunities, at the strategic level, deliberation and preparation will pay 
dividends. 
 
C. NEW GENERAL PRINCIPLES  
This study recommends that four new principles be included in the U.S. Principles 
of War. These are Knowledge, Moral Force, Perseverance and Administration. Their 
constituent bits are detailed in Table 5 below. 





Knowledge Information, Intelligence, Intuition, Detection, Command, Control, 
Communication, Observation, Orientation 
 
Moral Force  
 
Will, Esprit de Corps, Belief in Cause, Morale, Humanity, Military 













The manner in which these three mesh with the existing principles is illustrated in 
Figure 6. This is explained as follows: 
 The dictates of the Objective should pass through the Moral Force in the course of 
being translated to offensive action. This will ensure that moral force thereafter 
permeates all the other principles until the objective is attained. When every 
principle is applied and stiffened with moral force, they imbue the army with a 
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spirit for winning and a belief in the righteousness of the cause. At the strategic 
level, the apex objective will always be a political decision. The military head 
should guide the political decision makers while formulating the objective so that 
they are aware of the imperative of the principle of Moral Force. A 4GW breaks 
out only when the 4GW foe has built up his moral strength. It would be naive to 
take on the strength of a 4GW foe without being as strong morally. 
 All actions for execution of the offensive should be conducted with perseverance. 
The Principle of Perseverance should be embedded in each of the Principles that 
will be evoked to fulfill the aim of the war. This implies that all actions emanating 
to translate the offensive into the desired end state have to be executed with 
perseverance. To make it easier to comprehend this requirement, what we are 
looking for in 4GW is the following: 
• Perseverance in maintaining the mass, 
• Economy of force through perseverance, 
• Perseverance in maneuver, 
• Perseverance in achieving surprise, 
• Perseverance in building up security, 
• Perseverance in building unity, 
• Simplicity through application of perseverance in that there should be no 
haste to complete a task that can be better executed with time. 
 Knowledge is the connective tissue between the Principles. It reduces the friction 
caused by uncertainty and also facilitates interaction. 
 Overarching over all the principles should be the principle of Administration, 
which is given the least attention in the formulation of plans. It is a repeated 
lesson of history that strategists incorrectly assume that all effort should be 
centered on attaining the objective, even if there are gray areas of administration 
and logistics. It is presumed that once military victory is achieved, the rest will 
fall into place. This is seldom the case. General Walter Bedell Smith, General 
Dwight Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff in 1944--45, rightly said, “It is no great 
matter to change tactical plans in a hurry and to send troops off in new directions. 
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But adjusting supply plans to the altered tactical scheme is far more difficult” 
(Rutenberg, 1986). Many times, seemingly invincible or superior armies have had 
to give up victory because they neglected Administration. This is seen in a myriad 
of examples, from Napoleon’s defeat at the gates of Moscow to the repeat of this 
feat by Hitler, to Dien Bien Phu, to the fiasco at Desert One during the ill-fated 















Figure 6.   The Relationship of the Proposed Four New Principles 
 
Application of Miller’s hypothesis means that the Principles have to be kept to 
manageable “chunks.” Grouping the 13 Principles would aid the human mind to mentally 
checklist them when applying them to a situation. A suggested chunking of the 13 
Principles under three headings is given below.  
• The Core Principles. Objective and Offensive. 
• The Operative Principles. Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of 

























































































Figure 7.   The Core and Operative Principles drive the engine of war. The 
Enabling Principles bind the whole and reduce and protect against the 
friction of 4GW. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Clausewitz said that  
[P]rinciples and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame 
of reference for the movements he has been trained to carry out, rather 
than to serve as a guide which at the moment of action lays down precisely 
the path he must take. (Clausewitz, 1832) 
Attempting to make the Principles of War specific to a given situation would 
defeat the intended purpose of establishing them. The Principles of War should ease and 
facilitate thinking and application of the art of war, rather than bind the military mind to 
“think within a box.” There is no requirement to overhaul the Principles completely for 
4GW. The best course of action is to reorient the scope of the Principles to cater to 4GW. 
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The Principles of War in general should be applicable to any generation of war. In this 
manner, they aid progressive continuity in the evolution of the doctrine of war.  
One of the principles of war is “Simplicity.” The aim of this principle is to avoid 
unnecessary complexity, which clouds the true meaning of things. In the same manner, a 
single list of the Principles of War will facilitate understanding. This list should 
encompass all principles relevant to war in general, rather than having separate principles 
for different generations or for MOOTW. The Principles can then be interpreted for the 
relevant aspects of a particular war scenario. 
1. A Summary of Principles for War for 4GW 
  While the Core and Enabling Principles are existing Principles applied with 
adapted interpretation to 4GW, the Enabling Principles are additions drawing attention to 
aspects of greater relevancy in 4GW. To summarize, the Principles with their focus on 
aspects of 4GW are: 
• Objective. Clear, comprehensible, attainable and legitimate. Combining 
political and military goals. 
• Offensive. Dynamic action with foresight and availability of correct 
information. The aim is to physically and mentally wear out the opponent and his 
source of sustenance and cohesion. Initiative and restraint required at the tactical 
level.  
• Mass. Capable of dispersed deployment but concentrated application. 
Technology or firepower an aid but not a substitute for manpower. Mass essential 
to reassure the population, ensure their security and keep lines of communication 
secure.  
• Economy of Force. Minimum military force for static security-related 
commitments; maximum in proactive operations. Coordination with and 
utilization of police forces. Sound intelligence of the enemy will avoid idle 
deployment. Central control of intelligence. 
• Maneuver. Tactics varied to make maneuver unpredictable. Intelligence to 
aid maneuver essential. Flexibility inherent in that military maneuver be 
supplanted by political maneuvering wherever an opportunity presents itself.  
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• Unity of Command. 4GW has a political-military nature. Requires 
coordination between military, police and civil agencies.  
• Security. Of plans, population and the military itself. 
• Surprise. Initiative and maneuver negate the surprise the enemy may achieve. 
Unconventional operations essential. 
• Simplicity. Achieved by manageable and systematic milestones with 
sufficient cushion of time. 
• Knowledge. High level of cultural, political and military knowledge of the 
enemy and his networks is essential. This also facilitates intuitive operations. 
Media has to be used imaginatively in psychological warfare and the battle for 
hearts and minds. 
• Perseverance. In 4GW it is “slow and steady” which wins the race because a 
lasting peace requires changing the opponent’s mindset. 
• Moral Force. Moral superiority, dedication, belief in the cause and esprit de 
corps need to be maintained over the period that it takes to fight a 4GW to a 
successful conclusion. 
• Administration. As an aid to movement, maneuver, building trust and 
preserving morale. In the civil affairs field, administration should contribute to 
security of life of the population, which is a tangible, and security of their way of 
life, which is an intangible. This has to be a civil-military endeavor. 
 
2. A Recapitulation 
A world devoid of war is a Utopian dream. War, sadly, has a timeless certainty. 
Differences of interests will always exist and entities will always have to be prepared for 
war. In this preparation, the Principles of War are invaluable tools to guide and focus 
military knowledge for the conduct of war. They aid the intuitive application of doctrine 
by their continuity. War has evolved to a new generation called 4GW. Conventional 
armies continue to follow doctrines more suitable for conventional war. This results in a 
situation where even the United States of America, undoubtedly the strongest military 
power in the world, finds it vexing to defeat enemies who follow 4GW methods. Though 
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4GW represents a sea of change in the way war has hitherto been conducted, the 
underlying principles of war remain the same. It is essential to reinterpret the essence of 
the principles in light of 4GW. The increasing recourse to 4GW does not mean that there 
is no likelihood of Second or Third Generation wars. Such wars may still take place. 
Broadening the scope of the Principles of War will ensure that the capability to fight 








V. SPECIAL FORCES (SF) AS THE PANACEA FOR 4GW 
However repugnant the idea is to liberal societies, the man who will 
willingly defend the free world in the fringe areas is not the responsible 
citizen-soldier. The man who will go where he colors go, without asking, 
who will fight a phantom foe in jungle and mountain range, without 
counting, and who will suffer and die in the midst of incredible hardship, 
without complaint, is still what he has been, from Imperial Rome to 
sceptered Britain to democratic America. He is the stuff of which legions 
are made. 
 - T.R. Fehrenbach (This Kind of War, p. 658) 
The Generation Theory, like all other theories regarding the conduct of war, is an 
attempt to understand and find solutions as to how to best fight the new way of war. 
Classifying war into various time periods based upon the character of war is an effort to 
comprehend the nature of war in the present period. As the military historian Martin Van 
Creveld (1991) writes, “[t]o understand the future, study the past” (p. 192). The theories, 
and the debates generated by those theories, attempt to identify the best way to defeat the 
4GW enemy. In most cases, the conclusion is that where the opponent has found ways to 
negate the advantages of superior technology, there is a requirement to organize and train 
the military to fight like the 4GW foe. Hence, the ideal military configuration to fight in 
the 4GW battlefield is the Special Operations Forces (SOF) (Adams, 1998, p. 302), 
whose methods are as unconventional and “dirty” as that of the 4GW foe (McClintok, 
1992). Progressing to the view that creating SOF or increasing the size of SOF is the 
panacea for 4GW is natural. Such a conviction or desire of the public is illustrated by the 
2004 U.S. presidential elections, where a pledge to double the size of the SOF in response 
to 4GW foes such as al Qaeda or Iraqi insurgents was part of presidential candidate 
Senator John Kerry’s election manifesto. SOF are increasingly viewed as the mantra to 
fight all sorts of 4GW foes, from narco-traffickers and religious zealots to ethnic 
terrorists and insurgents. The proliferation of tasks for SOF raises the question of whether 
this is the correct approach or merely one that is being adopted absent any other solution. 
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A. SUITABILITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF) AS THE 
IDEAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION FOR 4GW 
1. The 4GW Environment 
“4GW uses society’s networks to fight” (Hammes, 2004, p. 208). 4GW is geared 
to carry out actions that directly affect the minds of the enemy’s decision makers. These 
actions could be terrorism, designed to mold public opinion through coercion, or 
information warfare, designed to affect the enemy’s psyche. 4GW is initiated by the 
weaker side and is more offensive than defensive because the 4GW practitioner neither 
intends nor tries to hold on to large physical assets such as territory or vital pieces of 
ground. Fourth Generation foes intermingle with the population whether the population is 
sympathetic to them or not. This is in contrast to traditional guerrillas, for whom 
population support hinged on gaining approval of the population. 4GW is therefore 
fought in an environment of “hiding and seeking.” Conventional militaries are not 
attuned to this environment, which combines detective and constabulary skills with 
military functions. Such skills need troops with adequate language and cultural skills to 
find clues for discerning 4GW foes from within the population, obtain actionable 
intelligence and launch immediate operations to utilize fleeting opportunities. It needs 
skills to counter disinformation and nullify the sources of support and sustenance of the 
4GW foe. The troops who have such skills are the SOF. 
2. The Iraq and Afghanistan Experience 
The U.S. SF experiences directing precision air strikes or hunting Scud missiles in 
the 1991 Gulf War and their predominant role in Afghanistan has brought SOF to the fore 
as the best suited fighting force to operate in 4GW conditions. In Afghanistan in 2003, a 
very small number of SOF were able to impart such synergy to both air operations and 
operations of the Northern Alliance that a quick and relatively cheap victory was attained. 
This has raised the call to replicate the Afghanistan example elsewhere, including in the 
present war in Iraq. This may not be possible as a there are a number of differences 
between the two wars. First, the kind of ground-forces component that was available in 
Afghanistan by way of the Northern Alliance is not available in Iraq and will not be 
available until a dedicated Iraqi National Army and police force are in place. Second, the 
Afghanistan War was more in the nature of a conventional conflict than the insurgency in 
 87
Iraq (Biddle, 2002). Until the Taliban were defeated, there were discernible frontlines, 
which are the most defining characteristic of conventional war. However, though the 
factors that facilitated success in Afghanistan are not available in Iraq, the enduring 
conclusion is that SOF enables a cheaper and quicker victory over an elusive 4GW foe.   
3. Assessment of the Suitability of SOF 
Defining and explaining 4GW, and elaborating on its complex character, brings 
out that fighting 4GW requires the following characteristics in the army: 
• An ability to think and fight unconventionally, 
• An ability to operate in adverse terrain, whether natural or man made 
urban jungles, 
• An ability to maintain a low profile, remain undetected and achieve 
tactical surprise,  
• Very high standards of morale, esprit de corps, endurance and 
perseverance, 
• Capability of creating ambiguity of involvement, leaving a small footprint 
and providing the government with an avenue for retracting and denying 
involvement when required,  
• A high level of cultural understanding of the area of operations, 
• An ability to organize, train and empathize with local forces. 
 
The characteristics given above are intrinsic to SOF. This implies that SOF are 
the most appropriate part of the military to meet 4GW challenges. In addition, of all the 
components of the military, SOF appear to be the most suitable to apply the Principles of 
War that are relevant to 4GW. This is evident when interpreting the Principles of War for 
4GW as detailed in Chapter IV. 
4. Principles of War Applied to Special Forces 
How the Principles relate to the SOF is given below: 
• Objective. SOF are the only component of the military that are capable of 
attaining or influencing political and strategic objectives through tactical actions.  
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• Offensive. The nature of their employment dictates that SOF are steeped 
in an offensive outlook. The training of the SOF is focused on this quality. 
Dynamic action is the forte of the SF.  
• Mass. In 4GW, this Principle is arrived at with an application of all 
resources of the government. The SOF are one of those resources. The nature of 
the employment of SOF compensates for mass, but does not substitute for mass in 
all circumstances. 
• Economy of Force. Use of SF is the epitome of Economy of Force. As a 
result, employing SF carries the greatest appeal in the minds of the political 
leadership and the public. They have an aura of giving “more bang for the buck.” 
• Maneuver. SOF follows UW tactics, which makes their actions 
unpredictable. They can maneuver with agility on any terrain because of their 
lighter configuration.  
• Unity of Command. SOF enable the combat power of a country to be 
applied without an irrevocable military commitment. This characteristic gives 
SOF applications a political-military nature and a greater ability to be employed 
under civilian direction.  
• Security. The nature of SOF leads to their reputation as being “the quiet 
professionals.” This aids their clandestine deployment and ensures the security of 
their employment. 
• Surprise. Unconventional operations are designed to surprise. The SOF 
doctrine rests on unconventionality. 
• Simplicity. Being small in size, the SOF have a limited footprint. The 
employment of SF aids simplicity, especially in complex situations. 
• Knowledge. SF are that part of the military which has a high level of 
cultural, political and military knowledge of the enemy and his networks. The 
conduct of operations by SF is intuitive, which is the result of their extremely 
high standards of training and detailed knowledge of their enemy. 
• Perseverance. In 4GW, it is strategic persistence and tactical speed that 
wins the race. SOF can be deployed over prolonged periods waging a quiet (and 
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maybe dirty) war, yet they do not create resentment against the war, either 
nationally or internationally.  
• Moral Force. Traditionally, SOF have an organization and doctrine which 
aid in generating, developing and maintaining of moral superiority, dedication, 
belief in the cause and esprit de corps. 
• Administration. SOF can operate with a limited administrative backup 
because of their small units of employment and ability to improvise. 
Rear Admiral William H. McRaven, in his study on validating the applicability of 
specific principles for special operations, arrived at six principles. These “Principles for 
Special Operations” are Simplicity, Security, Repetition, Surprise, Speed and Purpose 
(McRaven, 1995, pp. 11-23). All of these principles appear among the thirteen Principles 
of War given above, or among the details of their constituent bits given in Tables 3 and 5 
of Chapter IV. McRaven identifies “Repetition” as a separate principle, instead of a 
constituent of the larger principle of Perseverance as given in Chapter IV. McRaven 
stressed repetition because he identified constant practice and rehearsals as a determinant 
of success in special operations. Practice and rehearsals are conducted at the tactical level 
of war. This alludes to the suitability of keeping special operations at the tactical level of 
conduct, though their impact can be at the strategic level.    
From an examination of the principles described in Para. 4 above, it is evident that 
other than the principle of Mass, all principles are relevant to SOF. This reinforces the 
argument regarding the suitability of SOF in 4GW. The performance of SOF in the first 
Gulf War and in Afghanistan validated their importance in unconventional applications. 
SOF are the best structured to fight on the 4GW battlefield. If the size of SOF was 
increased to an extent that their mass became significant enough to impact the 4GW 
battlefield, theoretically, they would be the ideal army to be employed in 4GW. 
Practically, however, there could be pitfalls as the “footprint” increases. 
 The nature of sensors, air power, precision weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction negate large-scale conventional wars between nation-states. In this milieu, 
heavy armor, artillery or other firepower-based armies are not the more efficient means of 
fighting. Armies need to be centered on infantry using the tenets of UW. Light infantry 
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utilizing UW is best suited for 4GW. Special Forces are the best light infantry trained in 
UW. Hence, the obvious optimum solution is to increase the size of SF. Increasing the 
size of SF would make SF a sort of “Super Infantry.” Imparting such a shape to the army 
is in consonance with the reasons that led to the transformation of the battlefield from the 
Third to the Fourth Generation. 
 
B. WHAT AILS THE ARMY? 
Successive, apparently cumbersome deployments of the Army in 4GW conflicts, 
whether by the United States or other countries, have given rise to the perception that 
something ails the army. American, Russian, Indian, or even the hitherto hallowed Israeli 
Army have had their share of blundering on the 4GW battlefield. Whether in Somalia or 
Iraq, Afghanistan or Chechenya, Sri Lanka or Kashmir or the First or the Second 
Intifada, the public perception is that the conflicts could have been better handled by the 
militaries involved. This is evident from the volume of writing on these wars and the 
greater interest in theories of the changing nature of war, one such theory being that of 
4GW.  
Lessons learned from the above wars give rise to questions about what is wrong in 
the army. These questions persist even though these wars have ultimately had military 
success. The reason for this is that in the public eye success is no longer measured by a 
favorable outcome. Success is a favorable outcome with minimum casualties, 
accompanied by political success and achieved in the shortest timeframe. A study of 
these wars reveals some of the shortcomings in the approach to war in conventional 
armies as given below: 
• Doctrine. Army doctrine is still embedded in the mold of previous 
generations. Victory is still measured through the physical occupation of an area 
or the capitulation of an army. In 4GW, where both of these determinants may be 
absent, the army has to identify other tangible ways in which to define success. 
Body counts are one such answer, but in most cases, body counts have given an 
incorrect picture of success. The populations in the parts of the globe where 4GW 
foes are encountered are large. They have a greater capacity to sustain human 
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losses. The ability to sustain losses and the occurrence of losses eventually fosters 
a stoic culture. This makes the task of the conventional military even more 
difficult. Under such circumstances, body counts create an incorrect aura of 
victory. The 4GW foe is more than willing to sacrifice numbers to achieve 
success. Body counts do not lead to victory. Victory is more the result of winning 
over the population and marginalizing the leadership. The Airland Battle doctrine 
of the extended or deep battlefield was specific to the big war in Europe, and as 
that big war has vanished, so has the relevancy of that doctrine. Unfortunately, the 
U.S. Army and armies all over the world are still steeped in that doctrine. 
Wherever nuclear weapons are available, their presence is almost disregarded in 
the formulation of doctrine because their use is considered almost unthinkable. 
Even between adversaries armed with nuclear weapons, armies continue to use a 
doctrine for conventional war because they cannot imagine any other doctrine. 
The use of nuclear weapons on military targets is factored in without much 
consideration for the consequences of the use of those weapons. 
• Organization. Organization has to keep pace with technology or the 
benefits of technology cannot be realized. In 1939, the tank and the aircraft were 
both available to the French in greater numbers than they were to the Germans. 
However, the Germans organized themselves in combined arms teams to exploit 
the benefits of technology. 4GW is more a product of organization than of 
technologies. When available technologies are adapted or organized in a manner 
that fulfills needs, they change the nature of war. The Army/Corps/Division 
organization of conventional armies is meant for conventional war. However, this 
organization continues to persist in 4GW, even though most of the engagements 
of these wars have been at the tactical level. It can be argued that it is incorrect to 
change an entire military organization in response to a type of war that may be 
merely a passing phase. However, this phase has been around as a predominant 
form of war for almost 40 years, since the end of the Vietnam War.  
• Equipment. The equipment (and related technology) of conventional 
armies is tailored to fight conventional wars. The equipment of one side is akin to 
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that of the other. To gain an advantage, resources are spent to ensure that your 
equipment is better than that of your opponent. Commonality of equipment and 
technology also aids in predicting the way the enemy will fight. For example, 
even if the enemy has superior tanks, one can still superimpose the capability of 
his equipment on your own template to make reasonable deductions about how he 
will conduct his operations. In 4GW, there is a mismatch between the equipment 
of one side in respect to the equipment of the other. This mismatch makes 
intelligence about the enemy difficult to gather. Even if equipment is the same in 
certain spheres, the method of its exploitation will be different. For example, the 
primary use of the RPG-7 when used by a conventional army is as an anti-armor 
weapon. The conventional mind rebels at its unconventional use and never 
imagined the RPG-7 as an anti-aircraft weapon. Though RPG-7s are reported to 
have been used against helicopters in Vietnam, journalist Mark Bowden writes 
that prior to the Mogadishu incident, the firm view was that “It was difficult and 
dangerous, almost suicidal, to point [an RPG] skywards [and that] they were 
useless against helicopters” (1999, p. 106). The Somalis proved that RPGs could 
be used against helicopters and so did the Afghans (Operation ANACONDA, 
Feb. 2005, p. 72). In 4GW, the RPG may be used as an anti-armor or anti-
personnel weapon, an area weapon, a precision weapon or as a high trajectory 
mortar (Thomas, 1999). Other variations have included use as an anti-bunker 
weapon or modified to be an incendiary. 4GW has seen the utilization of weapons 
and equipment in ways for which the stronger side has been unprepared. 
• Training. The conventional military trains for the “big war.” Very little 
time is devoted to 4GW-related instruction. Every year militaries all over the 
world conduct their maneuvers. These maneuvers have no scope for preparing the 
army to fight in a 4GW environment. Archetypical maneuvers have spawned a 
number of jokes on army life alluding to the rigidity of ideas and the mindset in 
the military. The reason for this is the breakup of military affairs into strategic, 
operational and tactical fields. Strategic training is not conducted on the ground. It 
is the domain of war rooms and government directives. Tactical training occurs 
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mainly at the battalion level, conducted for the most part in the vicinity of 
peacetime billets. Operational training, which requires larger areas, is for armies 
that schedule large-scale annual maneuvers. The problem is that 4GW has little 
scope for the operational aspect. In the maneuvers themselves, while tactical 
exercises are conducted under realistic conditions, the operational exercises have 
a surreal atmosphere, because to complete the maneuvers in a given timeframe, 
tactical exercises are telescoped in order validate operational concepts.4GW 
actions are dispersed and do not involve large bodies of troops. Higher 
headquarters are involved in 4GW more in respect to the administrative aspects. 
The divergence of requirement and reality leads to a situation where training in 
aspects relevant to 4GW gets second shift in the conventional army. This leads to 
setbacks such as the lack of a coordinated approach when the war in Iraq became 
a 4GW, the casualties that the Indians suffered at the outset in Sri Lanka and the 
massacre of Russian troops in the initial stages of the war in Chechnya. In all 
cases, the armies involved improved their performance after paying a price in 
lives. 
 
1. The SOF Image 
SOF have one enduring image in the public eye, which is difficult to change. This 
image is that of efficient and calm killing machines who are force multipliers. This image 
has been built over the years, shaped by the kudos or opprobrium heaped on “special 
operators” or “commandos” (the erstwhile name for unconventional soldiers) in either 
print or movie media. The image cannot be dismissed as incorrect. If a Hollywood movie 
is made about Special Forces, what appeals to the public is what is called in SOF 
vocabulary as DA or “Direct Action.” Viewers find it more interesting to see SOF in the 
thrill of combat than to watch how they carry out mundane tasks such as training 
guerrillas.  
Because of this enduring image, there is confusion and shock when the people see 
their military struggling to win a 4GW. In such a case, the people logically ask why their 
government is not using UW forces to fight unconventional enemies. In their Hollywood-
created perception, SOF are not a scarce resource. They feel that in the same manner that 
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they saw or read about the amazing efficiency of SOF, the SOF can go and get the 
enemy. This picture exists not only in the minds of U.S. citizens, but also in the minds of 
people all over the world. Worldwide, people expect that what cinemas portray about 
SOF is close to their actual capabilities. Over the decades, movies like “Green Berets” 
(1968), “Rambo” (1982), “Commando” (1985), “Delta Force” (1986), “Navy SEALS” 
(1990), “Universal Soldier (1992)” and their clones have given the SOF an image 
synonymous with those who snatch victory from the jaws of defeat through the means of 
unconventional warfare. Research conducted at the University of Oklahoma suggests that 
while average moviegoers realize that the images of the U.S. Army are fictional, they are 
too strong to ignore and are used unconsciously by people in forming opinions. If such 
movies constitute the majority of exposure a person has to the military, the person will 
then draw upon those images when considering military affairs in forming opinions and 
making decisions about the military (Trammel, Turner and Briggs, n.d.). Public opinion 
does not appear miraculously from the sky. Its formation is aided by the media, which 
includes the entertainment industry. When the public has to make complex decisions on 
topics about which they are uninformed they turn to “knowledge supermarkets.” These 
supermarkets are primarily the media and the entertainment industry. George Gerbner’s 
Cultivation Theory states that images such as those seen in television and movies can 
form misrepresented expectations (Trammel et al.). The Cultivation Theory states that 
heavy exposure to mass media, namely television, creates and cultivates attitudes more 
consistent with a media-conjured vision of reality rather than actual reality. Public 
opinion shapes the views of policy makers. The policy makers and politics are deeply 
intertwined. When there is a requirement for increasing or reducing the size of the 
military, public opinion plays a great role in making the relevant decisions. This is not 
just to motivate young people to join the military or to inspire taxpayers to willingly fund 
the cost of the military. Considering public opinion helps create convictions that in the  
present world, elite forces are the best and most economical antidote to 4GW. The scores 
of articles that appear in the media on this subject are evidence that such a conviction has 
indeed been created. 
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2. Strengths and Weaknesses of SOF 
SOF are the successors to the Commandos, elite troops who fought 
unconventionally. Because 4GW is war waged by unconventional means, the natural 
conclusion is that 4GW should be fought by SOF. 
Terrorists, insurgents, militants, etc., are umbrella terms for 4GW fighters. In the 
same manner, in the present day there are two types of unconventional soldiers; first, 
Special Forces and second, contracted soldiers (or the erstwhile mercenaries). Contracted 
soldiers differ from mercenaries in that they are contracted openly by states, similar to 
commercial enterprises. Mercenaries on the other hand, are soldiers who operate in the 
shadows. No laws regulate their employment or restrict their actions. High quality 
contracted soldiers and mercenaries are for the most part ex-SOF. In fact, the high 
salaries being offered to contracted soldiers is causing a problem in retention of trained 
manpower, especially of the DA variety, in the SOF (Couch, 2005, p. 38). Such practices 
reinforce the view that SF are the most suited for 4GW. To examine this further, it is 
pertinent to go over the strengths and weaknesses of SF. 
a. Strengths of SOF 
The following are the strengths of SOF. 
• They have a strategic reach. Small size, modular self-contained 
organization, enhanced language and cultural skills and the ability to 
quickly adapt to changed operating conditions make it possible to 
deploy SOF in any part of a large country or in any part of the world 
(in case of the U.S. SOF) as a quick reaction force. 
• They have an independent direct-action capability. They are trained 
to carry out missions based upon their organic weapons and 
equipment.  
• They have the training and equipment to conduct operations that 
involve human intelligence collection. 
• They leave a small footprint. As a result, they are the preferred 
means of employment of force where political or strategic conditions 
dictate a need. 
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• They have the ethos and training to persevere in the face of setbacks 
without a decrease in morale. 
• U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) can task-organize better to suit the 
mission requirements because of the mix of specialists in each team 
(this comment is based upon the U.S. Army SF organization of A 
Teams). Most SF in the world follow the U.S. model. 
• SOF can respond faster to contingencies because of their small size 
and ethos to kick-off for an operation from a cold start. 
• They have a higher endurance level than conventional forces because 
of their selection and training. 
• SF are better oriented for conduct of operations in any region. This is 
a virtue of their small size, which enables them to carry out far 
ranging, and if required, covert, reconnaissance in peace time when 
the use of conventional units becomes difficult. 
 
b. Weaknesses of SOF 
The following are the weaknesses of SOF. 
• Because of their restricted size, they cannot maintain continuous 
oversight over an area with large magnitude either in terms of 
geography or population. 
• For prolonged deployments, they require the support of conventional 
forces whether they are of their own country or of friendly forces. 
Small SF detachments like “A Teams,” if tasked to train friendly 
forces, can carry out this task better if they do not have to cater to 
their own protection and administration.  
• They take a long time to be trained to full capability.  
• SOF are difficult to integrate in the big army because of the 
differences in their ethos and organization. This is a paradoxical 
situation because integration would undermine the autonomy that 
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builds up the unconventional approach that is the raison d'être of 
Special Operations. 
• SF do not have the capability of winning the peace among a hostile 
or threatened population. Where an area has to be occupied, SF do 
not have the mass to ensure that the population sees their presence at 
every location, which is essential for instilling confidence. 
 
3. The Misconception of the SF Image 
The term “Commando” created an image of conventional soldiers trained to carry 
out unconventional operations. This image evolved as a result of the Commando raids 
carried out in occupied Europe during World War II. Commandos were part of the 
conventional army and carried out “covert-overt” operations. The operations were covert, 
but after their conduct was over they could be overt as they were an adjunct to a larger 
war. The SF concept grew out of the insertion of Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
teams into various occupied areas to organize partisans. The OSS, being more of a “cloak 
and dagger” entity (Adams, 1998, p. 33) had a requirement of operating unconventionally 
but not as part of the “big army.” Based on the British Special Operations Executive 
(SOE) model, the OSS conducted tasks such as “sabotage, espionage, subversion and 
propaganda” (Marquis, 1997, p. 9). Hence, they were carrying out tasks that were more 
political in nature. Adams (1988), when describing the nature of operations carried out by 
SF, writes, “Special Operation Forces act out their deadly games in a clandestine 
environment that is only rarely visible to the public” (p. 9). SF are required to be 
clandestine to remain effective because too much exposure to their modus operandi 
dilutes their effectiveness in achieving surprise. 
The period of the 1960s saw an upsurge of revolutionary activities all over the 
world. In most cases, these were aided and abetted by Communists. The involvement of 
the U.S. military in Vietnam saw the deployment of Army SF in the Civilian Irregular 
Defense Group (CIDG) program, which was otherwise a CIA operation (Adams, 1998, p. 
84). Later, the 1970s saw an exponential increase in terrorist activities all over the globe. 
The U.S. response to this was specialist anti-terrorist units such as the GSG 9, 1st Special 
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Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (Delta Force), etc. By associating counter-terrorist 
components with the overarching concept of Special Forces, people have at times 
considered SOF anti-revolutionary, anti-communist and anti-terrorist. As per McClintock 
(1992), counter-terrorism is too often a name for torture and assassination, and despite 
terms such as psychological warfare, counterinsurgency, UW, and Low Intensity Conflict 
(LIC), when one takes away the rhetoric, the problem is that this type of war has always 
been associated in the Western mind with the “dark art.” The military is made up of 
people and this perception of the SOF flows not only into the people, but also into the 
conventional military.  
 
C. ANALYSIS OF THE PANACEA 
Conventional forces win by sheer numbers, air power, more firepower and 
superior training. SOF contributes to victory by achieving objectives that are conducive 
to their skills, weapons, tactics, training, physical fitness and organization. SOF skills are 
symmetric to 4GW and hence SOF are the ideal force to fight 4GW. Other than Mass, 
they have the qualities to bring every Principle of War to fruition. A solution to overcome 
the problem of deficiency of mass is to increase the size of the SOF. This is the same 
solution that public opinion arrives at, as previously described. The conclusion of this 
Chapter is that SOF are the panacea for at least the military aspect of 4GW as far as it 
relates to the conduct of operations. This makes for a compelling argument to increase 
the size of the SOF so that they can fight 4GW with a greater degree of efficiency than 
the conventional forces.  
Conventional forces have a role in a conventional war. If countries have enemies 
who will engage them only conventionally, then the requirement for conventional forces 
still exists. But the lessons and history of 4GW over the last 40 years have convinced 
every one of the weaker of two opponents that there exists a way to fight a war 
asymmetrically to negate the advantages of the stronger. Whether the asymmetry is 
created through nuclear weapons or through 4GW is a different issue. Among any two 
belligerents there will always be one who is weaker. India is weaker than China, Pakistan 
is weaker than India, the Israelis are weaker than the Arab world, the North Koreans are 
weaker than the South Koreans backed by a U.S. nuclear fist, Taiwan is weaker than 
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China, and Ecuador is weaker than Peru. The list goes on. Open war between equally 
matched belligerents is rare. Where there is a likelihood of that, as between Germany and 
France in 1939 and between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, other 
solutions are found. The Germans graduated to the next generation of war, and in effect 
so did the U.S. and the Soviet Union. They indulged in 4GW through proxies all over the 
globe. 
There are two things that create a “demand pull” for an increase in the size of the 
SF. One is public opinion, which shapes the actions of the political leadership. The other 
is the views of military theorists and thinkers, which shape the views of the military 
leadership and the bureaucracy. 
SOF are expected to play both the “Rambo” role and that of the winners of hearts 
and minds. The public perception, based on movies and a far greater exposure to the 
activities of the SOF than in the past, is that SOF are the answer to all vexing enemies, 
especially of the unconventional variety such as al Qaeda or the insurgents in Iraq. The 
public, therefore, expects that SOF will be utilized to a greater extent than the 
conventional military in 4GW. 
Military intellectuals are also increasingly advocating the view that the problems 
of 4GW require manpower skills and not technology. As military analyst Anthony 
Cordesman states, “[T]he missions that are emerging require skilled and well trained 
troops with area expertise, linguists in far greater numbers, and specialists in civic action 
and nation building as well as guerrilla warfare” (2004, p. xiii). The description of the 
requirement that Cordesman spells out fits the SOF like a glove. If Cordesman is not 
referring to the SOF, then he is suggesting that the entire army be trained in the image of 
SF. In other words, he advocates transforming the army to think and fight 
unconventionally. Similarly, Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the father of Network-Centric 
Warfare (NCW), also veers towards SOF-like qualities as the solution for the battlefield 
of the future because the battlefield with which NCW was conceived has spouted 4GW 
features. Cebrowski and Garstka (1998), writing on NCW, stressed the utilization of 
computerized information networks to turn “information superiority into significant 
competitive advantage.” This was envisaged to be done through linking technological 
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sensors, Command and Control centers and weapon platforms. NCW was a means to 
transform the military. However, the concept of NCW has adapted to the changing face 
of war. In an interview as Director of the Office of Force Transformation, Cebrowski 
stated: 
[NCW] is not about the network, rather it is about how wars are fought. 
How power is developed. During the industrial age, power came from 
mass. Now power tends to come from information, access and speed. The 
issue is not weapons reach. The issue is sensor reach. The whole world 
knows that if U.S. military systems can see a target we can kill it. 
Consequently, potential enemies are working very hard to make it difficult 
for us to sense their targets, so we are shifting from a weapons game to a 
sensor game. If you look at those Special Operations personnel on the 
ground in Afghanistan, they were sensors. (IITA Interview, 2002)   
Such interpretations are studied in all military institutes where doctrine is evolved, 
whether in the United States or elsewhere in the world. The message that comes across is 
clear; SOF can provide the answer to 4GW problems, get more of them. However, the 
question arises whether expansion may be a drawback in itself. Many within the SOF 
community have been of the opinion that the rapid expansion of the SOF in Vietnam 
seriously diluted the quality of the force. Expansion brings conventionally minded people 
into the Special Operations community. This undermines their greatest strength, which is 
to think and act unconventionally (Adams, p. 158). This aspect is examined in greater 
detail in Chapter VI. 
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VI. WHEN SPECIAL IS NO LONGER SPECIAL 
The smaller the unit the better its performance. 
-- T.E Lawrence (The Seven Pillars of Wisdom) 
 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) have traditionally been that part of the 
conventional military whose modus operandi is unconventional. When conventional 
armies are stymied by the methods of unconventional enemies, the perception is that SOF 
will be most suitable to beat this enemy. This perception is not misplaced. Indeed, 
sayings such as “fight fire with fire” and “set a thief to catch a thief” have time-tested 
logic. When faced with a difficult unconventional war situation, the first thought that 
springs to mind is to advocate an increase in the strength of the SOF. This was elaborated 
upon in Chapter V. In the U.S. military, SOF encompasses Special Forces of all the 
services. SF by itself refers to Army Special Forces. The Naval Special Forces are not 
referred to as SF; the terms used for Navy Special Forces are Naval Special Warfare 
Units or the more familiar SEAL Teams (Adams, 2001). Worldwide, the generic term 
“SF” refers to all types of Special Forces. For this reason, the terms SOF and SF have 
been used interchangeably as appropriate in this Chapter, as well as elsewhere in this 
thesis. 
Ross (1952) and Williamson (1967) have theorized that an increase in size does 
not necessarily translate to greater efficiency. Regarding both the economic field and 
organizational theory, they have suggested that greater size can lead to a decrease in 
performance. If this is the case and if the SOF are increased in size without deliberation, 
it is likely that their operating efficiency will be degraded. A question arises about 
whether the SOF be expanded to improve the ability to fight in the 4GW environment. In 
seeking an answer to this question, this chapter examines: 
• Factors affecting the optimum size of Special Forces, 
• Whether large size affects Special Forces in that an increase in size impacts 
negatively on their “Special” character. 
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This examination refers to the U.S. SOF but is applicable to SF anywhere else in 
the world. 
A. SUITABILITY OF SOF FOR THE 4GW ENVIRONMENT 
1. Special Forces and What Makes the SOF “Special” 
Special Forces are elite units with specialized personnel, equipment, training or 
tactics exceeding the capabilities of conventional military forces. They have a very high 
level of skill in specific areas. They normally follow unconventional methods of 
operation. Philosophers and economists agree that only the scarcity of a thing adds to its 
value. In the same manner for something to be considered “special,” other things must be 
considered “ordinary” in comparison. For SOF to be “Special,” they have to build and 
maintain skills and standards that the conventional military does not possess. The reason 
that the conventional military does not have “special” skills is because the skill sets of SF 
are unique and take time to acquire and perfect. To some extent they are also inborn. SF 
personnel need to have greater initiative, a sharper intuitive intellect and a streak of 
daring along with physical and mental stamina. All those who volunteer and join the SF 
have this quality in good measure. The conventional military at present finds it either 
unnecessary or unfeasible to acquire special skills because these skills are not central to 
the strategy and tactics of the First to Third Generations of War.  
2. The SF Operator 
An SF operator, if he is to be truly “Special,” needs to be an expert in his 
profession. Acquiring expertise takes time; hence inducting a “rookie” into the SF is not 
desirable. Therefore, SF ideally begins with inducting trained soldiers, who have put 
sufficient time in the military, into their ranks. The feeder units for entry into U.S. Army 
SF are generally the airborne formations and the Rangers. Those SF recruits therefore 
start off with a higher level of skills and a greater ease in assimilating the SF standards of 
fitness, culture and doctrine. The SF operator is typically older than the average enlisted 
soldier/sailor as learned by Clancy (2001, p. 5) and Couch (2005). The latter states that 
the average age is 28 years for a SEAL and 32 years for a member of an SF A-Team. 
This is because his training should ideally begin without having to spend time on basics. 
He ab initio needs military skills that come with combat experience and maturity, which 
a fresh entrant will not have. At the same time, he needs those qualities of daring and 
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risk-taking, which in an average person decrease with age. He requires the maturity to 
make considered decisions and must have the mental makeup to take risks with an icy 
clarity of mind, unhindered by the fog of youthful exuberance and bravado. The SF 
require mature people who can make considered and calculated decisions and risks. 
While risk-taking is a common feature among the young (say less than 25 years of age), it 
is rare in older people. The operator has to have above average physical fitness, which 
has been the traditional hallmark of a Special Forces soldier. He need not be a superman, 
but he should have the capability of sustained endurance in any terrain or weather. 
 
B.  THE SOF SIZE AND PERFORMANCE EQUATION 
Normally, size is not associated with agility and flexibility. These two qualities 
are among the greatest virtues of the SOF. Axiomatically, an increase in size should 
result in a reduction in these qualities. There are three main factors that call to question 
the suitability and feasibility of increasing the size of the SOF. These are: 
• The likelihood of deterioration in efficiency with an increase in size of the SOF, 
• The limits imposed on size by the kind of organizational structure most suitable 
for SF, 
• The limits imposed on size by the shortage of the correct quality of manpower 
for SF. 
 
In order to examine these factors a brief overview of SF is necessary. 
1. What Makes the SOF   
As per the techno--thriller author Tom Clancy (2001), modern SF may have had 
their beginning in the German “Storm Troopers” of World War I, who were the first units 
of soldiers with special skills (p.5). However, even prior to this era, soldiers who were 
different from the ordinary existed in the shape of the British “light infantry” or the 
American “sharpshooters” and “scouts” of the frontier wars. In modern war, SF came to 
the fore with the British Commandos and SAS. These were the models and forerunners of 
SF. These units were part of the conventional army and all their support functions, such 
as intelligence, logistics and transportation, were carried out by the army. The U.S. SOF, 
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as they are structured at present, have developed integral support facilities to a much 
greater extent. This enables the deployment of the SOF with minimal assistance from the 
mainstream army; the only assistance needed may be transportation and strategic 
intelligence. This capability, while being useful in situations where a low profile 
deployment is preferred, has its downside. It creates a belief that the SOF have the ability 
to independently handle even large conflicts. This impression gives rise to the demand for 
increasing the size of the SOF, with the belief that operations such as those in Iraq can be 
better handled by the SOF. 
The U.S. SOF consists of the actual operators (the trigger pullers or pure shooters) 
as well as those who support them through related activities. The operators represent 
approximately 25% of the total SOF strength. Couch (2005) states that the SOF are a 
little over 50,000 personnel with 16,000 being the “pure shooters.” Of these, no more 
than 5,000 can be deployed in prolonged sustained operations. The supporting personnel 
include PSYOPS and Civil Affairs (CA) units. Though these are support units, they can 
carry out operations in their own right. As given by Adams (1998, p. 16), the tasks of the 
SOF and the components entrusted to carry them out include: 
a. Army 
• Special Forces --- Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign 
Internal Defense (FID), Direct Action (DA), Special 
Reconnaissance (SR), Counter-terrorism (CT) 
• Rangers -- DA, CT 
• SO Aviation -- DA, SR and support all operations 
• PSYOP -- Support all operations 
• CA -- FID, UW, Information Warfare (IW) 
b. Navy 
• DA, SR, CT, FID, UW 
• Special Boat Unit (SBU) -- Support all operations 




c. Air Force  
• Support all operations  
The U.S. SOF have supporting units in terms of CA/PSYOPS as well as 
aviation, supply and communication assets. This is not the case in most other countries, 
where the SF rely to a much greater degree on the mainstream military and hence cannot 
contemplate independent operations. While all SOF need to have cultural, language and 
intelligence skills and the ability to think “outside the box,” the operators need a 
particular “special” mental makeup as well.  
2. The Limits of Organization Size  
Two aspects of organizational theory are relevant to the issue of limiting an 
organization’s size. The first relates to the span of control, which becomes larger with 
size and is thought to reduce efficiency. The second relates to the organizational type to 
be adopted, keeping in mind the specific requirements of an organization. 
The size of a country’s military establishment is dependent on the following: 
• The nature and level of threats that a country faces, 
• A country’s aspirations to power, since the armed forces are the source of 
and a determinant of power, 
• The tasks that the armed forces of a country have been given by the political 
leadership; e.g., in totalitarian states, the armed forces may have the task of 
keeping their own population in check, 
• The resources available to a country, such as population and financial 
resources, 
• The geography of the country; e.g., nature of its terrain and length of land 
and/or sea borders. 
Ultimately, the determinant of size is the availability of human and financial 
capital and the requirement for resources relative to present and future tasks. Capital is 
important because a country has to invest not only in the military but in economic tasks in 
other areas. If these areas are neglected, the social climate, quality of life and overall 
development could deteriorate. This is a politically important issue, especially in 
democracies. The size and cost of the army has to be prudent to avoid waste and 
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sufficient to carry out the required tasks. Studies have analyzed the relation of large-size 
firms to organizational efficiency. These studies conclude that there has to be a limit to 
firm size because beyond a particular size, performance is affected. This is especially true 
of organizations that are carrying out specialist functions.  
3. Effect on Size Due to Diseconomies of Scale 
The economist Dr. Staffan Canback (Feb. 2002), utilizing work done on this 
subject by O.E. Williamson (1975), concludes that there are four major categories of 
diseconomies of scale. These are: 
a. Atmospheric Consequence 
As companies expand, there is increased specialization but also less 
commitment on the part of the employees. The employees often have a hard time 
understanding the purpose of corporate activities, as well as the small contribution each 
of them makes to the whole. Applied to the military, we can state that as armies expand 
there is a requirement to specialize in specific areas, as the complete army cannot be 
expected to carry out each task with equal competence and precision. Theoretically it 
may be possible for the complete army to undertake any task, but the time taken to reach 
the required level of expertise, and the expenditure involved, will make that imprudent. 
Couch (2005, p. 38) states that  
it takes three years or more to train a SF operator for duty, and many more 
years before he becomes an impact player in that unit. New men entering 
the SOF training pipelines in 2005 will not deploy in operational units 
until 2007 at the earliest, and not reach their potential as special operators 
until well past the end of the decade.  
Because of such organizational constraints, there is a requirement to 
specialize components of a military for specific tasks. The SOF are a result of such 
specialization. The limits of firm size in turn apply to this specialized segment of a larger 
organization. If this segment is to be increased in size, it will itself become a bureaucracy. 
The soldiers that form the SOF will suffer from the weakness of a bureaucracy in terms 
of maintaining esprit de corps, and SOF soldiers will have less commitment because they 
will become such small cogs that they will have a hard time understanding the purpose of 
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their operations. They will feel that their contribution is too inconsequential in a large 
war machine to be carried out with the required degree of daring and perseverance. 
b. Bureaucratic Insularity  
As companies increase in size, senior managers are less accountable to the 
lower ranks of the organization and to shareholders. They thus become insulated from 
reality and will often strive to maximize their personal benefits rather than the overall 
corporate performance. This results in organizational slack. The very high degree of 
esprit de corps in SOF is the result of the officers being closely associated in the conduct 
of operations. It is in the conduct phase and in the operational field that esprit de corps is 
fostered, not in the planning phase, where there is no contact between the leaders and the 
led. It is because of this distance between the leaders and led that the conventional army 
has a lower degree of drive relative to SOF. If the size of the SOF is increased, so too will 
the bureaucratic insularity. In small SF units, planning is an interactive process involving 
the leaders and the led, because those who are led have specific core competencies which 
leaders draw upon to make plans. The officer-enlisted ratio in the SF A-Teams is 1:5. 
Such a ratio is unachievable in the conventional military without reducing the quality of 
officers. This ratio reduces the bureaucratic insularity at the grass roots level in SOF. 
c. Incentive Limits 
Large corporations tend to base incentives on tenure and position, rather 
than on merit, because of the difficulty in structuring well-functioning incentive 
programs. Large payments to employees may threaten managers and are avoided. This 
puts large corporations at a disadvantage when compared with smaller enterprises in 
which employees are often given a direct stake in the success of the company. In SOF, 
because of their smaller size, the soldiers have a direct stake in the success of their 
missions. The more non-bureaucratic leadership style means that leaders can more easily 
adapt to follow the advice of seasoned operators of special merit. The feeling of 
“ownership” that can be fostered in small, specialized units makes the members of the 
unit feel that they have a direct stake in its success.   
d. Communication Distortion 
A single manager cannot understand every aspect of a complex 
organization. Thus, it is impossible to expand a company without adding hierarchical 
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layers. Information passed between layers inevitably becomes distorted. This reduces the 
ability of high-level executives to make decisions based on facts. This factor is the easiest 
to apply to the SOF scenario. The larger the SOF, the more hierarchical layers that are 
required going by standard organizational practices.7 The smaller the SOF, the less noise 
there is in the passing of orders. Having flatter organizations may permit larger 
organizations to function without the corresponding increase in noise. However, flat 
organizations have their own shortcomings in that they reduce the tempo of large 
operations. The terrorist’s cell-based network is a flat organization. However, the cells do 
not operate in unison. Defense analysts John Arquilla and David Rondfeldt (2000) 
visualize that a very high level of Information Operations capability will permit 
“sustained pulsing” of swarms of small units to achieve a common objective, permitting 
flat organizations to execute high tempo operations. However, at the present time, the 
organizational changes and Information Operations competence permitting the level of 
stigmergic communications, which are required in swarming, are not developed to the 
required level of competence (pp. 85-87). The larger the SOF becomes, the more difficult 
it becomes to avoid communication distortion, which ultimately leads to loss of 
efficiency. 
4. Effect on Size Due to Problems of Coordination and Management 
Problems of coordination and management always manifest themselves as an 
organization grows larger. The problems of coordination and management are the 
fundamental factors that limit the size of organizations (Ross, 1952). This is supported by 
the following reasoning: 
• Coordination has to be the act of a single center. The principle of division of 
labor cannot be applied to the task of coordination. 
• The supply of coordinating ability available to an organization cannot be 
increased along with other factors since coordination is single point. 
                                                 
7 The move towards flatter organizations is currently gaining momentum as one of the objectives of 
transformation, taking the cue from the terrorist 4GW organizations, which, being based on the networked 
cell structure, are flatter. How flat military organizations can become is a matter of conjecture. The smaller 
the organization, the flatter its structure can be made. 
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• The supreme coordinating authority must have knowledge of the details of the 
problems as a condition of their solution. The larger the field in which 
coordination is attempted, the greater the knowledge required to be possessed 
by the coordinator. 
• Every increase in size beyond a certain point requires a lengthening of the 
scalar chain of authority because the top coordinator has to delegate authority to 
maintain the ability to manage effectively. 
• The scalar chain of authority has a limit. In other words, the span of control has 
a limit. 
 
Ross’ study occurred prior to the information revolution. The information 
revolution has increased the ability to increase the span of control. Coordinating ability 
can vary depending on individual ability, which explains the reasons why some Chief 
Executive Officers or Generals are more successful and sought after than others. 
Ultimately, however, the human brain has a limit. In spite of information management 
tools it can suffer from information overload.  
Armies have traditionally had the capacity to increase rapidly in size without 
apparent ill effects. Between 1933 and 1939, the German armed forces increased in size 
by 3500% (from 100,000 to 3,500,000 personnel) without any deleterious effects. This 
was made possible by increasing the number of controlling headquarters and by 
delegation, especially at the operational level. The strategic level, however, being a single 
center in the form of the Fuhrer, became overloaded. As a result, many crucial strategic 
decisions were erroneously made, not made at all or delayed because the military had 
grown too big for Hitler to have a grip on the situation or be able to devote all his 
attention to it.  
It is because of the decrease in efficiency that is concomitant with an increase in 
size that specialized organizations have short chains of command, a situation which has 
resulted from hard experience more than deliberate design. Whenever specialized 
organizations have grown too large, their efficiency has suffered. An example is the 
Waffen SS who were in essence specialized troops. They were formed in 1940 as 
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specialized bodyguards or to carry out specialized tasks that were political in nature and 
not in the realm of the regular army. By the end of the war they had grown to 600,000 
men (Pipes, n.d.). By this time, very little was left of their specialized character other than 
a marginally higher level of élan and ruthlessness. In the later part of World War II, the 
Waffen SS had in essence become much like the U.S. Marine Corps; they were a fourth 
service with their own formations up to corps size. They had become and were used like 
conventional troops.  
The U.S. Marines have traditionally been more special than the other services. 
They have particular standards of physical fitness and esprit de corps which they have 
maintained and sustained. The image they have assiduously built by word and deed has 
created an aura around them, exceeded lately only by the Special Forces. However, their 
size has militated against their becoming truly “special.” At the present moment, they can 
be considered elite infantry forces.8 The very reason that the SOF have remained a notch 
above the Marines is their smaller size. This enables them to adapt organizations and 
tactics, induct new equipment and reshape doctrine without the turmoil associated with 
change threatening to stymie these efforts. Should the SOF become bigger, they too will 
spout bureaucracies that will stifle innovation and initiative. The SOF remains more 
“special” than the Marines in the same manner that the flexibility afforded by size 
permits the Marines to introduce and adopt new concepts faster and more easily than the 
mainstream Army. 
If the SOF were to carry out operations independent of the combatant commands, 
as is often the point made by a number of military thinkers, they would eventually find 
themselves becoming more bureaucratic. If they have to go it alone in a country the size 
of Iraq, they would need large support staffs and technocrats. This would convert them 
into what they are trying to supplant. The net result would be having an instrument that is 
inappropriate for the task and which, in the process, looses its own sharp edge. As 
organizations grow larger they have greater communication and reporting requirements 
(Draft, 2003, p. 103). This increases the professional staff ratio. While proportionately, 
                                                 
8 This is a considered opinion of someone from another country who gets a macro view of the Marines 
when looking at the U.S. armed forces as a whole. 
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the administrative personnel may diminish with economy of scale in large organizations, 
the professional support staff increases greatly. The end result is that in large 
organizations, the proportion of the actual operating personnel declines. 
 
C. THE LIMITS ON SIZE DUE TO THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE  
1. Mintzberg’s Structure in Fives  
The Organization Theory specialist, Henry Mintzberg (1993), lists the five 
configurations of organizations as Simple Structure, Machine Bureaucracy, Professional 
Bureaucracy, Divisional Structure and Adhocracy.  
A brief description of these configurations is given below. 
• Simple Structure. An organization characterized as being small and 
informal, with a single powerful individual, often the founding entrepreneur, in charge of 
everything. 
• Machine Bureaucracy. An organizational form in which work is highly 
standardized. There is a large middle line hierarchy overseeing the work of the operating 
core. It is vertically centralized with decision making concentrated at the top. The work 
environment is not prone to change and fits best with mass production. 
• Professional Bureaucracy. Organizations that rely on trained 
professionals for their operating tasks. The trained professionals are given considerable 
control over their own work. The employees are highly skilled and free to make decisions 
on their own. 
• Divisional Structure. The form used by many large organizations, in 
which separate autonomous units are created to deal with entire product lines, freeing top 
management to focus on large-scale, strategic decisions. The separate units may be 
operating in the form of the other configurations. 
• Adhocracy. A highly informal, organic organization in which specialists 
work in teams, coordinating with each other on various projects. Adhocracies can 




2. Applying Mintzberg’s Structures to the Military 
Large conventional armies are predominantly Machine Bureaucracies with some 
qualities of the Divisional Structure. Decision making is concentrated at the top and little 
innovation is permitted even in complex situations. War is a complex and dynamic 
environment. However, since armies are not perpetually at war, peacetime configurations 
settle down to the structure of the Machine Bureaucracy, which permits assembly line 
functioning. Recruits enter the assembly line, come out as trained soldiers, carry out 
normal administrative and training functions and exit the system. This way of functioning 
becomes the predominant military culture. As a result, even if war increases the 
complexity of the environment, the dominant culture keeps the assembly line methods 
predominant. 
Mintzberg’s organization structure is determined by its environment. The 
environmental varieties rise from two determinants, first, its complexity and second, the 
speed of changes that take place in it. Based upon these determinants, four types of 
organizational form can be identified as detailed in Table 6. The Divisionalized form is 
not mentioned in the Table because it is a partial structure, superimposed on the others 
(Mintzberg, 1981). 
 
Table 6. Environmental Determinants of Organizational Structure (From 
Mintzberg's Taxonomy of Organizational Forms by F. Beshears) 
Environmental Variety = Complexity x Pace of Change 
 SIMPLE COMPLEX 
STABLE Machine Bureaucracy  
Standardized work 
processes and output 
Professional Bureaucracy 
Standardized skills and 
norms 
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The Table above shows that Adhocracies are the structures that are most suitable 
for environments that are complex and dynamic. Mintzberg (1993) states that  
a dynamic environment calls for organic structure and a complex one calls 
for decentralized structure. Adhocracy is the only organization that is both 
organic and relatively decentralized. (p. 267)  
War is complex and dynamic. Within the field of war, 4GW is even more complex and 
dynamic. Conventional war is relatively stable compared to 4GW because the military 
knows how to cope with a conventional war environment. In 4GW, the traditional 
uniformed and recognizable enemy is absent. 4GW enemies are hidden and 
unrecognizable and can attack at anytime from anywhere. Their actions are unpredictable 
and difficult to anticipate. Conventional war follows a relatively predictable path. In 
comparison, 4GW is a Pandora’s Box of surprises. For this reason it can be considered 
more dynamic, though the relative tempo of operations is slow. Therefore, an Adhocracy, 
which is meant for a complex and unstable environment, would be more suitable for 
4GW. An Adhocracy, because of its organizational construct and system of operation, 
has limits to its size in comparison to the other forms of structures. 
3. Understanding the Adhocracy 
Mintzberg (1993), in his analysis of organizations based on five configurations 
(Simple Structure, Machine Bureaucracy, Professional Bureaucracy, Divisional Form and 
Adhocracy), defines adhocracies as highly organic structures with little formalized 
behavior. They have high horizontal job specialization based on formal training; a 
tendency to group the specialists in functional units for housekeeping purposes but to 
deploy them in small, market-based project teams to do their work. An adhocracy relies 
on liaison devices to encourage mutual adjustment, which is the key coordinating 
mechanism within and between these teams. These devices are located at various places 
in the organization and involve various mixtures of line managers, staff and operating 
experts. Zander (1982), states that in making group decisions, a smaller group makes 
decisions faster and better than larger groups “because give and take is more rapid and 
widespread in a small group than in a large one” (p. 21). For this reason, an adhocracy, 
which relies on mutual adjustment for decision making, has to be smaller than other 
organizations doing the same task. Mintzberg (1993) also says, “project teams [in 
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adhocracies] must be small to encourage mutual adjustment. This results in narrow ‘spans 
of control’ for the adhocracy, by conventional methods” (p. 256). We know through 
intuition that smaller organizations can be better entrusted to carry out complex tasks. 
This is because complex tasks require greater coordination and coordination is easier 
when the span of control is narrower. When an order is transmitted through a longer 
chain of command, it loses some of its content or its meaning undergoes so many subtle 
changes that the result is a totally different effect from that intended.  
All the above reinforce the idea that the SOF organization will fare best when 
functioning as an adhocracy, and will therefore suffer if it grows too big because then it 
will start transforming into a bureaucracy. At the basic building block level, Special 
Forces are organized as specialists working in teams called Operational Detachment 
Alpha or colloquially, the A-Team. The A-Team is a miniscule adhocracy. As a result, 
the SOF organization is thoroughly permeated with the culture of an adhocracy. This is 
evident when comparing the characteristics and commonalities of an adhocracy and the 
SF, as illustrated in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Comparison of Adhocracy and Special Forces 
 
Point of 
Comparison Adhocracy Special Forces 
Personnel Fuses experts drawn from different 
specialties into smoothly functioning 
creative teams. 
The basic sub unit is the A-Team 
of 12 men.9 The men are all 
specialists in their respective 
fields. The A-Team is the 
building block of the core SF 
organization, the SF Group. 
Environment Operates best in a complex and 
dynamic environment. 
Have the training, organization 
and equipment to respond to 
rapidly changing situations in a 
high threat environment. 
Coordination Coordination and control are by 
mutual adjustment through the 
informal communication and 
Coordination is much more 
dependent on direct interaction. 
Advice of specialists is sought 
                                                 
9 The logic of having two men from each of the five specialties (operations/intelligence, weapons, 
medical, communications and engineering) and cross-trained in others, gives the twelve man A-Team a 
redundancy and reserve, as well as the ability to be split into two sub-teams called “split detachments,” 
which consist of one officer and five sergeants. 
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Point of 
Comparison Adhocracy Special Forces 
interaction of competent experts. 
Power does not flow according to 
authority or status, but to wherever 
the experts need to carry a particular 
task.  
and taken without the 




The operations essentially run 
themselves. 
There is a much higher level and 
acceptance of initiative of junior 
leaders. 
Restrictions There is a reduction in the need for 
rules.  
Actions are taken as per the 
emerging situation for which the 
lower level commanders are 
given great latitude and 
responsibility. 
Strength Cannot do ordinary things well, but 
is extraordinary at innovation. 
Cannot take over the tasks of 
normal conventional military 
forces in situations where greater 
mass is required. However, they 
have the capability of dealing 




Has to have narrow spans of control 
due to the smaller size of the work 
units, which in turn makes the work 
of these units more efficient.  
The ratio of officers to men (who 
are all non-commissioned 
officers) in the A-Teams is 1:5, 
which makes for a very narrow 
span of control from the bottom 
upwards. 
 
The above makes it evident that the adhocracy and the SF organization have much 
in common. The optimum size for a small discussion group is five members. In a group 
of this size, deadlocks can be avoided and members can shift roles rapidly. Five persons 
representing a cross-section of competencies are enough to provide all points of view yet 
keep creativity high (Hare, 1982, p. 142). The A-Team, which can be split into two sub 
teams of one officer and five sergeants, is in line with this logic. This configuration of the 
A-Team of the SF is based upon the OSS experience in the Balkans in 1942 and not from 
theories of group dynamics. It has been through long and hard experience that an 
adhocracy-like structure has been determined to be most suitable for SF. SF draw their 
strength through being an amalgam of experts. The key means of coordination has to be 
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mutual adjustment, as each expert is an authority in his field and can provide the best 
advice on a problem relevant to his subject area. This also means that SF are not an 
organization that is suitable for a larger force because of the requirement for extensive 
liaison and coordination. Because of the small size of SF, this can be done very quickly. 
In a bigger organization it would take far longer, particularly as the number of 
coordinators and levels of coordination increase. Prolonged periods of coordination result 
in inefficiency in war, hence the application of the adhocracy structure has to be 
restricted to smaller organizations. 
 
D. THE LIMITS IMPOSED ON SIZE BY THE SHORTAGE OF THE 
CORRECT QUALITY OF MANPOWER FOR SF 
1. Base Military Population 
With the plethora of “special” attributes required, the number of people suitable to 
be SOF soldiers is restricted. While SOF skills can be learned, the intuitive affinity for 
unconventional action is largely inborn. With such requirements there is a limit to the 
numbers of suitable personnel available for SF. In sum, there is a limit to the size of the 
SOF based upon the quality of manpower. This limit is dependent on the size of the base 
military population, which impacts the availability of entrants into the SOF. A 
sufficiently large military can be maintained with a large population and a reasonable 
level of resources. The U.S. apparently has a sufficient population base and no financial 
constraints. However, the current military base may not be large enough to accommodate 
the enhanced levels of SOF mandated by 4GW. This potential shortcoming is outlined in 
a number of writings that describe problems in maintaining adequate numbers of SF at 
current levels (Clancy, 2001; Kennedy, 2002; Jilson & Jorsh, 2002; Couch 2005). The 
last three references are from three different professional military journals. This implies 
that should the SOF be the ideal model to fight 4GW, then increasing the strength of the 
SOF without a dilution in quality may not be possible. 
2. The Vietnam Example of Factors Affecting Quality 
During the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army SF strength peaked at 13,000 with seven 
SF Groups (Adams, 98, p. 157). The size of the U.S. Army was larger than it is today so 
it might be presumed that a high standard of personnel was maintained in the SF. 
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However, this was not the case. In 1971, the small number of operators who remained 
from the early 1960s era felt that expansion had seriously diluted the quality of the SF (p. 
158). The reason for this was the lower quality of the base manpower, which was drawn 
from a conscript army during a very unpopular war that did not attract the right quality of 
volunteers. The correct deduction of the size of the base military and its capacity to feed 
the correct quality of manpower can be drawn from an all-volunteer force prior to the 
start of a prolonged and possibly unpopular war. Only danger to national survival and a 
firm belief in protecting national interests can keep the quality of conscripts high, as 
evidenced in Israel.  
3. The Law of Diminishing Returns 
The Law of Diminishing Returns states that if one factor of production is 
increased while the other factors remain constant, the overall returns will decrease after a 
certain point (The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2001). In the same manner, if the size of the 
SOF is increased without increasing the size of the base population, then the quality of 
SOF has to start decreasing after a certain point. The point at which the Law of 
Diminishing Returns starts to operate can be shifted by adding different factors. For 
example, if the pay and perks, or career prospects of the SOF are improved, it will push 
up the point at which quality will decline, in case the base strength remains the same. 
This is because the improvement in service conditions will attract a larger number of 
volunteers. 
The base manpower available and from which the SOF are drawn has declined 
from 1988-89 onwards, consequent to drastic downsizing in the U.S. military. During the 























Army SF 8,600 20,200  
In 1987-88, there was a pool of 90 
men out of which one SF soldier could 
be selected. In 2003-04, because the 
army had been downsized, there was a 
pool of 24 soldiers out of which one 
SF soldier could be selected. 
Strength 
of Navy 
583,800 400,000 365,900 
Navy SF 2,100 4,000  
In 1987-88, there was a pool of 277 
sailors available to select one Navy 
SEAL. In 2003-04, there was a pool of 





606,800 367,600 359,700 
Air SF 4,100 9,320  
In 1987-88, there was a pool of 148 
airmen available to select one AF SF 
airman. In 2003-04, there was a pool 
of 39 airmen available to select one 




















The Marines have a concept of 
Special Operations Capable (SOC) 
battalions. One battalion is trained for 
Special Operations and kept in 
readiness on both the East and West 
Coasts. The battalions are rotated after 
they serve a fixed tenure as SOC 
battalions. The logic of the Marines is 
that with additional training, any 
Marine can gain SF skills. This keeps 
the Special Operations skills at a high 
level throughout the force. 
An analysis of the information presented in Table 7 shows that: 
                                                 
10 Figures taken from The Military Balance 1987-88 and 2003-2004 of The International Institute of 
Strategic Studies. Figures for 2004 - 2005 from the CRS report on the size of U.S. armed forces, dated Feb. 
10, 2005. The USMC Special Operations Capable Concept  taken from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/lbrary/report/1992/MWJ.htm  
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• In the past 15 years there has been a 36% reduction in the military due to 
downsizing and a 100% increase in SOF. There is no direct recruitment 
into the SOF, which has two likely effects. First, if the percentage of 
those finally selected from those who apply is to remain the same, then 
the bar laid for selection has to be lowered. Second, if the same standard 
is to be maintained, and the present selection percentages are to remain 
the same as in 1988, there has to be a shortage of personnel vis-a-vis 
requirement. 
• Since SOF are drawn from the serving military, a dilution in quality has 
to take place because of the reduction in the base manpower. 
• The Naval pool has been very large and continues to be so today. This 
accounts for the reputation of the SEALs as being the most physically fit 
SOF (Adams, 1998, p. 5). This reiterates the requirement of a large base 
strength from which to select quality SOF. 
• The 2003-2004 figures form the correct benchmark from which to draw 
conclusions, because the military at that time fit the parameters of an all-
volunteer force. This was prior to the Iraq War, which can be called a 
prolonged war that does not meet the criteria of a war that has uniform 
support in the country11 
 
E. OVERCOMING THE PROBLEM IN INCREASING THE SIZE OF THE  
SOF 
The current size of the military is smaller than what is required to sustain the 
current size of the SF, while maintaining the quality of personnel at 1988 levels. 
Initiatives like stop loss are only of temporary help. If an increase in the size of SOF for 
4GW is imperative, the following should meet the goal; 
• Increase the size of the military base population from which SOF can be 
drawn, 
                                                 
11 The voting pattern of the U.S. 2004 presidential election is an indication of that, as Senator Kerry, 
with a decidedly anti-war stance, received 48% of the popular vote. 
(http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/result/president/) 
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• Direct recruitment into SF with increases in salary to induce high quality 
manpower,  
• Train the conventional military to take over some of those SOF tasks 
that require a lesser degree of expertise/difficulty. This will enable the 
SOF to concentrate on the high-end tasks.  
The last solution can take pointers from the U.S. Marine Corps and its concept of 
the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU), which are Special Operations Capable (SOC). 
These are standard Marine Corps battalions that are given additional training to make 
them SOC. One battalion on the East Coast and one on the West Coast are maintained in 
an SOC status and rotated after a period of time. The Marine Corps considers that Special 
Operation skills are capable of being developed in normal soldiers, albeit those who have 
the requisite standards of physical fitness.  
What the Marines are attempting to prove (they state that they have proved it) is 
that it is possible for any good infantry to be Special Operations capable. This raises the 
possibility that perhaps what is required is not SOF per se, but training in aspects that 
makes regular forces capable of fighting in the 4GW environment. The Marine Corps 
starts off with advantages in terms of a higher level of esprit de corps and physical 
fitness. Such levels can also be found in formations like the airborne division.  
 That the Special Operations community does not consider SOC Marines to be 
Special Forces is a different issue. This view may be correct, but there is no harm in 
having SF auxiliaries to supplement the shortage of SOF by taking on the lower spectrum 
of SOF tasks. This approach has the added advantage of keeping the actual SOF small, 
thereby enabling them to retain their “Special” character. 
 
F. THE IDEAL SIZE OF SOF  
The military, because of an environment in which it spends most of its time 
preparing for war, will find it difficult to break out of the Machine Bureaucracy mold. 
However, changes in the environment due to sociological and technological evolution 
make it imperative to maintain specialized skills. This leads to the requirement to 
selectively divisionalize the military organization. Divisionalized components have some 
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autonomy but operate under the standards and rules of the bureaucracy. An adhocracy is 
the organizational form, which, in its functioning and culture, is closest to SOF. 
Therefore, the ideal structure for the SOF could be what Mintzberg (1993, p. 269) 
describes as a “divisionalized adhocracy.” This is in line with the statement that 
“diseconomies of scale can be overcome by a multidivisional organization” (Canback, 
2003). The U.S. Special Operations Command can be likened to such a division. 
However, if it has to be a proper adhocracy, then the SOF should not serve under 
regional combatant commands, but must handle operations themselves with the 
combatant commands providing, at most, administrative support. This may be possible or 
even desirable for small operations. However, if the SOF are to be used in larger 
operations, the imperative of administrative and support will lead to an increase in their 
size and the attendant inevitable development of bureaucracies. The Marine SOC concept 
has merit. It shows how to field sufficiently large forces that may not be SOF but can 
have SOF-like capabilities. This opens up the possibility that specially trained infantry 
can be employed in 4GW. The actual SOF can then be employed only where a higher 
level of core SOF capabilities are required. If manpower has to be maintained with the 
ideal level of competency, then the precedence of maintaining all-volunteer SOF 
organizations during peacetime12 should be used as a benchmark to determine the 
strength of SOF that can be sustained at present competence levels. The Congressional 
Research Service report on SOF states that active and reserve SOF are 2% of active and 
reserve manpower (Feickert, 2004). Based on this benchmark, the SOF should not exceed 
2% of the total military manpower, with the actual operators not exceeding 1% of the 
total military manpower. Couch (2005) gives the figure of 16,000 operators in the U.S. 
SOF. This would be 1.3% of the 1.2 million manpower of the Army, Navy and the Air 
Force given at Table 8. The actual figure may be 1.8% as the operators are primarily from 
the Army and Navy. The figures quoted are of the authorized establishment. The ground 
                                                 
12 The motivating factor during wars of national survival provides larger numbers of highly motivated 
manpower than is the case in peacetime. Israel, which is perpetually facing the threat of national survival, is 
able to draw upon larger numbers of soldiers with SF suitable qualities than a comparable population can 
provide if not faced with the threat of national survival.  
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position may be different. Clancy (2001) states that the Army A-Teams are short 25% to 
33% of their authorized strength (p. 61).  
The bottom-line is that the real SOF should not be increased in size unless the 
right quality of personnel to form it can be sustained. 
4GW is fought through various means including political, economic, sociological 
and military. The military burden of defeating a 4GW foe falls mainly on the army, and 
within the army, on the infantry. This is inevitable as 4GW attempts to offset the 
technological superiority of a stronger opponent by preventing him from utilizing his 
mechanized forces. This is accomplished by retracting into the population and 
intermingling with both the people and the enemy. 4GW therefore requires “boots on the 
ground.” The soldiers on the ground need an expertise in UW to gain an advantage over 
the 4GW foe, whose way of war is UW. The SOF are the paragon of UW and thus are 
expected to shoulder the burden of fighting a 4GW. However, there is a limit to the size 
of the SOF. This leads to the conclusion that:  
• SOF are the ideal force for 4GW. However, increasing their size without 
accounting for environmental influences will cause the organization to succumb 
to the Law of Diminishing Returns. 
• The SOF that can be maintained depends on the base military of a 
particular country. The bulk of the operators are from the army. This is the case in 
both the U.S. and in all other countries. Therefore, the size of the army is crucial 
for recruiting sufficient SF. 
• By a rough measure in an all volunteer force, an overall SOF level of 
approximately 2% of the armed forces can be maintained and trained with the 
actual SF “trigger pullers” constituting 1% of the armed forces.  
 
An increase in the size of any organization leads to an increase in the span of 
control; large spans of control invariably lead to problems of coordination and 
management. Civilian organizations involved in cutting edge research and development 
suffer if there is a high vertical scalar chain of authority through which they have to 
proceed to get decisions. To avoid this, organizations have evolved which permit 
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specialized organizations much greater autonomy. The adhocracy is such an organization. 
If the SOF have to carry out operations independent of the combatant theatre commands, 
they will need to grow in size. Growth will inevitably lead to the development of a 
bureaucracy. In the author’s opinion it is better that SOF operate under and report directly 
to theatre commanders rather than through intermediate headquarters. This will keep the 
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VII. DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT AND 
TRAINING FOR 4GW 
Machines don’t fight wars, people do, and they use their minds. 
--Col. John R. Boyd (Defense and the National Interest) 
 
4GW is not fought on battlefields or in areas that facilitate conventional tactics. 
Neither is it fought in the space created after a population seeking its own succor has 
moved out of a war zone. 4GW is fought within a population in an environment where 
the ability of the air and naval forces of a superior enemy are degraded through a mix of 
natural or artificial terrain and the presence of the population. A battlefield is chaos 
personified; however, the professional soldier can discern the order in such chaos. In 
4GW, for the proponent of war with a conventional mindset, the battlefield environment 
is chaotic. It is beyond his comprehension because things happen which are outside the 
realm of his doctrine and training. 
 Of all the constituents of the armed forces of a state, it is the army which is 
crucial in 4GW because foot-mobility is possible over any terrain and because of the 
greater discerning capability of the human eye and intellect. In addition, there is nothing 
more precise than infantry direct firing weapons. They are more precise than precision 
laser guided bombs because the man on the ground sees the human target; it is this 
knowledge that is the best guarantee of avoiding collateral damage. This is what gives 
ground forces importance in 4GW. As former U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General Eric 
Shinseki says in the foreword to FM -1, “The Army” 
[L]and forces alone have the ability to place enough ‘boots on the ground’ 
and interact with populations, directly and continuously. In this capacity 
for human interaction, ground forces are unique. 
The army provides the crucial link between the government and the people when 
the normal civilian means of such interaction have been marginalized through 4GW. This 
is because the army has the ability to carry out missions while deployed within what may 
be a hostile or coerced population with the communications, fire support and logistics 
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integral to it. In fact, the army can extend assistance to the civil government and police 
forces through this capability. Because of this preeminent role in 4GW, it is imperative 
that if necessary, the army be optimally organized, trained, and equipped to engage on the 
4GW battlefield. This Chapter is a heuristic attempt to bring forth ideas to improve the 
capability of the army to operate on the 4GW battlefield. This involves defining a 
doctrine for the army to make it suitable for 4GW and thereafter identifying the manner 
in which the organization, equipment and training of the army could be adapted to the 
4GW environment. 
 
A. UNDERSTANDING DOCTRINE 
Doctrine can be defined as a statement of official policy. A doctrine enables the 
formulation of strategy for achievement of objectives. National strategy guides military 
doctrine. As mentioned in Chapter IV, military doctrine and the Principles of War are 
synonymous because doctrine leads to the appropriate fundamental principles for guiding 
actions. Hence, doctrine provides direction to the application of the Principles of War. 
Doctrine should be clear enough to give direction, but at the same time should permit 
flexibility to cater to changes in the environment. Military doctrine provides a guideline 
as to the relative importance of the principles at a particular point of time. Therefore, 
doctrine is not as timeless as the principles, which are based on those aspects of doctrine 
which have, over long periods, acquired universal relevance. For this reason, doctrine 
needs to be periodically revised. As an example, the Indian Army doctrine consists of two 
parts, Part I being unclassified. The letter promulgating the doctrine directs that Part I be 
reviewed and updated every five years as necessary; the doctrine is re-issued every ten 
years (Indian Army Doctrine, 2004). Doctrine encompasses more than just principles, in 
that where the principles are the result of the military’s education and experience, 
doctrine is dictated by the national strategy, which itself is dependent on geo-politics, 
ideology, resources and the nature of the government. It affects all aspects of the army, 
including its organization, equipment and training.  
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FM-3 describes doctrine as “[T]he concise expression of how Army forces 
contribute to unified action in campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements” 
(Para. 1-44). In addition, Para. 1-45 states: 
Army doctrine provides a common language and a common understanding 
of how Army forces conduct operations. It is rooted in time-tested 
principles but is forward-looking and adaptable to changing technologies, 
threats, and missions. Army doctrine is detailed enough to guide 
operations, yet flexible enough to allow commanders to exercise initiative 
when dealing with specific tactical and operational situations. 
The Indian Army doctrine, revised and issued in October 2004, defines doctrine as: 
[A] formal expression of military knowledge and thought that an army 
accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of 
current and future conflicts, the preparation of the army for such conflicts 
and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success. 
1.  U.S. Army Doctrine 
In the U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-0 details the Army’s doctrine. It begins by 
stating that the U.S. Army’s doctrine depends on three fundamentals (Para. 4-1). These 
are: 
• Elements of Combat Power, 
• Principles of War, 
• Tenets of Army Operations 
These three fundamentals are the foundation of the U.S. Army operational 
doctrine. The principles of war of the United States Army were discussed in Chapter IV. 
In order to be aware of the U.S. Army’s doctrine, it is essential to be familiar with the 
Elements and Tenets. These are briefly discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. 
a. Elements of Combat Power  
• Maneuver. Maneuver is the means by which commanders 
concentrate combat power to achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and 
dominance (Para. 4-4). The aim of maneuver is to bring troops to a 
suitable position for close combat because the final outcome of any action 
requires close combat. Maneuver as an element is different from 
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Maneuver as a Principle of War, because the latter refers to action to place 
the enemy in a position of disadvantage.  
• Firepower. Maneuver creates the conditions for the 
effective use of firepower. Firepower provides the destructive force 
essential to overcoming the enemy’s ability and will to fight (Para. 4-11). 
• Leadership. Teamwork and trust are essential for victory; 
these are developed through good leadership. Hence, leadership has to be 
nurtured, refined and honed through training. 
• Protection. Protection is the preservation of the fighting 
potential of a force so the commander can apply maximum force at the 
decisive time and place (Para. 4-20). The basic philosophy behind this 
element is to prevent wastage of resources through good and practical 
drills, training, procedures and application of combat power. 
• Information. Information enhances leadership and 
magnifies the effects of maneuver, firepower and protection (Para. 4-28). 
b. The Tenets of Army Operations 
The tenets of Army operations which are given in FM-3 describe the 
characteristics of successful operations conducted using the principles of war. The tenets 
increase the effectiveness of the principles and are as follows:  
• Initiative. Initiative has both operational and individual 
components. From an operational perspective, initiative involves taking 
such action that the enemy’s options are eliminated, while own freedom of 
action is retained. From an individual perspective, initiative is the ability 
to operate on a directive style of orders.  
• Agility. Agility is the ability to move and adjust quickly and 
easily. Operational agility stems from the ability to shift among offensive, 
defensive, stability, and support operations as circumstances and missions 
require. Tactical agility is the ability of a friendly force to react faster than 
the enemy. While physical agility is important at the tactical level, mental 
agility is important at all levels. 
 129
• Depth. Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, and 
resources. Depth is used to obtain space for effective maneuver, time to 
conduct operations and resources to achieve and exploit success. Depth 
enables momentum in the offense, elasticity in the defense and staying 
power in all operations.  
• Versatility. Versatility is the ability of an army to quickly 
transition from one type of operation to another. Versatility is developed 
by organizing the structure, equipment and training in such a manner that 
the same force can handle different situations.  
• Synchronization. Synchronization is arranging activities in time 
and space with the purpose of massing maximum relative combat power at 
a decisive place and time. Synchronization is a means, not an end, in that 
rigid adherence to it should not foreclose windows of opportunity.  
The manner in which the Principles, Elements and Tenets form U.S. Army 
doctrine is illustrated in Figure 8 (FM 3-0, 2001, Fig. 4-1). As can be seen in Figure 8, 
Army doctrine is based on the application of the Elements of combat power, when 
applied keeping in mind the Tenets and following all the Principles of War. When 
applied in this manner, an operational framework is created for the U.S. Army to engage 





Figure 8.   The Fundamentals of Full Spectrum Operations (From FM 3-0, 2001) 
 
2. Formulation of Doctrine 
It can be debated whether doctrine is best formulated using a “top-down” or a 
“bottom-up” approach. In both approaches there is a great requirement for situation 
analyses, because without knowing the situation, the doctrine formulated may be 
divorced from reality. The bottom-up approach should yield a better doctrine because 
ideas from the bottom have greater operational situation awareness. They are more 
workable because they are in touch with ground realities. The top-down approach is 
supposed to start off with greater situational awareness. However, this may not be the 
case, especially in 4GW, where the traditional determinants of an opponent’s strength are 
not identifiable, traditional means of strategic intelligence are not as effective and the 
actions of the enemy are unpredictable because they do not adhere to conventional 
templates. The formulation of doctrine in the first two generations of war was top-down. 
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In these cases, doctrine was shaped by the views of higher-level military strategists, 
princes and generals, who based their decisions on technological developments that they 
were in a position to know of and guide. 
The doctrine that gave rise to the Third Generation of War was more of a bottom-
up product. The “storm troop” tactics, which were the precursor to the Third Generation 
of War, were a “bottom-up” phenomenon (Gudmundsson, 1989). Based on the vision of 
General Oskar von Hutier, these tactics were formulated as a solution to the trench 
warfare stalemates. General Hutier’s vision was fulfilled in large part due to the latitude 
he gave junior leaders to solve this dilemma (Hammes, 2004, p. 31). This was further 
refined after World War I by other German officers who had seen the problems inherent 
in Second Generation War as young officers, and had realized the efficacy of combined 
arms teams in the form of the Strumtruppen. 
Unlike the Third Generation, in 4GW, existing technology has meshed with 
social, economic and political situations to find ways to overcome asymmetry of strength 
by formulating a doctrine that enhances asymmetry by looking for a solution from a 
different perspective and direction. This is illustrated in Figure 9. Entity B is dis-
advantaged in an asymmetrical confrontation with Entity A because of variation in 
conventional strength. This is overcome through adopting a doctrine which, through 
“swarms” of smaller entities, attacks the enemy indirectly and from within his own 
society. These attackers look different from the parent entity and cannot be formally 
identified with it. This creates a different kind of asymmetry; albeit one that has 
advantages for the weaker entity. In this manner, the doctrine of 4GW is based on 
creating strength out of weakness. The strength addresses the enemy’s “conventionality,” 






Figure 9.   4GW Doctrine: Turning Asymmetry into Strength 
 
3. Affect of Technology on Formulation of Doctrine 
Technology has a great impact on the formulation of doctrine. Evolving doctrine 
first and then having to develop suitable technology to fit the doctrine is not normally a 
workable approach. The U.S. “Star Wars” doctrine is an example where a doctrine was 
formulated before the availability of the envisaged technology. However, the aim of that 
program was to pressure the Soviet Union technologically, psychologically and 
economically. In this respect, the doctrine succeeded as it gave the United States an upper 
hand in arms negotiations. The bottom-up approach cuts down the lead time as 
“commercially-off-the-shelf” equipment and technology is used to execute the doctrine. 
4GW uses the bottom-up technological approach. This is also the reason why the 4GW 
foe sometimes manages to utilize technology that the armed forces either do not have or 
the straightjacket of conventional thinking does not permit them to have. For example, 
there have been a number of instances where sophisticated, light, portable and secure 











Chechnya. These were better than the radio sets being used by their conventional army 
opponents (Devdas, Aug 2003 and Several Caches with Weapons Found, Sep 2002). 
Other examples of the innovative use of existing technology are the use of cell phones or 
camera flash circuits to explode Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and the use of the 
internet for communications and psychological warfare.  
 
B. A REVIEW OF 4GW DOCTRINE WITH AN INDIAN BACKDROP 
As per Indian Army Doctrine 2004, the following aspects concerning doctrine are 
important (emphasis is of the author):  
• It is a formal expression of military knowledge and thought that an army 
accepts as being relevant at a given time, 
• Covers the nature of current and future conflicts, 
• The preparation of the army for such conflicts, 
• The methods of engaging in them to achieve success. 
 
1. Indian Security Concerns 
The security concerns of the Indian Army consist of two primary tasks. 
The first task is to defend the country against external threats, specifically China 
and Pakistan. The second is to defend the country against internal threats. The 
latter are in the form of insurgencies in the country’s border States, which could 
potentially be exploited by India’s adversaries. Among the primary external 
threats that India faces are: 
a. China 
China and India fought a war over a border dispute in 1962. The Chinese 
claim a total of approximately 57,000 square miles of territory that India regards as its 
own. This territory is comprised of approximately 35,000 square miles in the Eastern 
Sector, 8,000 square miles in the Central Sector and 14,000 square miles in the Northern 
Sector. India came out the worse off in this fight, losing areas in the Northern and Eastern 
Sectors. After the ceasefire on October 24, 1962, the Chinese withdrew from the Eastern 
sector but retained the area in the Northern sector of Aksai Chin because it is vital for 
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their links between Tibet and Sinkiang. The Chinese claim over what is now the Indian 
state of Arunachal Pradesh in the Eastern sector remains, pending settlement of the 
boundary issue. India disputes the annexation in the Northern sector. This thesis will not 
go into the cause of the dispute. What is relevant is that a dispute exists and it is a 
complex issue, which explains why efforts to resolve the dispute are proceeding very 
slowly. Indeed, 43 years after the Sino-Indian War, the boundary dispute is still not 
settled.  
The border with China is located along the Himalayan Mountains, which 
makes the Chinese threat infantry-based, as there is little scope to employ mechanized 
forces in the Himalayas. The terrain dictates that once the Chinese are on the Indian side 
of the Himalayas, their logistical problems become so acute that it is difficult for them to 
prosecute further operations. In addition, the Indians gain in conventional strength as the 
Chinese push inland. It is possible that China recognized this limitation and, after the 
1962 war, withdrew from those captured territories that were difficult to defend. 
Thereafter China aided the insurgencies in India’s northeastern states as a means to keep 
India under pressure. (Bhaumik, 2002). Presently China does not aid these insurgencies, 
however, it could do so in the future should it desire to up the ante. 
b. Pakistan 
India has 1280 miles of border with Pakistan. This border includes two 
areas of dispute. First is the 350 miles of the Line of Control (the ceasefire line after the 
1971 war, which is not recognized by either side as the international border). Second is 
50 miles in the area of Sir Creek in the Rann of Kutch (on the Arabian Sea coast). This 
border can be divided into the Mountain Sector, the Plains Sector, the Desert Sector and 
the Rann Sector. The dispute in the Mountain Sector is in the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir, and it is the main flashpoint. In the Indo-Pakistan Wars, wherever there have 
been any gains or losses in terms of territory, in any of the other sectors, these have been 
returned after the end of hostilities. This signifies the inviolability of the international 
borders. One-third of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir is held by Pakistan 
and two-thirds by India. Each country considers the other’s occupation illegal. Being in a 
position of conventional asymmetry, Pakistan has encouraged insurgency in Kashmir as a 
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proxy war against India. In the same manner, it encouraged the unsuccessful but bloody 
Sikh secessionist movement in the border state of Punjab in the 1980s to 1990s. 
c. Nuclear Factor 
  India is a nuclear-armed state. The rationale to go nuclear was the 
proximity of nuclear-armed China, as well as the humiliation of the 1962 war (Garden, 
2002). The Indian nuclear explosion in May 1974 was the consequence of the Chinese 
atomic bomb test on October 16, 1964. The Chinese test came exactly two years after the 
1962 Sino-Indian War in which India suffered a humiliating defeat. As far as India was 
concerned, the test was a reminder that it could never negotiate a settlement to the border 
problem as an equal because of the asymmetry created by nuclear weapons as well as the 
conventional asymmetry. China’s imperative to have nuclear weapons was obviously the 
military and ideological tensions with the United States and the Soviet Union. It was 
probably the strength gained by nuclear weapons that gave the Chinese the confidence to 
militarily clash with the Soviets in 1969 and 1972 over the border dispute along the Usuri 
River. This dispute was settled in 2004. 
  The Pakistani decision to go nuclear was inspired by the growing Indian 
capability towards building a bomb as well as its humiliating defeat in the 1971 war, 
where 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war fell into Indian hands and the country lost its 
Eastern wing. India conducted a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974. This spurred 
Pakistani efforts. By the mid 1980s it was widely believed that Pakistan had the bomb. 
After 1998, India decided to end its nuclear ambiguity. Pakistan immediately followed 
suit. Overt nuclearization brought to the Asian region a state of affairs similar to the Cold 
War situation in Europe. Presently, large armies exist in China, India and Pakistan. They 
are the first, second and fifth largest ground forces in the world (The Military Balance, 
2004). The presence of nuclear weapons makes the chances that these armies will have to 
fight large-scale conventional wars, extremely limited. 
  The only conventional wars that can take place are of the “limited” 
variety, which confines conflict below the threshold levels. Under these circumstances, 
the better option is to indulge in 4GW, which enables avoidance of a devastating full-
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blown conventional war with a nuclear scenario. It also enables a weaker side to offset 
the advantages of the stronger. 4GW scenarios in this context are as under: 
• Pakistan can utilize 4GW against India; it is following this pragmatic 
policy by indulging in 4GW in Kashmir,  
• China or India may utilize 4GW against each other. Should there be any 
intransigence on the part of India to resolve the boundary issue, in all likelihood 
China would prefer to exert pressure on India by supporting the insurgents and 
militant groups in northeastern India, as it has done in the past. This would be a 
4GW approach. U.S. Naval War College Professor Thomas Barnett (2004), 
however, states that the likelihood of conflict decreases with globalization. He 
includes China and India as states that may not fight wars because of the benefits 
of globalization. 
 
2.  Development of Indian Doctrine 
The Indian Army had two major borders to defend against countries with which it 
has disputes. The Indian Army experienced a generation of peace after the 1971 Indo-
Pakistan War. This gave unfettered time in which to refine the concepts of mechanized 
plains warfare, which seemed to be the decisive war India would be called to fight against 
Pakistan. The heightened Cold War in Europe was influenced by books such as “Race to 
the Swift,” and the doctrine of Airland Battle. This led to a version of the European 
battlefield on the Indian sub-continent. A proliferation of mechanized forces with 
electronic warfare capabilities took place, modest by European standards but large in the 
sub-continental context. 
The growth of mechanized forces made the army effective in mechanized plains 
warfare to the detriment of fighting 4GW. As a result, in the 4GW that the army was 
repeatedly called upon to fight, the following shortcomings emerged: 
• The army was ill equipped to take on 4GW foes. Its weapons for close 
quarter battle, which is where 4GW engagements take place, were not effective 
enough, 
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• The army lacked essential elements like body armor, protective clothing 
and night vision devices, 
• There was a lack of vehicles which were IED proof or had sufficient off-
road capability, 
• The army lacked non-lethal weapons, which are essential to the conduct of 
certain operations in 4GW, 
• The army lacked language skills and cultural knowledge, even within its 
own country. This is not strange in a sub-continental country which has 15 official 
languages and hundreds of dialects, 
• Since the army realized that it was fighting a new way of war, there was 
initially a shortage of manpower as large elements of the army were not released 
from previous commitments in view of conventional threats on Indian borders. 
Whenever Army involvement in 4GW increased, a concern arose that its ability to 
defend itself in a conventional war was getting degraded because of loss of 
training time, 
• The components of the Army, which were organized, structured, trained 
and equipped to fight Second and Third Generation Wars, were not organized, 
trained or equipped to participate in 4GW. 
 
3. Review of Indian Army Doctrine for 4GW 
In line with the Indian Army Doctrine 2004, the factors that shape India’s military 
doctrine for the era of 4GW should be: 
• Relevant for the Present Time. As the paragraphs above have illustrated, 
the doctrine that supports large-scale conventional war is not relevant for the 
present time. While conventional war is not dead, at the present time it is unlikely. 
This state has persisted since the 1974 nuclear test. Since then, tensions with 
Pakistan have surfaced many times. These led to near-war situations in 1984, 
1986-87, 1989-90, 1999 and 2001-2002 (Khan, 2003). In two of these cases, 
limited war took place; Siachen and Kargil (1984 and 1999; the former persists as 
a “no war-no peace” scenario). However, in all cases, intervention by big powers 
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because of the threat of nuclear conflagration prevented war. The security-
insecurity paradox that was conceptualized by the Henry L. Stimpson Center, a 
U.S. think tank, states that with the presence of nuclear weapons, higher-level 
stability prevails, with war being seen as a non-option. However, at the lower 
level, this breeds instability through a proliferation of states of low intensity 
conflicts below the threshold level, such as “no war-no peace,” proxy wars and 
insurgencies (Chari, 2001). The reality of the present time is that since the 1980s 
the deterrent impact of large mechanized forces has slowly decreased, to be 
replaced by deterrence through nuclear weapons. That such deterrence works, 
even if the nuclear weapons are held by two antagonists in asymmetrical 
quantities, is well known. The furor over possession of nuclear weapons by Iraq is 
a case in point. The quantum of deterrence with the suspected presence of a 
handful of nuclear weapons, even in conditions of total asymmetry, is evident 
from the situation concerning North Korea. Under these circumstances, the 
possibility of a conventional war in the high-intensity spectrum of conflict 
between India and Pakistan is unlikely. This calls for a doctrine for the Indian 
Army which supports building up capabilities for unconventional, low-intensity 
war or 4GW. Such doctrine would be relevant for the present times. 
• Cater to Current and Future Conflicts. The current conflicts that India 
faces are insurgencies in Kashmir and the Northeast. While the insurgencies in the 
Northeast do not directly threaten the security of the country as a whole, the 
insurgency in Kashmir does, because it threatens the country’s secular structure. 
A part of the country breaking away because it is inhabited by Moslems is 
unacceptable for a country that has the third largest population of Moslems in the 
world (CIA -- the World Factbook, n.d.). Because of the reasons given in the 
preceding paragraph, in the future there is little likelihood of conventional war on 
the Indian sub-continent. However, there is great likelihood of 4GW continuing. 
The Indian army will have to engage in fighting an enemy that uses 4GW 
methods. In the less likely scenario of aggression by China, a 4GW approach 
towards countering the aggression may be more suitable. Similarly, if China 
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encourages 4GW in India’s Northeast, improving the Indian Army’s ability to 
fight 4GW foes would be beneficial. Therefore, a doctrine that improves the 
Indian Army’s ability to respond to 4GW methods would better cater to current 
and future conflicts. 
• Preparation for 4GW Conflicts. Preparing for 4GW conflicts involves 
organizing, training and equipping the army for that role. To arm and train an 
army conventionally and then make it fight in an unconventional manner is 
wasteful. While the skills of conventional warfare should not be consigned to the 
scrap heap, they do need to be adapted to make them suitable for 4GW. This 
involves organizational changes to enable the army to overcome weaknesses that 
conventional armies find in themselves when engaged in 4GW. These weaknesses 
are mainly an inability to gather the correct intelligence, emphasis on attrition, 
weakness in waging information and psychological warfare in the Fourth 
Generation environment and lack of skills in building a relationship of trust with 
the population. This requires focus on education and training from the grassroots 
level upwards. Finally, the weapons and equipment for conventional war are not 
suitable for 4GW. They are either too destructive or inappropriate. There is a 
requirement to identify the correct way to equip the army for 4GW. 
 
C. GENERAL DOCTRINE FOR 4GW 
Army doctrine should be based on the fact that large conventional wars are 
unlikely in the near future. As its primary function, the doctrine should support the 
conduct of unconventional war. The doctrine should enable conventional armies to fight 
in an unconventional manner, which is the appropriate way to approach 4GW. It should 
enable the conventional firepower-based army to acquire an unconventional character 
where maximum destruction does not translate to success. Towards this end, doctrine for 
4GW should stress the following features:  
• Light Infantry Forces in Sufficient Numbers. The army should have the 
capability of deploying sufficient light infantry forces to fight 4GW. Where there 
is a paucity of such forces, the army should have interoperability with 
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paramilitary organizations and police forces to compensate for the shortfall. The 
other branches of the army should be capable of supporting operations in the 
4GW environment. For this reason, within the army, the organization, equipment 
and training aspects of the infantry should be made appropriate to 4GW. 
• Restricted Heavy Forces. Restricted heavy forces would be required 
where the enemy tries to play upon the symmetry-asymmetry paradox by 
alternating 4GW methods with conventional methods. 
• Synergy in Intelligence. There should be a synergy between the 
intelligence agencies of the state and the army to provide actionable intelligence. 
The intelligence gathering abilities of the army need to be transformed; the focus 
should be on gathering intelligence in relation to a 4GW foe rather than a 
conventional army, which has different connotations. The doctrine needs to give 
primacy to human intelligence in urban areas and technological intelligence in 
open areas. 
• Practical Transformation. Changes should be relevant to the nature of 
4GW. Transformation should be attempted by building on existing strengths 
rather than attempting to introduce those capabilities which are ultimately more 
expensive. Transformation in capabilities should be relevant to the level of 4GW. 
Manpower intensive nations need to utilize their area of strength, which is their 
manpower. If they follow the doctrine of rich nations there is likely to be 
dysfunction. 
• The Conduct of War in Varied Fields. 4GW encompasses war in 
political, social, economic and military fields. The army is closely concerned with 
the military field, but should have clear information about how the other fields 
interact with the military, what resources are available to them and how best to 
utilize those resources. The army doctrine should incorporate those resources in 
formulating the strategy for 4GW. 
• Adaptability. 4GW involves carrying out multifaceted tasks such as 
offensive, defensive, stability and support operations. Since it is difficult even for 
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large armies to have dedicated troops for each field, the army should have the 
ability to carry out all or most of these tasks using the same troops. 
• Jointness. Jointness is an essential concept in Third Generation Wars. In 
those wars, equal importance is placed on all components of the military. In 4GW, 
the war will primarily be fought by land forces. Conduct of 4GW by land force 
commanders will be more appropriate. Jointness in 4GW is related to 
interoperability with other branches of the government, such as the civil 
administration and police forces. 
 
D. ORGANIZATION FOR 4GW 
 Chapters V and VI brought out that the nature of 4GW makes Special Forces and 
their unconventional warfare skills most suitable for 4GW. Chapter VI described the 
problems that might arise if the size of the Special Forces is increased. What emerged is 
that such action in the average society or country will be difficult because of the problem 
of finding the correct quality of manpower to fill the ranks of the Special Forces. 
The answer lies in organizing the army in a manner in which it can carry out 
functions akin to Special Forces. In addition, 4GW requires defensive operations with the 
aim of creating a sense of security in the population. The population can restrict the 
maneuverability of whomsoever it chooses by withholding its cooperation. However, it 
will do this only when its own security concerns are not met. 
An enduring thought that is central to the modernization of armies is that the 
modernization will permit the total manpower of the army to be reduced. The use of 
technologically advanced weapons and equipment enables a greater amount of firepower 
to be delivered more accurately, by weapon systems which can be operated by lesser 
numbers of personnel. That is the manner in which the U.S. and other Western armies 
have been able to greatly decrease their manpower component. Delivering firepower is a 
concept intrinsic to the first three generations of war. In the Third Generation, there is a 
variation in that firepower and maneuver are combined to upset the enemy’s ability to 
make correct and timely decisions. Because of this, the enemy is out-maneuvered and 
defeated. 
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The Airland Battle doctrine called for highly mobile mechanized forces with 
integrated firepower and a large component of aerial firepower. This created a 
requirement for manageable armies that could move swiftly in time and space. The 
requirement reduced the size of U.S. Army formations to organizations that are less 
manpower-intensive and more equipment-intensive. The result has been that current U.S. 
Army infantry formations are so reduced that the infantry division is “infantry” in name 
only. This was fine as long as war was conventional and fought in the realm of the 
Second or Third Generations. However, a problem arises when war enters the realm of 
4GW. The experience of Iraq is an example. Here, a combination of Second Generation 
“awe” and Third Generation “shock” enabled a technologically superior but numerically 
inferior army to win a decisive victory. It led to such a swift collapse that those who were 
interested in following the course of the war were almost disillusioned that the opponent 
was knocked out so soon. It was like going to see a much advertised prizefight only to 
have the more belligerent opponent knocked out with the first punch. However, from the 
moment the conventional war ended and the 4GW began, the shortage of manpower 
became painfully evident.  
In 4GW, this problem is not specific to a first world army like the American 
Army. While fighting a 4GW in Kashmir, the Indian army has been forced to raise 
infantry-intensive units and formations for the specific task of fighting 4GW. While this 
restructuring was taking place, non-infantry units, especially artillery, which has had no 
role in 4GW, have been used to supplement the infantry (Indian Army Website, Regiment 
of Artillery History, n.d.). This arrangement is not the most satisfactory because good 
infantry skills take almost as much the time to acquire as technical skills. 
As mentioned earlier, Special Forces skills are ideal for 4GW. When SF are at a 
premium, normal infantry can carry out some SF akin tasks.13 However, acquiring the 
correct degree of proficiency takes time because these skills are learned through the 
medium of combat experience. In addition, problems arise because normal infantry do 
not have the specialized equipment available to the SF. It is possible to train the infantry 
to be like the SF, but it will take time. This has been demonstrated by the U.S. Marine 
                                                 
13 Author’s experience during counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir. 
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Corps concept of Special Operations Capable (SOC) units, where the duration of pre-
deployment training for MEU (SOC) is six months. Training units for six months in SF-
like skills for a six-month deployment is not a very time effective endeavor. The Marines 
do not subscribe to this view because they feel that the MEU (SOC) concept enables 
them to maintain the complete Corps at a level of training up to the standards of Special 
Forces. This is because at any time there are six MEU (SOC) units. Two are deployed, 
two are training for the next deployment and two are in transit to or from deployment. 
Since units are rotated from within the Corps, the Marines believe that this permeates SF 
skills throughout the Corps. 
1.  Organization Tasks in 4GW 
In 4GW, the army is required to be organized in two complementary elements. A 
defensive element and an offensive element, as given below: 
• The defensive element is required to provide security to the lines of 
communication, the government machinery and most critically, the people. In 
addition to providing security to the people, defensive elements may have to 
provide administrative support, which should help keep the people on the side of 
the government. This is particularly true when government agencies cannot 
function due to coercion or destruction of infrastructure such as communications. 
In addition, through providing passive security, they are to deter attacks and 
restrict the freedom of maneuver of the enemy. Such a role was carried out by the 
conventional French Army in the Algerian War. In Iraq, the indigenous Iraqi 
police and army forces seek to provide such security services. A defensive 
component must be capable of carrying out protective, policing, civil affairs, 
intelligence and psychological warfare tasks. 
• An offensive component consists of appropriately armed, mobile (with the 
type of mobility depending on terrain) light infantry, backed by a viable 
intelligence generating organization. Special Forces are traditionally best suited 
for this task if they have the correct intelligence. The problem is that they may not 
be available in sufficient numbers relative to the area of operations. If that is the 
case, then this task would have to be carried out by normal infantry. In Algeria, 
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such a role was carried out by paratroopers and the Foreign Legion. In Iraq, the 
role is being carried out by U.S. ground forces.  
2. Organizational Components 
4GW requires prolonged deployments, which result in psychological stress and 
strain on the troops who are committed. This creates a requirement to have sufficient 
troops for rotation; the result is that armies must maintain twice the numbers of troops 
needed for deployments. GW organizations, therefore, will have to be bigger in terms of 
manpower. The components required for 4GW are: 
• Special Operations Forces. Special Operations Forces having an 
unconventional warfare ethos and training are the 4GW warriors of the state. The 
old term “commando” is not appropriate for 4GW because commandos, though 
unconventional warriors, were too identified with conventional war. Special 
Forces are suitable to be employed in 4GW as their methods of operation are in 
symmetry with their 4GW enemy. This enables them to counter the 4GW foe 
more effectively. To this extent, the propensity to increase the Special Forces to 
fight in the 4GW environment is logical. The drawbacks of Special Forces are 
first, an inability to develop intelligence on their own because of their smaller 
size, and second, unrealistic expectations from the establishment, which demands 
more from them than they can deliver. Special Forces can carry out very 
successful operations under very difficult conditions while operating in small 
units with a minimal footprint, if they have the correct intelligence.  
• Light Infantry Forces. Chapter VI identified the problems inherent in 
increasing the size of the Special Forces. While Special Forces are best used for 
specialist tasks (for example, hunting a high value person such as Osama bin 
Laden), light infantry (i.e., infantry not armed with heavy weapons for 
conventional war) able to travel quickly over any terrain is required for those 
offensive tasks which are a daily experience in 4GW. These include operations 
where the intelligence while not as specific, is sufficient to maintain pressure on 
the enemy and prevent him from consolidating his position.  
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• Paramilitary and Police Forces. 4GW is a manpower intensive war 
requiring offensive and defensive capabilities. The defensive component does not 
require the same level of skills that the offensive component requires. Therefore, 
troops with a lower level of skills can take on policing as well as security tasks. 
Ideally, paramilitary forces in the form of a Gendarmerie are ideal for this task. 
The latter can operate better with a local police force that has a similar ethos and 
working culture. This is important because there is nothing better than local police 
for obtaining grassroots intelligence. The local police have the best language and 
local cultural skills, which are very difficult to acquire, develop and maintain. 
Where the police force is weakened and compromised, central police forces can 
better assist in building up the police grid. In Iraq, in the absence of sufficient 
forces of this type, especially when there were no Iraqi police forces, this void 
was filled by private military contractors. 
 
3. Organizational Size 
a. Defensive 4GWF Force 
A defensive force should have an infantry-based component large enough 
to be deployed independently. This infantry-based component can provide security in a 
particular area of operations. It should be big enough to provide security for itself and for 
the civil population in its area, yet small enough to interact with the people on a personal 
level. This contact should occur with individual people. There should also be a 
hierarchical contact, both with the civil administration (if existing) and the informal 
leadership of the populace, which may consist of traditional heads, religious heads, 
intelligentsia or the socially or financially prominent people. This implies that the 
military hierarchy should interact at their respective levels with the hierarchy of the 
people. Such contacts are important as a source of intelligence and assist the military 
force in understanding and alleviating the population’s fears and grievances. An infantry-
based component deployed independently in a specific area must be able to ensure its 
own security and carry out its own housekeeping and tasks. The size of this component 
would depend on the size of the population in the given area, the nature of the terrain and 
the enemy threat level. 
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A suggested guide: 
• High threat urban area with heavy density of population -- Company (100-
120 men), 
• Low threat urban area with high/low density of population -- Platoon (30 
men), 
• High threat rural area with heavy density of population -- Under-strength 
Company (50-60 men), 
• Low threat rural area with high population density -- Platoon (30 men), 
• Low threat rural area with low population density --10 to 12 men. 
The area that the component can dominate cannot be sacrosanct. It 
depends on the terrain and situation. The components of this force need to be 
predominantly infantry, supported by sufficient intelligence components. 
b. Offensive 4GW Force 
An offensive force for 4GW has to be organized in order to operate for 
prolonged periods on its own. It needs to have suitable means of mobility (air, vehicular 
or the physical fitness for foot mobility with appropriate equipment in harsh terrain). It 
needs to have firepower that is superior to the enemy’s, but which is unconventional to 
the extent that it does not rely on conventional Second Generation means of fire support, 
such as indirect firing weapons. It requires secure and reliable means of communication. 
The size of this force is dependent on its method of operations. However, even where the 
traditional methods of counter-insurgency are applied, offensive operations above the 
brigade level rarely give commensurate results unless the terrain is very open (desert or 
bare mountains with low population density). In all other types of terrain, offensive 
operations based on intelligence are best conducted in small units. The author’s 
experience has been that the most successful operations are conducted with the strength 
of a reinforced platoon (40 men) or, depending on the situation, an under-strength 
battalion (200 to 250 men). Co-locating the offensive force with the defensive force, if 
possible or required, helps reduce their administrative and protective requirements and 
provides larger numbers for offensive tasks.  
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When required, larger bodies of offensive elements can be concentrated, 
but as the strength of the offensive element increases so does its footprint. The result is a 
greater application of firepower, a bigger target for the enemy, the need for a larger 
administrative component and the creation of a longer chain of command. These slow 
down their tempo, flexibility and initiative. 
To sum up, in 4GW there is a requirement to have the army organized in 
the following manner: 
• It should have separate offensive and defensive components. These 
components should have the equipment and training appropriate to their tasks. 
• Headquarters should be primarily concerned with the collection of 
information and the creation of intelligence. The conduct of operations should be 
left to the units. This is in line with a principle of management which states that 
the capacity of managers to direct knowledge workers is limited as the workers 
know best how to carry out the task (Kennedy, 2005).  
• There should be a coordinated intelligence component in which all 
intelligence resources of the government, the police and the military are 
integrated. Intelligence staffs must be larger and available at all levels, from 
company upwards, in both offensive and defensive components.  
• Units must have weapons and equipment appropriate to 4GW. 
• There should be military police elements integral from company level 
upwards in the defensive component. They should be trained in policing tasks and 
able to advise others in this role. 
• At all levels interpreters must be incorporated. This is in addition to the 
requirement to have cultural knowledge and functional language skills in all units. 
 
E. EQUIPMENT 
The term “equipment” as used here encompasses weapons, equipment or other 
material means. While the list can be lengthy, the points made below are representative 
and meant to convey the apparently simple or unconventional aspects of equipment 
which need to be addressed for 4GW. There is a saying, “look for the potatoes at the edge 
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of the field.”14 This saying indicates the place to look for the solution to a problem. The 
genesis of this statement is that the largest number of pests and the least amount of 
nutrients and insecticides are located at the edges of a field. To grow hardy strains of 
potatoes, farmers transplant potatoes from the edge of fields in successive crops. The 
rationale of this saying in the context of 4GW is that workable and practical solutions to 
4GW problems come from the experiences of those countries that have to fight 4GW 
with a paucity of resources. 
1. Weapons 
There is a requirement to have weapons that are relevant to the generation of war 
that is being fought. Much to its chagrin the Indian Army found that the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, armed with the ubiquitous AK-47, had a basic 
personal weapon that was superior in terms of volume of fire, robustness and ease of 
carriage, to the individual weapon of the Indian army, the 7.62mm Self Loading Rifle 
(Athale, 2002). While other infantry weapons helped the Indian army hold its own in Sri 
Lanka, the fact was that in difficult terrain and an environment where the average ranges 
of engagement were at close quarters, the semi-automatic Self Loading Rifle or the 9mm 
carbine were not suitable (Subramanian, 2000). To cope with the same shortcoming in 
Kashmir, until such time as the indigenous 5.56mm Indian Small Arms System (INSAS) 
could be introduced, the Indian military purchased 64,000 AK-47’s from Bulgaria (The 
Tribune, Apr. 05, 2004). 4GW does not require heavy artillery or modern battle tanks -- it 
requires weapons that facilitate agility and limit collateral damage. 
2.  Equipment 
a. Vehicles for Protected Mobility 
The U.S. experience in Iraq has illustrated the disadvantages of using a 
lightly armored vehicle such as the Humvee in high-threat areas. However, in 4GW, such 
a vehicle is sometimes needed because certain situations or areas require relatively 
nimble vehicles. The tank, which is the prime weapon for a conventional war, is not 
suitable in most 4GW situations. In any case, as has been experienced by some countries, 
the 4GW fighter can have surprises up his sleeve to engage heavy armor. The Russian 
                                                 
14 Explained by Prof. John Arquilla at the Naval Postgraduate School during his course on Warfare in 
the Information Age. 
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experience in Chechnya showed that in an urban area, a 40-year old weapon like the 
RPG-7, when used in a swarm attack, can wreak havoc. Such problems arise when 
equipment designed for conventional war has to be utilized in the 4GW environment. 
Therefore, there is a requirement for equipment designed for 4GW. An example of the 
type of equipment required is the South African-built Cassiper anti-IED vehicle. 
Designed for the deadly guerrilla war fought in the South African bush before the 
collapse of apartheid, it is built to survive 4GW IEDs. It was inducted in limited quantity 
in Kashmir and found to be useful. 
b. Personal Equipment 
The personal clothing and equipment of soldiers is designed for 
conventional war. Helmets which protect against artillery shrapnel, boots which are 
robust and protective over rough terrain, rucksacks which can carry 70 to 80 pounds of 
load and body harnesses which can hold entrenching tools and loads of ammunition are 
some examples of equipment more suited to conventional war. The troops employed in 
4GW require equipment that is appropriate to 4GW. Examples are shoes that facilitate 
stealthy and swift movement, helmets and body armor that are light and convenient, and 
body harnesses that are suitable for carrying the minimal loads required in 4GW. While 
Special Forces may have such clothing and equipment, they may not be available to the 
rest of the army. Personal equipment needs to be designed with 4GW in mind. 
  c. Security Equipment: Fences 
A proliferation of electronic systems to monitor clandestine entry has its 
limits. Ultimately, the human monitoring the surveillance system has two eyes and a 
single brain to monitor the surveillance devices. The United States local media reports 
that certain towns advise people that they are unable to respond to burglar alarm systems. 
This is because with too many alarms installed and accidentally going off throughout the 
day, the police do not have sufficient resources to respond to them. The same is the case 
in border management. Hostile borders have to be monitored by more than just eyes. 
They need physical barriers. A poem by the famous poet Robert Frost written in 1915 
states, “fences good neighbors make.” Two thousand years after the Great Wall of China 
was erected and sixteen years after the Berlin Wall was torn down, the world is 
rediscovering the utility of fences in the 4GW world. Already there is a rival to the Great 
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Wall of China. The Indian border fence stretches almost 1000 miles along the Indo-
Pakistani border and is the longest illuminated fence in the world. A similar fence is 
being erected on the Bangla Desh border, not to prevent movement of anti-national 
elements per se, but to prevent illegal immigrants. This is akin to the fence along sections 
of the U.S.-Mexican border. India is not alone in this experiment with fences, which is 
the result of looking for solutions in the world of 4GW. Fences or walls exist in Northern 
Ireland, Morocco, Cyprus, Botswana and Israel and their number is increasing. Just as 
walled-in communities are an increasingly visible sign of insecurity in today’s world, 
fencing is a new 4GW protective measure. No obstacle is good until it is under 
observation, hence fences and protected areas such as the “Green Zone” in Baghdad add 
to the requirement of manpower in 4GW. 
d.  Non-Lethal Weapons 
The army requires arming and training with non-lethal weapons. Twelve 
years ago, the author was witness to an army operation against terrorists who were hidden 
in a complex of limestone mine caverns. After repeated attempts to induce them to 
surrender failed, a decision was taken to use force. However, within the confines of the 
caves no weapon was effective. An attempt to literally smoke out the terrorists using 
smoke generators did not produce the desired result. After twelve hours of fruitless siege, 
a tear gas gun was obtained from the nearby police post. Two tear gas shells forced the 
terrorists to surrender within five minutes. Tear gas is still not authorized in the 
equipment tables of the Indian army as it is a police weapon. This incident illustrates the 
viability of non-lethal weapons and the requirement to induct them as weapons for 4GW. 
3.  Equipping the Infantry Soldier for 4GW   
The infantry soldier is at the forefront of 4GW. There is, therefore, a requirement 
to equip the infantry soldier for 4GW. Continuing to regard conventional, big war as the 
army’s primary task means that obtaining the equipment needed to fight 4GW remains 
second priority. The problem stems from a lack of realization as to which is the primary 
task of the army. This enables the Fourth Generation enemy to maintain its ability to 
sustain effective operations. 
In order to make the infantry suitably equipped for 4GW, the following 
equipment is required: 
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• Protected high mobility vehicles, 
• High quality personal protective equipment, 
• IED detection and defusing equipment, 
• Weapons capable of being used by day and night and which minimize 
collateral damage, 
• Surveillance and detection equipment for offensive and defensive 
operations, both during day and night, 
• Non-lethal weapons, as used for riot control, including means to use 
incapacitating agents whether physical or chemical (water cannon, taser, 
tear gas, rubber bullets, etc.), 
• Restraining equipment to hold suspected individuals while operating 
amongst the population. 
 
F. TRAINING  
The thrust of the training in an army indicates the generation of war which forms 
the cornerstone of that country’s doctrine. Ever since the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli 
Wars and the astounding success of the Israelis, the world has picked up ideas about the 
future conduct of war from the Israeli success. For example, Alvin and Heidi Toffler 
posit that the conception of the Airland Battle had learned much from the Israeli success 
in 1973 (1993, p.51). 
The cornerstone of the Israeli success was Third Generation maneuver war. 
Because of that trend, maneuver has been the center point of training from the 1970s 
onwards. In the army, those lacking knowledge about maneuver warfare were relegated 
to the backwaters of the profession. In the world’s major armies, officers who are 
ignorant of concepts such as Auftragstaktik or the Airland Battle cannot expect to rise in 
the profession. This has resulted in a vacuum in knowledge about unconventional warfare 
and low intensity conflict. This vacant space formed a “blind spot,” which has been  
occupied by 4GW. The proponents of Second and Third Generation warfare have been 
targeted by weaker foes whose level of resources did not permit their adaptation of 
maneuver war. 
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As Col. Anthony Wood, USMC (Ret.), stated in an interview with the author, the 
transformed nature of war requires  
a thinking military which recognizes the changes affecting warfare in all 
its forms; one which understands the capabilities and limitations of 
technology; one with an officer corps and senior enlisted corps possessing 
highly educated and trained minds fit for clear thinking and effective 
decisions. 
Understanding 4GW requires educated minds more than anything else. The point was 
previously made that 4GW requires more infantry, but it also requires educated infantry. 
The aim of training the army for 4GW should focus on this requirement. 
The failure to understand the nuances of 4GW, in spite of its prevalence in almost 
all parts of the globe, has led to the apparent frustration of conventional armies in 
combating it. There is a requirement to focus and structure the training of armies towards 
4GW as their primary mission in the conduct of war. This requires the following actions:  
• Basic Training. The basic training and instruction must be aimed at 
preparing the army for 4GW, which translates to unconventional war. This 
training and instruction requires that UW be made the cornerstone of military 
training as long as another paradigm shift away from 4GW does not take place. 
4GW requires stress on aspects such as basic infantry field craft, detection, 
deception and intelligence acquisition, including the generation of intuitive 
intelligence. Training has to stress fluid tactics on an extended and/or urban 
battlefield, widely dispersed forces acting with great initiative, decision support 
and small unit initiative and invention. Training curricula have to stress 
developing these basic infantry skills right from enlistment or entrance into 
officer training programs. Training junior leaders to hone their decision making 
and initiative skills is essential because military engagements in 4GW take place 
largely at battalion level and below. Training to be proficient on the 4GW 
battlefield has to be done with the realization that civilians will be present on the 
4GW battlefield and that retaining their support is vitally important. While 
instinctive reaction is required when subject to an ambush, instinctive action 
should be taken with restraint, consequent to an ambush, to avoid alienating the 
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population. To be ahead in the OODA loop there is a requirement to train the 
army to comprehend what they have to “observe” and to anticipate what they 
have to be aware of in a 4GW environment. For example, there is a requirement 
to dismiss the conventional warfare template, which states that ambushes only 
take place in lonely bends on roads in the jungle. The jungle syndrome 
presupposes that an ambush is never expected on a busy street. This is not 
surprising as the earlier generations of war assiduously avoided inadvertent harm 
to non-combatants, and ambushes invariably took place or were expected away 
from inhabited areas. In 4GW, ambushes can take place anywhere, including 
within a busy marketplace filled with people. Indeed, one can say that the suicide 
bomber is a 4GW ambush. 
• Doctrinal Training. The doctrine of 4GW should be part of the training 
curricula of both officers and enlisted personnel. If the imperatives of training for 
4GW are stressed early in the career of a soldier, he will be that much more 
proficient in the craft of 4GW. Training in police-type, humanitarian and 
administrative operations, as well as offensive operations, is required. They 
highlight the dichotomy in 4GW.  
• Inter-Agency Cooperation Training. 4GW involves extensive inter-
agency operations. Extensive interaction and jointness is required, not only among 
the three services, but more importantly between the army, the police and the 
administration. This requires educating armies about the procedures, techniques 
and methods of operations of the other government agencies. This education is 
required not only at the unit level but also at the level of the staffs that have the 
important tasks of liaison and coordination. 
• Intelligence Training. Troops should be proficient in integrating 
technological aids to intelligence acquisition, utilizing human intelligence. 
Gathering of human intelligence should be given impetus because in 4GW it pays 
greater dividends. Training should include extensive area and cultural 
familiarization, which helps the application of intuitive intelligence.  
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• Technological Training. Training is required in recognizing and utilizing 
those aspects of commercial technology that can be made use of in 4GW, whether 
in adapting 4GW methods or countering them. Training should stress the use of 
technology as a lever to increase efficiency of actions, but to not consider 
technology as the end all, which may lead to the neglect of basic infantry skills 
required in 4GW. The 4GW enemy may be using primitive means to carry out his 
actions. Unless troops are trained to recognize the kinds of primitive means that 
can be used, they will be victims of asymmetry in that they will not be able to 
anticipate enemy actions and will be surprised by the 4GW foe.  
• Training in Consequence Management. Training is required in 
“consequence management,” which is a term used for action to restore function to 
any effected areas of the establishment after an enemy attack (or a natural 
disaster). The most important part of this training focuses on not viewing a 
temporary setback as a permanent defeat, thereby causing loss of morale or 
leading to blindly destructive reaction. Training should stress the long time-span 
of 4GW in comparison to training in conventional war, which ingrains the 
importance of speedy termination of operations.  
• Training in Psychological Warfare. Media management is extremely 
important in 4GW. Armies have to be aware of the impact that media has and the 
correct way to handle media. Psychological warfare in 4GW can be effectively 
utilized only if there is adequate cultural awareness. 
• Cultural Training. 4GW is fought within the population. The support of 
the population is extremely important and can be the basis of victory or defeat. 
Every culture has its own set of rules of behavior. Even within a country different 
communities have different sets of values. Unless these are known, the correct 
way to handle and interact with the population cannot be identified. Cultural  
training is required to understand the networks that operate within a society. 
Knowledge of such networks is required to preempt actions, cut off sources of 
support or locate fugitives. 
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• Language Training. Language training is essential to enable acquisition 
of human intelligence, assimilation of cultural awareness and working with the 
people.  
• Training in Ethics and Laws. Training in ethical considerations and 
discipline to ensure that armies know the limits and standards they should adhere 
to in their interaction and handling of the population. This is essential to ensure 
that the 4GW strategy of attempting to alienate the population from the other side 
by highlighting atrocities, illegality or insensitivity is negated. 
• Police Training. Armies need to take on policing tasks where the local 
police forces have been marginalized. Before the state apparatus gets back on 
track, armies will have to be involved in bringing order within a community, 
resolving disputes, invigorating flagging civic agencies and goading reluctant 
public officials. Police training will also assist in the conduct of other operations 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
[T]he man who sacrifices the possible in search of the impossible is a fool. 
-Carl Von Clausewitz (On War, p.637) 
War as a means to resolve interstate conflict has restrictions and limitations in the 
present globalized world. War anywhere in the world affects the global economy; this 
leads to efforts from the world community to prevent its outbreak, and if war does erupt, 
to terminate it swiftly. The world community aims to prevent war by pressuring the 
nation-state responsible for initiating war through international ostracism, trade sanctions, 
withdrawal of aid and restrictions on the travel of its people. One or more of these means, 
singly or in combination, can exert enough pressure to force a country to refrain from any 
activity that disturbs the world equilibrium. In 1994, even a country as divorced from the 
world economy as Sudan found that it had to evict Osama bin Laden when the United 
States and Saudi Arabia exerted pressure on it to do so. This limitation of modern war 
can be overcome by keeping war at a level of low intensity conflict or below the level of 
regular state--versus--state war. Under these circumstances, those fighting wars have an 
ambiguous identity that is becoming more confusing by the day. Such fighting is done 
more often by paramilitary forces, guerrilla groups, ethnic militias, vigilante squads and 
even criminal gangs and mercenaries than by regular, uniformed soldiers (Renner, 2000). 
The nature of these enemies is even more confusing as it becomes difficult to 
differentiate between terrorists, freedom fighters, militants, insurgents, guerrillas, 
criminals, gangsters, rebels, volunteers and so on. This is evident from the war in Iraq, 
where the terms used by official sources and the media to describe the enemy are 
constantly changing. For example, one news item in the Washington Post newspaper 
referred to the same enemy as “insurgents,” “rebels,” “militants,” and “miscreants” (U.S. 
and Afghan Forces Kill Ten Insurgents, May 22, 2004). Rather than untie the Gordian 
knot of identity, it is easier to state that all these entities are 4GW fighters. 
Since the Second World War, nuclear weapons have proliferated throughout the 
world. This, along with the extreme expense of modern conventional weapons, in 
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combination with globalization, has made conventional war an unviable option. In all the 
major flashpoints in the world, India-Pakistan, United States-North Korea, United States-
Iran, China-Taiwan, Israel-Arabs, China-India and Russia-Chechnya, one of the 
belligerents is either so inferior conventionally or nuclear weapons are available to both 
sides in enough measure as to negate conventional war. However, in all these areas 
countries maintain large conventional armies. They prepare for an impossible war and 
neglect the possible. The words by Clausewitz quoted at the commencement of this 
Chapter indicate that such action is obviously unwise. Clausewitz also said that war 
consists of reciprocal actions of application of force by two belligerents which has no 
limit (1832, p. 77). This is not a sensible option for the weaker side, which knows that 
limitless escalation on the conventional plane will result in defeat. The weaker sides in 
conflicts have learned that through 4GW they can level the playing field. 4GW increases 
the chances of a weaker belligerent attempting to engage in war, albeit in a shadowy and 
ambiguous way. This thesis argues hat the shape of war for the foreseeable future is 




This thesis began by examining some theories about the changing nature of war. 
These theories support the view that both the present and future nature of war is 
Unconventional War. For ease of reference the thesis calls this war “4GW.” There are a 
number of theories attempting to explain the transformation of war; the “Waves” of the 
Tofflers, the “Epochs” of Robert Bunker, the “Ages” of van Creveld the “Eras” of Hanle 
and the “Generations” of Lind. 
All these theories try to explain the same issue; they try to make sense out of the 
transformations in war that have taken place earlier in order to understand the 
transformation that is taking place now. Such transformation is inevitable because there 
have been dramatic changes in society and technology in the past 50 years.  
All theorists, including those who promulgate the “Generation Theory,” attempt 
to explain the new face of war wherein efforts are made to circumvent the strength of the 
opponent. A large content of 4GW is “evolved insurgency” as the theorists of the 
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Generation Theory acknowledge. The generation theorists also acknowledge that the 
generations do not displace each other, but overlap and even coexist. The Generation 
Theory, like the other theories, attempts to open our minds and makes a case for the 
transformation of the military in line with the transformation of war.  
Chapter II examined war and went into detail on the Generation Theory. In brief, 
4GW is a form of warfare whose methods enable a weaker entity to wage war with a 
stronger entity by using their weakness and the strength of the adversary as levers to gain 
advantage. To do this, 4GW uses unconventional strategy and tactics that are very 
different from conventional war. 4GW undermines enemy strengths by circumventing 
them. It attacks the enemy’s moral strength and aims to attrite his will to continue the war 
through the very means that give democracies their strength, viz. openness, easy 
availability of technological means, trade and easy immigration. This is aided by another 
great strength of democracies, the media. The global media make it possible to influence 
audiences all over the world. Therefore, management of the media is of great importance 
in 4GW. 
Chapter III dealt with two issues; the relation between 4GW and terrorism and the 
moral and ethical issues of 4GW. Because the 4GW foe uses terrorism as a means of war, 
4GW and terrorism tend to get mixed-up. This Chapter described the manner in which 
the advent of 4GW has brought some legitimacy to terrorist methods in that many 
theorists find them acceptable in 4GW. Therefore, it would be prudent to accept and 
recognize terrorism as a strategy and tactic within a new way of war. Criticism about the 
moral degradation inherent in terrorism does not deter those who use it. This is because 
of terrorism’s obvious value. Just as doctrine has to be developed to fight wars of 
maneuver, so must it be developed to cope with terrorism in 4GW. Because of its 
favorable cost/benefit ratio, terrorism will be inherent in 4GW. Though a military action 
to the extent that it is involves violence, the impact of terrorism is political, social and 
economic rather than military. It can result in political decisions as in the impact of the 
Madrid bombings on the Spanish elections in 2004, social fissures as created by ethnic 
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and in Kashmir and economic slowdown such as 
caused by the terrorization of truckers or construction workers in Iraq.  
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Chapter IV dealt with the effect of 4GW on the Principles of War. The Chapter 
examined whether the Principles of War as subscribed to by the U.S. Army need 
modification in light of the new way of war. The conclusion was that though 4GW 
represents a sea of change in the way war has hitherto been conducted, the underlying 
Principles of War remain the same. It is essential to reinterpret the essence of these 
principles in light of 4GW. The increasing recourse to 4GW does not mean that there is 
no likelihood of Second or Third Generation wars. Such wars may still take place. 
Broadening the scope of the Principles of War can help ensure that capabilities to fight 
conventional war are not lost while the adroitness and competence to fight 4GW is 
refined. The Chapter concluded that there is a requirement to not have separate principles 
for what is called MOOTW. Such differentiation creates the impression that 4GW is not 
war. There is a need to include Perseverance, Knowledge, Moral Force, and 
Administration as principles of war. These have existed in some form within the 
commonly accepted nine Principles of War. However, these aspects require greater focus 
in 4GW. Therefore, they need to be considered as separate principles.  
Chapter V examined the manner in which Special Forces are more suited to 
operate in the 4GW environment. The Chapter also looked at why the mainstream army 
is not as effective in the same environment. The Chapter identified the strengths and 
weaknesses of both forms of the army and concluded that the Special Forces are more 
suited to conduct 4GW than the mainstream army. This led to the view that increasing the 
size and utilization of Special Forces is the answer to the problems that states face in 
4GW. 
However, increasing the size of the SOF is apparently not easy. It takes time and 
requires specialized manpower resources. Chapter VI examined the problems inherent in 
expanding an organization without diluting its qualities. The Chapter used economic and 
organization theories to support a conclusion that even countries with large armed forces 
cannot maintain “true” Special Forces without diluting their character. The Chapter 
concluded that an adhocracy structure is the best structure to ensure the effectiveness of 
Special Forces but such structures have limits of size. The Chapter concluded that it 
would be both more effective and more feasible to train armies to engage in some of the 
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tactics, techniques and procedures of SOF. This would enhance their effectiveness 
without having to increase the size of the SF. 
The conclusion of Chapter VI was that it is better to transform armies into a light 
infantry forces with SF like unconventional warfare capabilities for 4GW. This requires a 
transformation in the doctrine, organization, equipment and training concepts of armies to 
make them appropriate for 4GW. Chapter VII suggested the means and aspects that need 
to be incorporated to make armies suitable for 4GW. This transformation should make 
unconventional war the primary way to wage war for armies. A conventional big war 
would be a secondary way to wage a war.  
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Change generates resistance, and so will the statement of this thesis, that the 
shape of the future is infantry-based armies whose primary role is in unconventional 
warfare. This is understandable as the primary unconscious and romanticized picture of a 
modern army is tanks, artillery and missiles, just as the primary picture of an air force is 
jet fighters rather than transport aircraft. Modernization has ingrained an image that 
negates infantry-heavy armies. Force projection is a more enduring image of the military, 
regardless of the fact that all nations stress that their military is only for defense. Force 
projection recalls mechanized armies sweeping away all resistance in their path. This 
image is rooted in use of firepower, especially that which is based on tanks and airpower. 
There is no place in this image for slow moving infantry, which is the image of the First 
Generation of war. The fact is that 4GW seeks to negate the effectiveness of traditional 
means of force projection by creating conditions of asymmetry. This symmetry-
asymmetry paradox is illustrated in Appendix B. 
This thesis was motivated by the author’s view that large conventional armies 
need to adapt to 4GW as their primary mission. The basis for defining the paradigm for 
change was the manner in which the U.S. and the Indian armies are structured and 
operate. There are a number of differences between these two armies because of their 
historical background, the economies supporting them and their geopolitical interests. 
However, they do have some commonalities. These commonalities render the 
recommendations presented in this thesis applicable to both armies in varying degrees. 
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Their commonalities are the following: 
• As military organizations in democracies, both armies operate under the 
same constraints of civilian control, 
• They are subject to the same dynamics as any large organization. These 
include bureaucratic friction, career competition and personnel problems,  
• For a long time their armies have been stressed by involvement in 4GW. 
The recommendations can be framed more in conceptual terms than concrete 
terms because of the wide scope of this thesis. The following recommendations are made 
for defining the paradigm for change in light of 4GW: 
1. A Return to Manpower-Based Armies 
The reference to the paucity of “boots on the ground” is often heard in advocating 
solutions to the 4GW in Iraq in which the U.S. is involved. This thesis highlighted the 
importance of the presence of soldiers among the population to reduce the freedom of 
action of the 4GW foe as well as instill a sense of security in the people. The link 
between the people and the government cannot be maintained in an unsecured 
environment without the physical presence of the armed forces of the government. It is 
immaterial whose “boots” they are, as long as their accountability and allegiance is to the 
government. The boots could be of the army, paramilitary forces, police, private security 
agencies or armies of allies. The last is a viable option only when operating in another 
country. Where countries are involved in 4GW within their own geographical limits, 
allies can be counterproductive as they dilute the legitimacy of the government. However, 
it is important what sort of “boots” they are. This implies that the people in those boots 
must be educated and trained for 4GW.  
It is commonly accepted that decreases in size through induction of high 
technology enables reduction in manpower with similar or increased efficiency. The 
Revolution in Military Affairs, Transformation or the Future Combat Systems (FCS) all 
aim to improve performance in terms of precision fires and flexibility of employment 
with a backdrop of achieving economies of manpower (CBO, 2005, p. 16). This is good 
as long as the potential wars are of the Third or earlier generations. However, for 4GW, 
the payoff with increased technology and decreased strength will increase the problems in 
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successful conflict termination because 4GW needs manpower to interact with people as 
much as it requires improvements in technology. An initiative such as FCS will decrease 
the personnel in combat units by one-third (p. 37). This decrease is offset by enhanced 
firepower. If the 4GW presents no targets other than those which can be engaged by 
small arms, the increase in precision firepower will not convey any advantages. This 
thesis recommends that in 4GW the size of armies in terms of manpower must be 
maintained at a high level: high in terms of numbers and high in terms of quality. High 
numbers indicate that the manpower should be sufficient to dominate the area of 
operations by physical presence rather than firepower. Size is related to geographical 
considerations, terrain conditions and the size of the population. The larger the 
geographical area, the more difficult the terrain for mechanized movement and direct 
observation: the larger the population size, the greater the requirement in terms of 
manpower. In the world of 4GW, numbers matter.  
2. An Infantry-Centric Army 
In all the 4GWs that have been or are being fought, the infantry has had to bear 
the maximum responsibility and suffer the most casualties.15 Infantry is the most 
maneuverable and the most mobile of all arms. It can operate in any terrain or weather. 
The infantry is the arm that can operate in conditions that give it an intimate feel of 
ground realities. This gives infantry the ability to close in and engage the 4GW enemy in 
a condition of symmetry. This ability also enables the infantry to interact best with the 
population. Within its integral capability, the infantry can carry out stability and support 
operations and offensive and defensive operations with equal competence. 4GW requires 
a light infantry predominant army. “Heavy” infantry capable of beating tank attacks is 
suitable for the conventional battlefield, not for 4GW.  
 Additional civil affairs and intelligence capabilities can greatly increase the 
infantry’s effectiveness. Technology must enhance the nimbleness of infantry in 4GW, 
                                                 
15 The list for awards given by the Indian Army in 2005 is representative of the infantry-centric nature 
of 4GW. Of the 100 awards, 87 have been awarded to infantrymen (26 posthumously). Ten were awarded 
to other army personnel, including one posthumously, and all ten were serving in infantry units involved in 
4GW. The remaining three were awarded to an Army aviator, an Indian Air Force pilot and a soldier from a 
paramilitary organization. List of Personnel Recommended Gallantry Awards on Republic Day 2005. 
Retrieved May 15, 2005, from http://indianarmy.nic.in/rd2005/gallantryawards_05.htm 
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not make it dependent on static assets that reduce its great maneuverability. A stress on 
infantry and its modernization should be countered by a balanced reduction of the 
“heavy” forces. 
3. Keeping Special Forces “Special” 
The thesis recommends that Special Forces need to be kept “special” by not 
permitting them to be expanded indiscriminately. The Special Forces must have very 
high standards of quality of manpower, equipment and training. There is a finite capacity 
for a society to organize and maintain high-quality Special Forces. Uncontrolled 
expansion of Special Forces will dilute their effectiveness; the result will be Special 
Forces which are not as competent in carrying out special tasks. The requirement for 
lower spectrum Special Forces skills can be achieved by training the infantry in the ways 
of Special Forces. 
4. Principles of War 
The thesis recommends reinterpreting the essence of the Principles of War in light 
of 4GW. Existing Principles of War need to be applied while keeping in view the reality 
of 4GW. Where inevitable, the scope of the Principles of War can be enhanced by 
separating essential aspects that exist within present principles and giving them the status 
of separate principles. The thesis recommends that Perseverance, Knowledge, Moral 
Force, and Administration be included as Principles of War to supplement the nine 
existing principles in the U.S. Army. This will ensure that capabilities for fighting 
conventional war are not lost while the focus, adroitness and competence to fight 4GW 
are strengthened.  
5. Knowledge Based Operations 
The inclusion of knowledge as a Principle of War indicates the importance of 
intelligence in 4GW. Conventional war with clear frontlines is unambiguous about who 
the enemy is and where is he generally located. In 4GW, the biggest challenge is to 
identify and find the enemy. This strength of the 4GW foe can only be overcome by 
excellent intelligence. Intelligence organizations need to be made more appropriate to 
4GW. They have to interact with the civil intelligence agencies to an extent that is not as 
important in conventional war. The starting point for improving intelligence acquisition 
needs to be a change in a salient aspect of the previous generations -- the primacy of 
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“operations” as a career field. The overriding importance of operations results in the best 
manpower and equipment resources being allocated to operations. The best manner to 
improve intelligence acquisition is to provide it with the best equipment and the best 
manpower. This will require changes in personnel policies that favor performance in the 
intelligence field. While is it easy to say that HUMINT must be improved, it can only be 
improved if the intelligence organization in an army has the best and the brightest people. 
Knowledge based operations include cultural and linguistic knowledge. This is important 
for operations outside the home country and also within large countries where there are 
ethnic diversities and varied languages. 
6. A Doctrine Supporting Unconventional War 
The thesis recommends that the doctrine for the army must begin with the fact 
that 4GW is its primary responsibility. The nature of 4GW requires transforming the 
army into an infantry force with Special Forces like unconventional warfare capabilities. 
This requires a transformation not only in the doctrine of the army but also in its 
organization, equipment and training. The doctrine has to de-emphasize large operations 
and stress on firepower. It has to focus on intelligence, contact with and knowledge of the 
population and technology to improve grassroots functioning rather than facilitate 
delivery of heavy firepower. Stress on urban warfare should bring in the consideration of 
built up areas as “terrain.” 
 Unconventional warfare is not something that should be learned after having 
learned the art of conventional war. Rather, unconventional war must be the focus of 
training, with conventional war being taught as a specialty that may be required. It is only 
with this metamorphosis that conventional armies can be structured to fight 
unconventionally in the 4GW environment. In the generation of 4GW, the hitherto 
unconventional must become the conventional.  
 7. Organization Changes for a Practical Transformation 
Transformation should be relevant to the nature of 4GW being faced. It must 
begin with a clear understanding of the new battlefield imperatives and their implications. 
Change should not start with the application of technology, it should end with it. 
Organizational changes are not only about the shape and size of organizations but must 
include other areas such as personnel management. A stumbling block to retaining the 
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best talent in the Special Forces is the career development and promotion pattern of the 
conventional army, which insists on a particular career progression to reach high ranks. 
This dissuades unconventional soldiers from pursuing careers within Special Forces. 
Personnel policies should also permit the best manpower to be retained in the army. An 
army that requires lower-ranked officers and men to exercise greater initiative and 
assume greater responsibility must ensure that those personnel have adequate training and 
expertise. 
8. Approach to Terrorism  
Terrorism is viewed as an evil but inevitable adjunct to 4GW. To this extent, the 
training of armies must include measures to deal with and withstand terrorism. Since 
terrorism targets the population, the public must be educated about how to cope with 
terrorist incidents. For the same reason, the media must be responsible in that their 
actions should be balanced to not encourage terror incidents. Fatalism is a negative 
quality. However, response to terrorism must be tempered with fatalism. Terrorist acts 
abound in 4GW. To go on a crusade after every terrorist attack is a reflex. In 4GW, 
restraint is required because the Fourth Generation enemy gains by such reactions; 
indeed, it is his endeavor to initiate “knee-jerk” responses. 
9. The Ethics of War Require Conforming to the Times 
4GW requires that the ethics of war be re-examined by the international 
community to enable them to fight a war which uses terrorism as a tactic and which blurs 
the distinction between civil and military. Adhering to ethics framed during the time of 
First Generation War creates hindrances in the prosecution of 4GW. This is all the more 
relevant when one side in 4GW is creating asymmetry by having a different set of ethics 
to prosecute the war. 
10. The Media 
The army must institute measures to ensure that its officers and men know and 
understand the assistance that the media can render in the conduct of 4GW. At the same 
time, the media has to be educated about the conditions under which 4GW is fought and 
the areas where the media has to show responsibility in whetting any news that might 
retard or damage the efforts of the army. 
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C.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
4GW is fought to a greater extent by the army than the other branches of the 
military. The other branches serve in a support role. The reason for this is obvious: 
recourse to 4GW takes place when one side is far weaker in conventional determinants of 
strength, such as air or naval forces. The non-state character in any case virtually rules 
out use of conventional air or ground forces by one of the sides. Perforce, this thesis has 
been army centric.  
4GW, the shape of future war, has arrived. This shape manifests in 
unconventional war. This thesis argues that while taking advantage of technology that 
enhances effectiveness and saves manpower, one must keep in mind that 4GW requires 
greater manpower. 4GW also requires that low technology fighting skills be refined 
because the doctrine of 4GW is centered on circumventing the advantages of 
technologically superior enemies. 
 This thesis argues that the ideal means to fight in the milieu of 4GW are 
organizations that can fight unconventionally, such as SOF. However, the constraints of 
expanding SOF mean that the task of fighting 4GWs will devolve on the next most 
suitable means, which is infantry. Infantry in 4GW must not be organized as conventional 
heavy infantry, dependent on heavy firepower; it should be light infantry capable of 
operating with integral weapons and equipment. 
With the growth in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons, 
restrictions on conventional wars will increase. As states are restricted in their actions by 
the world community, if they wish to degrade another state, their actions are more 
conveniently done in the non-state and transnational arena. This is done through non-state 
para-military, terrorist and criminal elements that in turn become semi-independent and 
draft their own scripts and redefine the use of force and violence. When we hear labels 
such as “terrorist” and “thug” we often picture some sort of sub-species. However, this 
subspecies is clever, inventive and committed, and often willing to die individually or 
collectively for his or her cause. Defeating them demands understanding their motives 
and values, respect for their courage and sober appraisal of their abilities. This requires a 
military which considers delving into this murky realm part of its job and not an unsavory 
business created by inefficient politics which only politicians should handle. The reality 
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is that if bad politics or other internal causes, lead to a 4GW for a country and the country 
then wants out of the problem, it cannot expect someone else to come and take care of the 
problem. That country will have to pull its own chestnuts from the fire and it will need its 
own army, the ultimate guarantor of security, to do it. 
This thesis raises the question of whether we should continue planning and 
preparing for a war that will never take place, or should we prepare for a war that has 
been with us for decades now and is likely to remain. Making a change creates 
apprehensions that the change may usher in even greater difficulties than it solves. It is 
easier to deal with existing difficulties than to contemplate the unknown. Evolution can 
occur only by stepping out to try something different. 4GW has been evolved by the 
weaker entities because of compulsion. The stronger must evolve means to tackle 4GW 
with the confidence of familiarity, rather than with the apprehension of the unknown. 
This thesis has been written by an author who was born into an Army steeped in 
the Second Generation and whose professional education idolized Third Generation War. 
However, in his 28 years in the army he has seen that when it came to applying his 
accumulated conventional knowledge to actual combat situations, the conventional 
knowledge did not help because the situations had more of a 4GW character. This thesis 
has been a result of a desire to identify the correct course of action to resolve this 
dilemma, which manifests itself increasingly all over the world. Because of the strong 
foundation all armies have in conventional war, a radical departure from conventional 
war becomes an anathema. This may be evident in the thesis where certain suggested 
courses of action to transform the army for 4GW ultimately produce suggestions that 
appear shackled by the chains of conventionality. 
It is the belief of the author that if the ethos of armies is not directed towards 
unconventionality, they will not be able to adapt themselves to 4GW.  
Sir B.H. Liddel Hart’s theory of the Indirect Approach had been the basis of Third 
Generation War. The theory of the unconventional approach thrust onto us by “evolved 






             (Refers to Chapter IV, Para. A) 
 
Comparison of the Principles of War 
(in order of priority) 
 
PRINCIPLES OF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sun Tzu, 4th 
Century B.C.16 
Objective Offensive Surprise Concentration Mobility Coordination     
Vegetius16 Mobility Security Surprise Offensive       
Napoleon 182216 Objective Offensive Mass Movement Surprise Security     
Clausewitz 183216 Objective Offensive Concentration Economy of Force Mobility Surprise     
Jomini 183616 Objective Movement Concentration Offensive Diversion      
Fuller 191216 Objective Mass Offensive Security Surprise Movement      
British Army 
192017 
Objective Offensive Surprise Concentration Economy of Force Security Mobility Cooperation   
U.S. War Dep’t 
192116 Objective Offensive Mass 
Economy of 
Force Movement Surprise Security Simplicity Cooperation  
Fuller 192516 Direction Offensive Surprise Concentration Distribution Security Mobility Endurance Determination  
Liddell Hart16 Objective Movement Surprise        
CGSC 193616 Offensive Concentration Economy of Force Mobility Surprise Security     
Mao 193816 Political Objective Mobility Offensive Defensive Concentration Surprise     




Surprise Security    
                                                 
16 From Whaley (2003). 
17 Alger (1982). 
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PRINCIPLES OF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Giap16 Political Objective Speed Surprise Morale Security Cooperation     
U.S. Army  




Command Security Surprise Simplicity  
Montgomery 196816 Surprise Concentration Cooperation Control Simplicity Speed Initiative    









Security Surprise Simplicity  
British Army 
(Montogomery 












of Morale Security Administration 
Israeli Army18 Objective Initiative and Offensive Concentration 
Economy of 













of Morale Security Administration 




Force Initiative Coordination      
China19 Aim Morale 
Offensive 






Coordination   
Principles of 
MOOTW20 
Objective Unity of Effort Security Restraint Perseverance Legitimacy     
 
 
                                                 
18 FM-100-5 (2001). 
19 From U.S. Joint Staff Officer’s Guide (Washington: DoD, 1997)  
20 JP 3-07 1995 
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APPENDIX B 
(Refers to Chapter VIII, Para. B) 
 
THE SYMMETRY - ASYMMETRY PARADOX 
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• A and B are two symmetrical antagonistic entities that both follow the 
conventional method of war. While they look alike (square with identical 
dimensions), the structure of A is stronger (educated population, better 
technology, better economy, more stable). In a contest where each exerts force 
on the other, A will successfully push itself inside B (signifying defeat of B). 
• B adapts unconventional war. Its basic shape changes though its diameter 
remains equal to the side of the square. A cannot now force itself into B (square 
peg in a round hole), whereas B can force itself inside A. With asymmetry in 
shape, the one who has changed its shape has an advantage. 
• A also adapts unconventional war. There is again symmetry. A’s initial 
advantage of a stronger structure again manifests itself. A can again force itself 
inside B and win. 
• If B reverts to its original shape (square) it still does not help. 
• The conclusion is that in a war between mismatched opponents, one weaker, 
one stronger, the weaker entity will benefit by introducing asymmetry, while the 
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